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PROFITS AND THEIR RECOVERY
GRAHAM DOUTHWAITEt
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION

Establishing Equitable Jurisdiction

1. Definition: Profits as Inclusive of Non-Monetary Benefits,
but Not of Plaintiff's Lost Profits

T HE WORD

"profits" can mean any kind of advantage. In its narrowest sense it means excess of returns over expenditure in a given
transaction or series of transactions. For purposes of this discussion
it is defined as the value of any advantage, including savings to the
defendant, recoverable by a plaintiff without any necessary relation
to his proven damage.' Gains which an injured person might have
made but for the defendant's conduct are considered as damages, not
as profits.2 Though plaintiff's lost profits do not thus fall within
the scope of this work, it is worth noting that when these are sought,
defendant's profits are relevant as probative of plaintiff's damage.
Moreover, when plaintiff's lost profits are sought as damages, there
is precedent for the use of an arbitrary ten percent of defendant's
gross gains as the presumed profit plaintiff would have made.' It is,
of course, where a defendant has reaped gains far in excess of the
plaintiff's lost profits or other proven damage that the doctrines here
explored assume their fullest importance.
t Professor of Law, University of Santa Clara School of Law. B.A., Witwatersrand, South Africa, 1934; LL.B., 1936; B.C.L., Oxford University, 1940.
1. For examples of recoveries which would be profits rather than mere compensatory damages, see Spirt v. Bechtel, 232 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1956) (special transportation privileges accorded to corporate officers without proper authority) ; Matarese
v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946) (reasonable value of idea
and services whereby defendant saved expenses) ; Liggett v. Lester, 237 Ore. 52,
390 P.2d 351 (1964) (savings to defendant); Pederson v. Johnson, 169 Wis. 320,
172 N.W. 723 (1919) (liquidated damages forfeited by a defaulting vendee of land
in terms of a stipulation inserted by vendor's agent without authority and retained
by agent).
2. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 243 F. Supp. 500,
516 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), stating that in patent nomenclature what the defendant makes
is "profits" while what the owner of the patent loses by the infringement is "damages."
3. See Lundberg v. Welles, 93 F. Supp. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (copyright infringement) ; Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. East Bay Union of Machinists,
227 Cal. App. 2d 677, 39 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1964); Eastman Kodak Stores, Inc. v.
Summers, 377 S.W.2d 476 (Mo. 1964) (breach of contract).
4. See Western Electro-Plating Co. v. Henness, 196 Cal. App. 2d 564, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 691 (1961).
5. In Carter Products, Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 214 F. Supp. 383 (D. Md.
1963), on an award totaling $5,500,000, $2,750,000 was for profits on general sales
made by the defendant. The dollar amount of the recovery in an accounting for profits
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School(346)
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2. Profit Recovery Outside the Common Law
In our common law jurisprudence, profits, 'as such, are recoverable
on the basis of a constructive trust in a suit brought in equity. At
times, as will be seen, the same result has been reached in a suit at law
on the basis of a quasi contract. The former approach is alien to the
civil law. The latter is not. Quasi contract has its roots in the Roman
maxim announcing the golden doctrine of unjust enrichment and is
very much a part of the civil law. 8 In the field of quasi contract, however, the element of impoverishment of the plain-tiff, though it often
takes an attenuated form, is usually regarded as a pre-requisite to recovery. 7 To the extent that the modem civil lawyers ignore or gloss
over this requirement, and to this extent only, defendant's profits can
be said to be recoverable.
In this area of quasi contract, though there are substantial differences in the way in which, and the situations to which, the doctrine of
unjust enrichment is applied, one can discern a general parallel approach in the common law and in the civil law systems. In the later
Roman law there does not appear to have been any broad sweeping recognition of the doctrine of unjust enrichment as founding a cause of
action. Much like quasi contract in the common law, the situation had
to be fitted into an accepted pigeon-hole of liability, for example, the
condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam (to recover money paid in
pursuance of an illegal or immoral agreement), the condictio causa data
causa non secuta (for recovery when there 'has been a failure of consideration), the condictio indebiti (for recovery of money paid under
mistake), and the like. The framers of the Code Napoleon seem to
have had the same approach, and it was more due to the work of legal
writers (particularly Pothier) that the notion evolved that there was
a more sweeping basic underlying principle. 8 A significant parallel
can be seen in the growing recognition in the civil law countries of this
under the unjust enrichment rationale has no relation to the damages, if any, sustained
by plaintiff. Maier Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117 (9th

Cir. 1968).
6. The Roman Law of Justinian, in addition to recognizing obligations quasi ex
contractu, recognized those quasi ex delicto. This latter class, however, did not as the
rubric might suggest, bear any relation to unjust enrichment. It was introduced to
cover certain new delicts introduced by praetorian laws for which the accepted pattern
had no category, embracing, incidentally, actions for negligence.
7. See p. 350 infra.
8. Observations as to the impact of the doctrine in relation to remedial gaps in
the civil codes of France, Germany, and Italy, are to be found in O'Connel, Unjust
Enrichment, 5 Am. J. CoMp. L. 2 (1956). The author discerns a parallel between the
nineteenth century tendency of English lawyers to confine unjust enrichment within
the strait-jacket of quasi contract, and the inclination of their colleagues in France
to confine it to those situations for which the Code made specific provision. The
codes of Germany and Switzerland, on the other hand, do contain recognition of the
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
doctrine in terms of general applicability.
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doctrine of unjust enrichment as an all-pervasive flexible weapon of
justice and the evolution in the common law of a general recognition
of the potential of quasi contract as a means of securing restitution of
unjustified benefits conferred. But, at any rate, on this side of the
Atlantic, the real growing point of the restitutionary principle has not
been in the doctrine of quasi contract. For the most part9 American
lawyers seem content, in regard to that oft despised spurious appendage
to the law of contract, to take 'he view of an English law lord ° that
the growth has stopped. Equity thus ,has taken to pre-empting the field.
But let it not be imagined that even the civil lawyers have let the
doctrine of unjust enrichment run to seed. This, as an English legal
historian observes, would be to substitute chaos for law." Professor
Nicholas, a student of the Roman law, has recognized that an unregulated discretion in the judiciary is ultimately the negation of law.
He emphasizes that no civil law system remedies every unjust displacement of wealth from one to another but considers that the civil
law pattern is unitary by contrast with the "complex and fragmentary
character" of the common law of quasi contract. He summarises the
requisites of the enrichment action at civil law under five heads: (i) enrichment, (ii) impoverishment of plaintiff, (iii) a connection between
the enrichment and the impoverishment, (iv) absence of justification
or cause and (v) ",subsidiary" character of the remedy. If the second
element, impoverishment of plaintiff, were rigidly required, defendant's profits as such would never be recoverable. Some courts, notably
the French, do not take this requirement literally. Failure to acquire
an asset or the loss of a chance of remunerative activity is regarded
as sufficient impoverishment to support the action of unjust enrich2
men.t.'
9. For a discussion of quasi contractual liability, see p. 350 infra.
10. "Our law did advance in certain respects some ways towards recognizing a
doctrine of unjust enrichment, but the process was stopped short, leaving certain
anomalies based on ancient authority embedded in the law." In re Cleadon, Ltd. [1939]

Ch. 287, 307.
11.

See Holdsworth, Unjustifiable Enrichment, 55 L.Q. Rlv. 37 (1939), who is

eloquently persuasive as to the undesirability of adopting any broad theory of unjust
enrichment as a single basis of relief, since this would leave everything to the judge's
own personal concept of justice. Roman and English law became great, he says,
because they resisted the temptation to "escape from the strait-jacket of a legal
formula" and to "relax rules of written law whenever they stood in the way of an
ideally perfect decision on the facts."
12. Nickolas, Unjustified Enrichment in the Civil Law and Louisiana Law (pts.
1-2), 36 TUL. L. Rlv. 605 (1962) ; 37 TUL. L. Rev. 49 (1963). The liability, to the
extent of his unjustified enrichment, of one who has benefited by unsolicited intermeddling in the affairs of another (a doctrine deriving from the Roman negotiorum
gestio, but ordinarily alien to our law) in civil law countries is discussed in Lorenzen,
The Negotiorium Gestio in Roman and Modern Civil Law, 13 CORNZLL L.Q. 190
(1928). Such an intermeddler might well be made to account in our law as a guardian,
trustee, or executor de son tort; if he is not such, whether his profits can be reached
depends on whether there is any general theory of accountability for tortious misPublished by Villanova
University
Charles Widger
appropriation
of another's
values.School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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In short, then, the civil law systems permit recovery of profit insofar, and only insofar as, they have been able to fit the fact situation
into one in which established doctrines permit the application of the
action for unjust enrichment. Loss to the plaintiff, or diminution of
his estate - a factor which can be ignored in our equitable suit for
profits - is a proof requirement that trammels the application of the
remedy just as it has trammeled, and perhaps still trammels" the application of the quasi contractual remedy in our courts.
The Louisiana Code provides that he who receives what is not due
to him, whether he receives it through error or knowingly, obliges himself to restore it to him from whom he unduly received it.' 4 This article can not be invoked to recover profits of 'a fiduciary or profits derived
from a tortious misappropriation of another's property. And indeed,
were it not for the equitable remedies of the construotive trust and the
equitable lien, alien to the civil 'law, and were it not for the doctrine of
constructive fraud, Louisiana lawyers who would try to keep faith with
the civil law would have a hard time finding a remedy against disloyal
fiduciaries. Those who do not avail themselves of the above-mentioned
doctrines have merely trespassed on the terminology of our trust jurisprudence.' 5 More generally however, the liability is predicated on a
highly liberal construction of the Code definition of fraud, construing
it to embrace non-disclosure when a duty to disclose can very readily
'be assented.' 0 Though this approach seems to rule out recovery of profits as such, as distinguished from plaintiff's damages, it is 'hard to envisage the courts of that State, surrounded by neighboring precedent
awarding profits as such, plowing a lone furrow with the 'blinkers firmly
concealing the high-powered mechanized instruments of their sister
states. Thus, another formula they use is to 'hold the defendant as
7
owing fiduciary obligations as a usufructuary.
13. See p. 350 infra.
14. LA. CIv. CoDp art. 2301 (1870).
15. See Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263 F.2d 748 (5th Cir.
1959) (Louisiana's limited equity jurisprudence will not prevent the imposition of a
constructive trust or equitable lien on a disloyal corporate fiduciary); In re Pan
American Life Ins. Co., 88 So. 2d 410 (La. 1956) (a trust relationship existed
between pledgor and pledgee) ; Sentell v. Richardson, 211 La. 288, 305, 29 So. 2d 852,
857 (1947) (a disloyal agent holds "merely as trustee for the account of his principal") ; Haynesville Oil Co. v. Beach, 159 La. 615, 105 So. 790 (1925) (a selfdealing agent was guilty of a breach of trust, and the title which he thereby acquired
to a drilling rig inured to the benefit of his principal). For an example of the employment of a civil law doctrine which enables an owner to recover his goods in
changed form from a thief, to achieve substantially the result attained by tracing
in equity, see Succession of Onorato, 219 La. 1, 51 So. 2d 804 (1951).
16. See Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 268 F.2d 317 (5th
Cir. 1959).
17. See Succession of Heckert, 160 So. 2d 375 (La. 1964).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
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3. PresentingGrounds for Equitable Relief
Although it may be possible to present a case for the recovery of
a defendant's profits on a theory of quasi contract, the decree that defendant account for his profits is essentially a form of equitable relief.'"
Hence facts must be averred and established which will support the
jurisdiction of equity in the cause. This remains the case even where
law and equity have been merged for procedural purposes. The fact
that the complaint need merely set forth the facts constituting the cause
of action and a demand for the relief to which the plaintiff supposes
himself to be entitled does not mean that plaintiff can get equitable relief where a separate court of chancery would not have accorded him
such relief. The codes have not changed the substantive rules of
equity.' 9
When a case is made for relief such as an injunction,2" specific
performance, 2' or reformation or cancelation of an instrument,2 2 no
problem is presented. Equity has jurisdiction because of the inadequacy
of the remedy at law and the court has supplementary jurisdiction to
decree that the defendant account for his profits.2 3 When, on the other
hand, the situation does not call for any such equitable relief, it must
be shown that a bill for an accounting in equity will lie. The ,traditional
grounds on which jurisdiction to decree an accounting in equity is
based are the existence of a fiduciary relation between the parties, a
18. See Lapsley v. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, 246 F.
Supp. 389 (D.D.C. 1965) (where the action is for damages for common law copyright infringement, plaintiff cannot recover by merely showing defendant's profits);
Lehman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 456 (1932) (when equity
has acquired jurisdiction of a suit for infringement it will award, as an equivalent
of or substitute for damages, compensation measured by the rule applied to trustees,
thus allowing defendant's profits as a measure of compensation. See also Fuller
Products Co. v. Fuller Brush Co., 299 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1962).
19. See Bradley v. United States, 214 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1954).
20. Compare St. James Church v. Supreme Court, 135 Cal. App. 2d 352, 287
P.2d 387 (1955), which held that when the complaint is for an ascertainable sum, no
case for an accounting in equity is stated, yet, if an injunction is also properly sought,
equity has exclusive jurisdiction with Allen v. Illinois Mineral Co., 299 Ill. App. 537,
20 N.E.2d 898 (1939), where, notwithstanding that injunctive relief was sought, the
court held it had no jurisdiction for an accounting of minerals taken from land. The
mere fact that a number of items were involved did not of itself present a case of complexity of account. The latter case is clearly against history and the weight of authority.
21. See generally Kidd v. Kidd, 61 Cal. 2d 479, 39 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1964) ; Indianhead Truck Line, Inc. v. Hvidsten Transport, Inc., 268 Minn. 176, 128 N.W.2d 334
(1964) ; Four-G Corp. v. Ruta, 56 N.J. Super. 52, 151 A.2d 546 (1959) ; Abdulla v.
Matasy, 89 Ohio L. Abs. 221, 185 N.E.2d 313 (1961).
22. See National Presto Industries, Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99 (Ct. Cl.
1964) (reformation); Sebree v. Rosen, 374 S.W.2d 132 (Mo. 1964) (cancellation).
23. See Lehman v. Krentler-Arnold Hinge Last Co., 284 U.S. 448 (1932);
Sottile v. Mershon, 166 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1964) ; Shaw v. Owen Gin Co., 229 Miss. 126,
90 So. 2d 179 (1956); Favero v. Wynacht, 140 Mont. 358, 371 P.2d 858 (1962);
In re Sanitary & Improvement Dist., 177 Neb. 15, 128 N.W.2d 121 (1964); Rhode
Ifland Dairy Quee'n, Inc. v. Burke, 95 R.I. 339, 187 A.2d 521 (1963).
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complexity of the accounting situation and a need for discovery to
24
determine the amount due.

As to the first of these, it should be remembered that for this purpose the fiduciary concept today extends to all situations where a confidence has been reposed and abused, 'and is not restricted to true fiduciaries. 25 As to the second, the very fact that the amount of defendant's
profits is not known can be argued to present a complexity of the
accounting situation. 26 And, as to the third, modern discovery procedures have all but negated its practical significance today.
Where there is no equitable jurisdiction to which a decree to account can be appended as incidental relief; no statute, -as in the trademark and copyright infringement situations, authorizing a recovery
of defendant's profits; and no complexity of the accounting situation
24. Kalberloh v. Stewart, 378 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. 1964). As to the historical
origins of the bill for accounting in equity, see Belsheim, The Old Action of Account,
45 HARV. L. Rzv. 466 (1932) ; Langdell, A Brief Survey of Equity Jurisdiction (pts.
1-2), 2 HARV. L. Rzv. 241 (1889); 3 HARV. L. Rlv. 237 (1890); Lile, Bills for
Account, 8 VA. L. Rzv. 181, 266 (1922).
25. See p. 403 infra. However, the mere existence of an agency, without more,
is insufficient to warrant equity's taking jurisdiction of a suit for recovery of a
sum certain. There must be a showing that the agent holds property belonging to his
principal or that he has profited beyond his lawful compensation. See Arnold Productions, Inc. v. Favorite Films Corp., 298 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1962) (no equitable accounting against agent to distribute films on profit-sharing basis); Berry Seed Co. v.
Hutchings, 247 Iowa 417, 74 N.W.2d 233 (1956) ; American Button Co. v. Weishaar,
170 S.W.2d 147 (Mo. 1943); Kaminsky v. Kahn, 23 App. Div. 2d 231, 259 N.Y.S.2d
716 (1965) (accounting where defendant held stocks transferred by plaintiff with
agreement as to dividends which was not performed, there being a fiduciary element
plus a holding of profits due to principal) ; Alkahn Sil Label Co. v. Felsenstein, 7
App. Div. 2d 904, 182 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1959); Williams v. New York Ins. Co., 174
N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (commission agent not a fiduciary; pre-trial examination and discovery adequate remedy).
26. See Rosenak v. Poller, 290 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (an accouting is
predicated on the assumption that plaintiff does not have the means to determine how
much, or in fact whether, any money properly his own is being held by another);
Goffe & Clarkener, Inc. v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d 801 (D. Kan. 1928) (an
accounting should lie where it would be impossible for a jury to do more than guess,
or blindly follow the calculations of one witness) ; Remme v. Herzog, 222 Cal. App.
2d 863, 35 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1963) (accounting where accountants differ as to what profit
book indicates) ; Second Michigan Co-op. Housing Ass'n v. First Mich. Co-op. Housing Ass'n, 358 Mich. 252, 99 N.W.2d 665 (1959) (accounting where, by reason of
intricacy of fact situation, jury would not be appropriate tribunal). But see Dairy
Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962) (in view of the powers given to district
courts by F4D. R. CIrv. P. 53(b) to appoint masters to assist jury where issues are
complicated, the burden of showing complexity of accounts as a basis for equitable
accounting is difficult to discharge) ; Payrolls & Tabulating, Inc. v. Sperry-Rand Corp.,
22 App. Div. 2d 595, 257 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1965) (mere allegations of the difficulty of
assessing damages are insufficient for equitable jurisdiction and a conventional business
relation does not become fiduciary by mere allegations to that effect) ; Jernberg v.
Virtus Co., 32 Misc. 2d 820 225 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (the mere fact that
money due under an agreement is determined by volume sales does not justify
equitable accounting).
27. See Arnold Productions, Inc. v. Favorite Films Corp., 298 F.2d 540 (2d
Cir. 1962) ; Hornbeek v. Hornbeek, 5 Ill. App. 2d 253, 125 N.E.2d 535 (1955);
Dormay Constr. Corp. v. Doric Co., 221 Md. 145, 156 A.2d 632 (1959); Johnson v.
Bugle Coat, Apron & Linen Service, Inc., 191 Md. 268 60 A.2d 686 (1948) ; Jernberg
v. Virtus Co., 32 Misc. 2d 820, 225 N.Y.S.2d 180 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ; Williams v. New
York Ins. Co., 11 Misc. 2d 823, 174 N.Y.S.2d 392 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (pre-trial examination and discovery is an adequate remedy for recovery of commissions due to agent
whose compensations are dependent on sales made).
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that a discovery order will not remedy; the state of modern authority
compels the conclusion that whether equity will assume jurisdiction to
decree an accounting is very much in the court's discretion. If it so
chooses, it will lend a ready ear to such arguments as ,these: Equity,
by tradition, has always had concurrent jurisdiction in cases of fraud ;8
equitable, or constructive fraud, can be found in any unconscientious
conduct whereby defendant has acquired a benefit,29 justifying the imposition of a constructive trust on his gains ;30 fraud invariably involves an abuse of confidence reposed, thus warranting the court in
treating defendant as a fiduciary ;31 the very fact that defendant's profits may exceed plaintiff's proven damage goes to show that ithe remedy
at law is inadequate ;32 the illogic of letting the measure of a victim's
recovery depend on the accident of whether or not he is able to state
a cause of action for equitable relief such as an injunction is apparent.
If, on the other hand, the court is not disposed to entertain a suit for
an accounting it will say 'that, even where fraud is averred, "3 the law
affords an adequate remedy in damages. Here a lot will depend on a
good presentation of the complaint, and the only categorical statement
that can be made about these borderline situations is a negative one,
28. See Nieberding v. Phoenix Mfg. Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 350, 176 N.E.2d 385
(1961) ; Stark v. Cole, 373 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1963) ; Annot., 53 A.L.R. 815 (1928).
29. See Kirschner v. West Co., 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962) (a suit for misappropriation of trade secrets disclosed in confidence to be regarded by federal courts
as suit in equity whether or not injunctive relief is sought) ; Boyett's, Inc. v. Gross,
276 Ala. 452, 163 So. 2d 610 (1964) (a bill for accounting is good if it shows such
wrong dealing as would authorize equity to take cognizance of the cause) ; Sojourner
v. Sojourner, 247 Miss. 342, 153 So. 2d 803 (1963) (breach of a promise made without
intent of performing it can support a constructive trust). But see Root v. Lake Shore
& M.S. R.R., 105 U.S. 189, 214 (1882), where the court rejected the contention that
patent owner could base right to an accounting in equity on a fiduciary relation,
saying that this, if accepted, "would extend the jurisdiction of equity to every case of
tort where the wrongdoer had realized a pecuniary benefit."
30. See Fur & Wool Trading Co. v. Fox, 245 N.Y. 215, 156 N.E. 670 (1927);
Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N.Y. 261, 91 N.E. 582 (1910) (accounting for profits made
by recipient of stolen property) ; Phillips v. Ball, 358 P.2d 193 (Okla. 1961) (a constructive trust may arise wherever one acquires title to property in an unconscientious manner).
31. See Valdes v. Larrinaga, 233 U.S. 705 (1914) ; Berman v. Coakley, 243 Mass.
348, 137 N.E. 667 (1923); Dow v. Berry, 18 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Wis. 1883).
32. See Ingram v. People's Finance & Thrift Co., 226 Ala. 317, 146 So. 822
(1933) (accounting in equity should lie if the facts create a doubt as to whether
adequate relief might be obtained at law) ; Concrete Coring Contractors, Inc. v.
Mechanical Contractors & Engineers, Inc., 220 Ga. 714, 141 S.E.2d 439 (1965) (to
exclude equitable relief, remedy at law must be complete and substantial equivalent
of equitable relief) ; Majestic Loose Leaf, Inc. v. Cannizzaro, 10 Misc. 1040, 169
N.Y.S.2d 566 (Sup. Ct. 1957) (fact that suit lies in conversion does not preclude
accounting in equity).
33. See Berry Seed Co. v. Hutchings, 247 Iowa 417, 74 N.W.2d 233 (1956)
(accounting denied where defendant, managing plaintiff's business on a commission
basis, acquired a large sum by misrepresenting profits) ; National Comm. on Mother's
Day v. Kirby, Block & Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 390, 234 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1962) (even
where the facts may support an action for fraud, accounting will not lie unless a
fiduciary relation is established) ; Kocon v. Cordeiro, 98 R.I. 222, 200 A.2d 708
(1964) (a suit for damages for deceit against a corporate fiduciary is an adequate
remedy at law).
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namely; if there is no dispute as to the amount due, no complexity of
the transaction, no arguable "fiduciary" angle, and no grounds of ancillary equitable jurisdiction, the court that decreed an accounting of profits will be reversed on appeal as having abused its discretion. In Freeman v. Fryer,84 plaintiffs, who had an option to buy land which defendant optioners had sold to another at a profit, got their suit into
equity by seeking an injunction to restrain defendants from negotiating
a note they had given as a deposit on their contract. The court, stating
that a chancellor has a great deal of discretion in cases of account and
that here the remedy in damages was not as "clear, complete, practical
and efficient to the ends of justice" as the remedy in equity, affirmed the
decree for an accounting. Some courts however, would allow a prayer
for injunctive relief to support the jurisdiction to decree an accounting,
closing an eye to the fact that the need for injunctive relief is not
shown."
4. Decree as Incidental to Statutory Injunctive Relief
The award of defendant's profits, when a statutory violation is enjoined, is not without precedent. Unless a contrary legislative intent is
manifested, such a decree seems clearly proper. Restitution of amounts
overcharged in violation of rent-control statutes "6 and of backpay to
employees due under Fair Labor Standards legislation 7 prior to the
amendment of the controlling statute to prohibit such restitution, has
been granted. Defendants enjoined from violating the Fair Trade laws
by underselling goods manufactured by plaintiff have, on occasion, been
made to account to plaintiff for their profits through the medium of a
34. 30 Ill. App. 2d 185, 174 N.E.2d 217 (1961).
35. Rice & Adams Co. v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509 (1929) (patent) ; Blisscraft of
Hollywood v. United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1961) ; Scovill Mfg. Co. v.
United States Electric Mfg. Co., 31 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) ; Automatic
Laundry Serv. v. Demas, 216 Md. 544, 141 A.2d 497 (1958) (accounting against
party joined as defendant in suit for injunction against breach of contract) ; Bruno
v. Frediberg, 21 App. Div. 2d 336, 250 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1964) ; Safeway Steel Scaffolds
Co. v. Clayton, 413 Pa. 229, 196 A.2d 378 (1964) (accounting pursuant to consent
judgment in suit for injunction against unfair competition and use of confidential
information). But see Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. R.R., 105 U.S. 189 (1882) (declining accounting where suit brought long after expiration of patent) ; King Mechanism
& Eng'r Co. v. Western Wheeled Scrapper Co., 59 F.2d 546 (7th Cir. 1932) (denying
equity jurisdiction where plaintiff's patents had either expired or were on the verge
of expiration since need for injunction not present, the court holding that the mere
possibility of a larger recovery in equity did not give equity jurisdiction) ; Van Raal
v. Schenk, 170 F. 1021 (7th Cir. 1908) (no accounting where injunction denied).
36. See United States v. Moore, 340 U.S. 616 (1950) ; Porter v. Warner Holding
Co., 328 U.S. 395 (1945) ; McCoy v. Woods, 177 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1949). Generally,
as to profits made by defendant in contempt of an injunction, see note 90 infra.
37. See McComb v. Frank Scerbo & Sons, 177 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Walling
v. O'Grady, 146 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944); Walling v. Miller, 138 F.2d 629 (8th Cir.
1943) (stating that any error herein, if error there be, would go to the merits and
not to the jurisdiction).
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fine for contempt. 8 A more logical approach might well be that if anybody i's to have such profits it should be those who can show they could
have sold to the same customers at the regular price in competition
with the defendant.8 9 Yet one might argue against this that the manufacturer is injured by the cheapening of his produot in the public eye.
Profits, as such, are not awarded for violations of the Clayton Act
since the statute spells out the damages. Nevertheless, plaintiff's damages can be measured by reference to defendant's profits." Similarly,
profits, -as such, are not awarded for violations of the Sherman Act,4
though they are not irrelevant to the measure of plaintiff's recovery.42
But one who suffers at the hands of a person who bribes the plaintiff's
employee to misrepresent the state of the market and thereby to extract
exhorbitant prices from plaintiff under the guise of arm's-length bargaining, thus violating the Robinson-Patman Act, can recover profits
of the briber as a participant in the employee's breach of duty. The
43
liability of the briber and of the employee is joint and several.
Similarly, courts have declined to order restitution to defrauded
purchasers, of profits made in violation of the Federal Food Drug &
Cosmetic Act when injunctive relief is granted. In United States v.
Parkinson,4 the court held it had no statutory power to decree restitution as ancillary to its injunctive power. In dismissing an appeal, the
court said it was not 'the fashion of the English Crown to use Chancery
as -a method of enforcement of regulations and that the use of the extraordinary remedies of equity in governmental litigation should never
be permitted unless clearly and expressly authorized by statute. " The
38. See Gillette Co. v. Two Guys From Harrison, Inc., 36 N.J. 342, 177 A.2d 555
(1961), rejecting a contention that, without proof of damage, such award is punitive,
since it does not take from the defendant assets unrelated to his wrongful conduct.
In Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467 (2d Cir. 1958), a
decree awarding defendant's profits was held erroneous for want of proof of such
profits; but this seems to ignore the rule that the consequences of an inability to
demonstrate the loss resulting from a proven invasion of another's rights should rest
on the defendant.
39. See Sunbeam Corp. v. Civil Service Employee's Co-op. Ass'n, 187 F.2d 768
(3d Cir. 1951), rev'd, 192 F.2d 572 (1951).

40. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
41. See Dantzler v. Dictograph Products, Inc., 309 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1962).
42. See Rubenstein v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 176 F. Supp. 527 (D. Minn.

1959) (pooling of net profits of monopolistic and victimized enterprises and equal
division thereof adopted as formula for assessment of damages).

43. Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 829
(N.D. Ohio 1964). See Sunbeam Corp. v. Masters, 97 F. Supp. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1951)

(accounting proper).
44. 135 F. Supp. 208 (S.D. Cal. 1955).

45. United States v. Parkinson, 240 F.2d 918 (9th Cir. 1956).
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fact that profit-recovery decrees are considered proper in analogous
statutory injunction situations does, however, point in a contrary di40
rection.
II.

PROFITS DERIVED FROM ABUSE OF THE
FIDUCIARY RELATION

A.

Disloyalty

Aside from statute' equity has from centuries back compelled a
disloyal fiduciary to disgorge his profits."8 If he has such profit in his
hands, " he is generally held chargeable as a constructive itrustee thereof." This applies even to a gratuitous agent51 and in general extends
to situations where it is the fiduciary's spouse who benefits. 2 The
doctrine has not been confined to situations where the remedy in damages is inadequate. The choice, profits or damages, rests with the injured party.5 3 And where an award of profits would not make the
plaintiff whole the court can, after the accounting has been taken, base
its award on profits lost to plaintiff.54 The purpose of profit recovery
being to discourage potential conflicts of interest and duty, 55 it need not
be shown that complainant suffered any loss from the misconduct.5
1. Secret Commissions
The most obvious example of the situation where a fiduciary is
accountable for his profit arises where he has acquired a secret com46. See Goodrich, Restitution - Modern Application of an Ancient Remedy,
9 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 567 (1954) ; 7 FooD DRUc CosM. L.J. 666 (1952) ; 4 STAN.
L. Riv. 519 (1952); 104 U. PA. L. Rtv. 719 (1956).
47. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2237 (West 1954), which gives a trust beneficiary
an option to require the trustee to account for profits, to pay value of use of property
used, to dispose of it, to replace it, or to account for its proceeds.
48. See Scott, The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALIL. L. Rzv. 539 (1949).
49. See also pp. 370-71 infra.
50. Kirschner v. West Co., 300 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1962) ; Bandringa v. Bandringa,
20 Ill. 2d 167, 170 N.E.2d 116 (1961).
51. Spector v. Miller, 199 Cal. App. 2d 87, 18 Cal. Rptr. 426 (1962). See
Wightman v. Wightman, 223 Mass. 398, 111 N.E. 881 (1916), which held that a
brother, employed as assistant in brother's grocery, who continued to act and take
salary after employment terminated by brother's insanity, sending out bills in brother's
name, was accountable for profits as long as he did this, but ceased to be so accountable when he thereafter continued business in his own name, there being nothing to
show him responsible for goodwill of business.
52. See also p. 369 infra.
53. See Dubuque Products, Inc. v. Lemco Corp., 227 F. Supp. 108 (D. Utah
1963). Compare Sequoia Vacuum Systems v. Stransky, 229 Cal. App. 2d 281, 40
Cal. Rptr. 203 (1964), with Durwood v. Dubinsky, 361 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. 1963).
54. Defier Corp. v. Kleeman, 19 App. Div. 2d 396, 243 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1963).
55. United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910).
56. See Byer v. International Paper Co., 314 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1963) (servant)
United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1961) (servant) ; Brophy v. Cities
Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949) ; Mangels v. Tippett, 167 Md. 290, 173
A. 191 (1939) (trustee) ; In re Roese's Estate, 237 N.Y.S.2d 367 (Surrogate's Ct.
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mission.57 Itis immaterial that the person who reposed trust in no way
suffered any prejudice from the transaction.5" And the fact that he has
recovered the amount of the commission from the donor does not affect
his right to recover it from the fiduciary.59 The amount can be recovered in quasi contract" or through the imposition of a constructive
trust.61 The doctrine has been applied to effect recovery by a business
house, of frequency discounts granted by a television station to an advertising agent, by reason of the agent's frequent use of -spot advertisements of the principal's products over its stations. 62 It has, of course,
no application where it is the clear custom of the community that the
agent is entitled to retain gratuities given to him by the public whom
he serves." In a very early case this qualification was extended to
render an insurance agent not accountable for a sum given to him by
another insurer in recognition of the benefit it had received from a
satisfactory loss adjustment negotiated by the agent.64 It is believed,
however, that today a different result would be reached.
The Federal "Anti-Kickback Act"6 provides for the recovery by
the government from the giver or the -recipient of kickbacks where government subcontracts were bought. The Act, which controls even where
the government is not a direct party to the contract, merely supplements
the existing doctrine by giving the government a clear and direct procedural right to sue as party plaintiff for -such profits. 6
2. Interest Conflicting With Duty: Self-Dealing
The oft-quoted words of Justice Cardozo apply to all persons who
hold fiduciary status. "Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm's length are forbidden to those
bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than
the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to
1962) (executor); Donemar, Inc. v. Molloy, 252 N.Y. 360, 169 N.E. 610 (1930)
(agent) ; Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 189 A. 320 (1937).
57. See Paramount Mfg. Co. v. Mohan, 196 Cal. App. 2d 372, 16 Cal. Rptr. 417
(1961); RnSTAUM5NT (StCOND) or AGtNCY § 388 (1957).
58. See p. 355 supra.

59. See p. 384 infra.

60. Reading v. Attorney General, [1951] 1 All E.R. 617 (A.C.).
61. See Mile-O-Mo Fishing Club, Inc. v. Noble, 62 Ill. App. 2d 50, 210 N.E.2d

12 (1965).

62. Store of Happiness v. Carmona & Allen, 152 Cal. App. 2d 266, 312 P.2d

1104 (1957).

63. Compare Zappas v. Roumeliote, 156 Iowa 709, 137 N.W. 935 (1912), with
Harrison v. Kansas City Terminal Ry., 36 F. Supp. 434 (W.D. Mo. 1941).
64. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Church, 21 Ohio St. 492 (1871).
65. 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-54 (1964).
66. See United States v. Davio, 136 F. Supp. 423 (E.D. Mich. 1955), wherein
the constitutionality of the statute is discussed. See generally Annot., 102 A.L.R.
(1936);
13 A.L.R.
905Widger
(1921)School
; cf. Annot.,
71 A.L.R.
933 (1931).
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this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.
Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity
when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the
'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions. .

.

. Only thus has

the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than
that trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any
'6
judgment of this court.

7

Similar thinking has often found expression thus: Whenever one
person is placed in such relation to another by the aot or consent of
that other, or the act of a third person, or by the law, that he becomes
interested for him, or interested with him, in any subject of property
or business, he i's prohibited from acquiring rights in that subject
antagonistic to the person with which whose interest he has become
associated.6 8 Rights so acquired are held in trust for those in whose
interest he was so prohibited, and to the extent of the prohibition. 9
For the practitioner such vague broad language helps little. Truly,
man is a social animal. But it is seldom that his actions are motivated
by sheer altruism, undiluted by any measure of self-interest. But, for
better or for worse, the courts take care not to limit the doctrine by
narrow definition of fiduciary or confidential status.7 ° The doctrine
has been applied, for example, to enable the members of an "earnings
pool," who floated a corporation for the more advantageous exploitation of their earnings, to recover from one of their number the profits
on warrants of such corporation he had acquired at issue price and
sold at a profit. 7' Further, the mere existence of a fiduciary relation
does not, of course, necessarily mean that 'any transaction between
67. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928), noted
in 29 COLUm. L. Rzv. 367 (1929); 42 HARV. L. Rv. 953 (1929); 38 YALS L.J.

782 (1929).

68. See Trice v. Comstock, 121 F. 620 (8th Cir. 1903). See also Bate v. Marsteller, 232 Cal. App. 2d 605, 43 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1965) ; Georgia Bank & Trust Co.
v. Hadarits, 221 Ga. 125, 143 S.E.2d 627 (1965); Mackey v. Rootes Motors, Inc.,
348 Mass. 464, 204 N.E.2d 436 (1965); LeMon v. Landers, 81 Nev. 329, 402 P.2d
648 (1965).
69. See Clements v. Cates, 49 Ark. 242, 4 S.W. 776 (1887).
70. Sojourner v. Sojourner, 247 Miss. 342, 153 So. 2d 803 (1963).
71. Kreher v. Prescott, 153 So. 2d 316 (Fla. 1963) ; Prescott v. Kreher, 123 So.
2d 721 (Fla. 1960). In Brigham v. McCabe, 27 App. Div. 2d 100, 276 N.Y.S.2d 328
(1966), the allegations were that a bank, with whom funds of a retirement system
had been deposited, had made a profit from the use of these funds and that, in violation
of the Education Law, an officer of the bank was a member of the board of the retirement system. The court, while it conceded that the depositor-trustee was owed the
duties of a fiduciary by the bank, held that these allegations stated a case for injunctive relief but not for an accounting of profits. The court took the view that the
statutory violation was not wrongdoing in the sense that requires an accounting.
Though the decision is not easy to reconcile with the strict doctrine that a trustee

can never be permitted to profit from his trust, it may well be a commendable one.
To apply the doctrine to a situation where an individual happens to be one of a large
group of executives of the trustee side and also one of a large group on the beneficiary
side, there being nothing underhanded or irregular about their dealings outside of this
technical violation of law, would be to subordinate common sense to harsh doctrine.
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the parties is tainted with self-dealing. Thus a partner who, on disagreement arising between the partners, agrees to buy the others out
is not acting in a fiduciary capacity in so doing.72 And, as a general
rule, a full disclosure, laying bare the facts to the beneficiary "without
ambiguity or reservation, in all their stark significance" will protect
7
the self-dealing fiduciary from accountability.
Local statutes should be consulted on this matter. The Uniform
Trusts Act, for example, forbids a trustee directly or indirectly to buy
or sell property for the trust, from or to, itself or an affiliate; or from
or to a director, officer or employee of such trustee or of an affiliate; or
from or to a relative, employer, partner, or other business associate.7 4
3. Profits or Commissions Net Yet Received
The traditional remedy for the recovery of a secret benefit acquired
by a fiduciary is the imposition of a constructive trust on such benefit.
When the benefit has merely been promised, and not paid over, there
is no property in the 'hands of the fiduciary to which the trust can
attach. For this reason, English courts restrict the beneficiary to an
action for money had and received when the benefit actually reaches
the fiduciary. 75 Additionally, since a contractual right might be considered the subject matter of a trust 7 6 it ought to be possible to

impress a constructive trust on the agent's claim against the bribegiver. Although the agent himself would probably have no enforceable
claim for the bribe owing to the illegality or immorality of the transaction, it can well be argued that where the bribe-giver has already
received the fruits of the tainted transaction, the injured beneficiary
is not a party to the immorality and is thus not precluded from asserting his rights as beneficiary of a constructive trust. In such a suit,
the disloyal fiduciary would be joined as a co-defendant.7 7 Recovery
72. Griffith v. Barlich, 211 Cal. App. 2d 288, 27 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1963).
73. In re Alker's Estate, 20 App. Div. 2d 894, 248 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1964).
74. UNIFORM TRUSTS

AcT

§

5.

75. See Powell & Thomas v. Evan Jones & Co., [1905] 1 K.B. 11. (The liability
of the bribe-giver in tort is, of course, another matter).
76. A. ScoTT, TMS LAW oit TRUSTS

§ 82

(1967).

77. In Rush v. Curtis-Wright Export Co., 175 Misc. 873, 25 N.Y.S.2d 597 (Sup.

Ct. 1941), the assignee of a purchasing agent for the government of Columbia
(injured principal) brought the suit to recover the amount of a bribe. While holding
that this assignee could not recover because of the illegality of the contract, the
court asserted that he held the bribe-contract as a constructive trustee for Columbia
and directed payment of the bribe to plaintiff on plaintiff's giving a surety bond for
that amount with interest to secure its payment to Columbia. This was reversed in
Rush v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 263 App. Div. 69, 31 N.Y.S.2d 550 (1941),
aff'd mem., 285 N.Y. 562, 43 N.E.2d 712 (1942), because the suit had been at law and
the foreign principal was not before the court. However, the decision supports the
proposition that the injured principal can assert a constructive trust over the conits tainted
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on a basis of constructive trust against the bribe-giver could also be
predicated on the argument that he has, with knowledge, received
the beneficiary's property and is thus a constructive trustee thereof.7"
If, for example, $x + y was the amount the principal paid for the
bribe-giver's performance, and $y represents the amount of the bribe,
the bribe-giver has shown that he would have performed for $x. To
the extent of the $y, therefore, he has restitutional liability. Thus,
where in the course of a dispute a seller paid the buyer's agent a bribe
to effect a settlement which was effected to the buyer's complete satisfaction, the buyer could nonetheless recover the amount from the seller
on the theory that the price was to that extent "loaded." 79
4. Profits Derived from Exploitation of Opportunities
Arising from the Fiduciary Relation
A fiduciary who secretly secures an advantage from the exploitation of an opportunity which he ought to have exploited for, or
offered to, the reposant of confidence, holds that advantage as a constructive trustee and is consequently accountable for profits derived
therefrom. 0 But, in determining the opportunities to which this well
known doctrine extends, close questions are often presented."' Clearly
the rule is applied more strictly to the trustee of an express trust than
it is ,to a joint adventurer 8 2 or a mere agent.8 '

The application of

84

the doctrine to corporate fiduciaries and to employees, whom for some
purposes are regarded as occupying a fiduciary status8 5 will be considered later.
Perhaps the most frequent application of the doctrine arises where
the defendant has acquired the renewal of a lease which he holds -in
a fiduciary capacity. Here the courts have often talked of the "chance
of renewal," the probability of continuing in the established lessor/lessee
78. RESTATEM8NT (SXcoND) op AGENCY § 314 (1957).
79. Donemar, Inc. v. Molloy, 252 N.Y. 360, 169 N.E. 610 (1930). See also Mayor
ot Salford v. Lever, [18911 1 Q.B. 168, which, though holding only that the bribegiver's tort liability is unaffected by the fact that the bribe has already passed hands,
supports the reasoning in the text.

80. See Town & Country House & Homes Serv., Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314,
189 A.2d 390 (1963) (agent) ; Fortugno v. Hudson Manure Co., 51 N.J. Super. 482,
144 A.2d 207 (1958) (partner) ; General Automotive Mfg. Co. v. Singer, 19 Wis. 2d
528, 120 N.W.2d 659 (1963) (agent).
81. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928), where the
decision to impress a constructive trust on a joint adventurer who acquired a lease
renewal was by a majority of one judge in a court of seven.
82. See In re Jarvis, [1928] 2 All E.R. (Ch.) 336 (trustee) ; Aaron v. Puccinelli,
121 Cal. App. 2d 675, 264 P.2d 152 (1953) (joint adventurer).
83. Glasser v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 414 Ill. 180, 111 N.E.2d 124 (1953)
(agent).
84. See p. 398 infra.
85. See p. 384 infra.
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relationship being itself regarded as a kind of product of the lease.86
Whatever the nature of the fiduciary relation, one who contemplates
activity which might conceivably be regarded as competitive acts wisely
in insuring himself against accountability for his profits by making a
full disclosure to the persons for whom he is acting. This, if the latter
have legal capacity and have not been imposed upon, will protect him.
5. Acquisition for Self of Asset Due to Another
A fiduciary who acquires property for himself in breach of his
duty to acquire it for his beneficiary holds the property as a constructive trustee. Since he cannot retain any gain derived from such a
transaction, the enforcement of his duty to make restitution of the
property and its fruits is on a plane with accountability for profits.
If the defendant is shown to be a true fiduciary, and it is established
that the property was so suited to the beneficiary's needs that the acquision deprived him of an opportunity that should have been exercised
on his behalf, a cause of action for a constructive trust is presented."
It is immaterial that the fiduciary acquired it with intent to hold for
himself or that this intent was formed later.
However, the fiduciary principle can extend much further. There
are a multitude of situations where one who has promised to acquire
an asset for another, and instead has acquired it for himself, can
be held as a constructive trustee. While no exhaustive discussion of
the ramifications of this area can be attempted here, answers to the
following questions will prove helpful in pinpointing the possible areas
wherein a fact situation involving profit recovery can be presented:
Was there a contract between the parties, or was it a mere
gratuitous promise ?
Was 'it -intended that both parties should have some interest in
the acquisition, so that the transaction qualifies as a joint
adventure?
86. See Warner Bros. Theatre, Inc. v. Cooper Foundation, 189 F.2d 825 (10th
Cir. 1951); Mitchell v. Reed, 61 N.Y. 123 (1874); 13 MINN. L. RIv. 711 (1929).
87. See McLeod v. Lampkin Hotel Co., 257 Ky. 269, 77 S.W.2d 937 (1935)
(agent) ; Ebberts v. McLean, 128 Tex. 573, 98 S.W.2d 352 (1937).
88. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. United States Partition & Packaging Corp.,
199 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
89. Sands v. Eagle Oil & Refining Co., 83 Cal. App. 2d 312, 188 P.2d 782 (1948).
This is not conclusive, and a gratuitous promise can be made the basis of a con-

structive trust; Crowder v. Lyle, 225 Cal. App. 2d 439, 37 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1964);

Harrop v. Cole, 85 N.J. Eq. 32, 95 A. 378 (1915), aff'd, 86 N.J. Eq. 250, 98 A. 1085
(1916). The fact that no consideration passed for the promise cannot but be relevant
to show no binding commitment was intended. See, e.g., McIllwain v. Doby, 238 Miss.
839, 120 So. 2d 553 (1960).
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Whose money was to be used for the acquisition?9°
If plaintiff's money, whose money was actually used ?"'
Was defendant to be plaintiff's agent in making the purchase ?92
In whose name was the purchase intended to be made?"
Was the agreement in writing ?"
Did it relate to land ?5
If the price was not paid, did plaintiff or defendant assume liability for it ?98

Was plaintiff induced in any way to act to his detriment? For
example, did plaintiff not act to protect his rights to redeem the
property about to be sold ,at a forced sale 'by reason of defendant's
promise to 'acquire it and -to hold it for him ?
At -the time of the agreement did either plaintiff or defendant
98
have any equitable interest in the subject matter thereof?
If there never was any agreement as to the subject matter, what,
if any, are the circumstances in the 'relationship between plaintiff
and defendant which would make it defendant's duty to acquire
this asset for plaintiff ? For example, did he acquire knowledge
of this opportunity in a confidential capacity?"
If the agreement was oral and there is a question as to whether
the controlling statute of frauds would render it unenforceable,
has there been 'any conduct on the part of 'plaintiff which could
amount to part performance?"'0
These suggested lines of inquiry are presented as nothing more than
guideposts, and the practitioner acts wisely in thoroughly familiarizing
himself with the state of authority in the jurisdiction involved before
hastily concluding that the answers have provided a cause of action
for the imposition of a constructive trust.
90. See Gates Hotel Co. v. C.R.H. Davis Real Estate Co., 331 Mo. 94, 52 S.W.2d
1011 (1932) ; Kinert v. Wright, 81 Cal. App. 2d 919, 185 P.2d 364 (1947).
91. Where the plaintiff's money is used, there is a clear case for the imposition of
a constructive trust. See Brunson v. Sports, 239 S.C. 58, 121 S.E.2d 294 (1961).
92. See Harris v. Dunn, 55 N.M. 434, 234 P.2d 821 (1951).
93. See Matney v. Yates, 121 Va. 506, 93 S.E. 694 (1917).
94. This is obviously of interest, but oral agreements can equally furnish the
basis of a constructive trust. See Brown v. Zimmerman, 18 Ill. 2d 94, 163 N.E.2d
518 (1959) ; Gaines v. Hamman, 163 Tex. 358, 358 S.W.2d 557 (1962).
95. A good argument can be made that a contract to acquire land and convey it
to another is not within the statute of frauds. See Harris v. Dunn, 55 N.M. 434, 234
P.2d 821 (1951). In any case, constructive trusts are a recognized exception to the
rule that trusts in real estate cannot be enforced unless in writing.
96. If it was plaintiff who assumed liability, consider the possibility of accountability on the basis of a resulting trust (not restricted to land).
97. See Swon v. Huddleston, 282 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1955) ; Pannone v. Pannone,
36 Misc. 2d 54, 231 N.Y.S.2d 195 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Annot., 42 A.L.R. 10 (1926);
cf. Annot., 135 A.L.R. 232 (1938).
98. See Tanous v. White, 186 Miss. 556, 191 So. 278 (1939).
99. See Funderburg v. Shappert, 24 Ill. App. 2d 566, 165 N.E.2d 543 (1960);

Cincotta v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 17 Misc. 2d 983, 185 N.Y.S.2d 935 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
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6. Purchase for Self of Beneficiary's Property
An obvious conflict of interest and duty is presented when a fiduciary
purchases for himself, directly or indirectly' 01 the property of his
beneficiary. He owes it to the latter to get top dollar while his own
interest is to generally get it as cheaply as he can.'0 2 Ordinarily, the
result of such a transaction is to give the beneficiary an election. He
may disaffirm and recover the property ;103 or, he may treat the transaction as a conversion, recovering the difference between the price paid
and the value either at the time of the transaction or at the time of
0 5
the discovery thereof; 0 4 or, some say, at the time action is brought.
0 6
The doctrine
If the fiduciary has resold, his profit can be recovered.
10 7
Further,
is not of course restricted to transactions involving land.
it is immaterial that the sale was intrinsically fair, that no undue
advantage was obtained, or even that the price was the highest that
could be obtained. The right to disaffirm still exists. The rule is
also not restricted to private sales.' 0 8 It has been applied to render
accountable a trustee of a count-approved trust for bondholders for
profits realized on a sale of bonds purchased by the trust subsequent
to the court approval, even without a showing of bad faith, inadequacy
of consideration or concealment. The contention that defendant, as
underwriter of the bond issue, had acted in good faith pursuant to his
duty to maintain the market failed, with the decree of foreclosure
being viewed as extinguishing any duty he might, as underwriter, have
owed to the mortgagor. 10 9

The rule, however, is not without its qualifications. It does not
apply where the defendant can meet the burden of proving that he
acted in the utmost good faith and made a full disclosure to all the
beneficiaries who, being of full capacity, consented to the transaction
or ratified it with full knowledge." 0 Nor, in the case of an express
trust, does it control where the settlor authorized such dealings"' or
101. See Holmes v. McKey, 383 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1962).
102. See Wofford v. Wofford, 244 Miss. 442, 142 So. 2d 188 (1962) ; Moorehead
v. Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174 (1964) (administrator).
103. Moorehead v. Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174 (1964).
104. Tatsuno v. Kasai, 70 Utah 203, 259 P. 318 (1927).
105. See Annot., 62 A.L.R. 63 (1929).
106. Robertson v. Chapman, 152 U.S. 673 (1894); Adams v. Herman, 106 Cal.
App. 2d 92, 234 P.2d 695 (1951).
107. Pierce v. Beers, 190 Mass. 199, 76 N.E. 603 (1906).
108. Whatley v. Wood, 148 Colo. 349, 366 P.2d 570 (1961) (purchase by trustees
of creditors and stockholders of defunct corporation through attorney). See Annot.,
20 A.L.R.2d 1280 (1951).
109. Dick & Reuteman Co. v. Doherty Realty Co., 16 Wis. 2d 342, 114 N.W.2d

475 (1962).
110. Moorehead v. Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174 (1964).
111. See Appeal of Burke, 378 Pa. 616, 108 A.2d 58 (1954), wherein trustees,
under authority of the trust instrument, took over portions of the trust property at a
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where leave of the court has been obtained." 2 A further qualification
is presented where the defendant was acting to protect an interest he
had in the property in a capacity such as mortgagee or spouse with
rights of dower or curtesy. But as against the beneficiary, such rights
extend only to the protection of the interest for which the purchase
was made. Where the purchase is made to prevent loss to the beneficiary's estate, any title acquired is held in equity for the beneficiary's
benefit."'
Further qualifications extend to agents. The rule does not apply
to a transaction not within the subject matter of the agency." 4 And
a realtor, authorized to sell at a stated net figure and to keep any
excess as commission, can 'buy for himself without any disclosure."'
In ,such a case the principal has lost nothing beyond the net price fixed
and it is immaterial to him who buys." 6 Additionally, the law does
not forbid an agent from buying for himself, provided such disclosure
is made as will effect a termination of the fiduciary relation. However,
the agent cannot wait until he receives an offer in excess of the agreed
price and then purchase it for less without informing the principal
of this offer. To allow the agent to do such would encourage him to
buy it and re-sell 'ait the higher price for his own gain."11 7 But mere
notification to the principal that he is acting for himself does not necessarily terminate his fiduciary status, especially where he receives the
agreed commission on the sale to himself without communicating other
offers that have been received."

8

112. Moorehead v. Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174 (1964).

For an example

of statutory authority for a court order, see MODgL PROBAT4 COD4 § 155 (1947).
113. Moorehead v. Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174 (1964).
114. See Dickey v. Volker, 321 Mo. 235, 11 S.W.2d 278 (1928).

115. Pascal v. Cotton, 205 Cal. App. 2d 597, 23 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1962) ; Hutton v.
Scherrard, 183 Mich. 356, 150 N.W. 135 (1914).
116. Allen v. Dailey, 92 Cal. App. 308, 268 P. 404 (1928). See 13 MIcn. L. Rev.
429, 524 (1915).
117. Compare Rattray v. Scudder, 28 Cal. App. 2d 214, 169 P.2d 371 (1946), with
Buchanan v. Fritts, 240 S.W.2d 614 (Ky. 1951), holding not liable for profits a
realtor who bought from his principal and resold at a profit at a public auction when
there was no showing of knowledge that any others were planning to bid at the auction
for a price higher than that which he had paid principal.
118. Zikratch v. Stillwell, 196 Cal. App. 2d 535, 16 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1961) ; In re
Noonan's Estate, 361 Pa. 26, 63 A.2d 80 (1961) (sale by fiduciary to his employee) ;
but see Cooper-Fortieth Co. v. Keller, 49 Ohio Abs. 296, 75 N.E.2d 809 (1947),
where an agent, after having communicated an offer for the property he was employed
to sell which was refused, openly made an offer in his own name. It was held that
the resulting contract was enforceable even though the acceptance was without
knowledge of interim offers which the agent had failed to communicate, since the
submission of his own offer terminated the fiduciary relation. This decision seems
out of line with reason and with authority. The principal has not consented to the
agent's purchase until the agent's offer is accepted. Until then, the duty to comhttps://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
munciate material facts (the interim offers) should be held to continue.
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7. Sale of Own Property to Beneficiary
Where one under a fiduciary duty to acquire property for another
without the consent of that other, 119 purchases the property from himself
in his individual capacity, the beneficiary can set aside the transaction
and hold him as a constructive trustee of the purchase money. 120 This
can be done whenever the fiduciary's interest, though not absolute, is
of a sufficiently substantial nature as to affect his judgment.' 2 ' The
rule extends to the purchase by a corporate trustee, for the trust, of
an asset owned by an affiliated or subsidiary corporation in which it
has a substantial interest. 12 2 The complaint should request restoration,
insofar as restoration is possible, of the property so dealt with. 23
Prejudice to the beneficiary need not be averred or proved. 124 Alternatively, the profit made by the fiduciary on the transaction can be
recovered. 2 5 To recover the difference between the price paid by
defendant and 'the price he received from the plaintiff or his estate, it
must be shown that he originally acquired the asset for the purpose
of reselling it to the plaintiff. 2 If this cannot be shown, only the
difference between its actual value at the time of the sale and the
price paid by the plaintiff (or out of his funds) can be recovered.' 2 7
8. Profits Derived from Wrong to Third Person
There are very few situations where an employer can recover the
profits of a servant derived not from an act of disloyalty of which he is
the true victim, but from a wrong to a third person. Where it has been
allowed, it seems to have been based on a theory of unjust enrichment.
Thus in Reading v. Attorney General 28 a sergeant in the British
Army had received about $20,000 from Egyptian smugglers for riding
in uniform on trucks they used for their illegal purposes, thereby
119. Dean v. Shingle, 198 Cal. 652, 246 P. 1049 (1926) ; Hall v. Paine, 224 Mass.
62, 112 N.E. 153 (1916).
120. See In re Anneke's Trust, 229 Minn. 60, 38 N.W.2d 177 (1949), which held
voidable a purchase by a trust company of securities for its trust accounts from its
own securities or banking department, since the temptation to favor shareholders at
the expense of trust beneficiaries may be as insidious as that of a private trustee
to favor himself.
121. See Montgomery v. Hundley, 205 Mo. 138, 103 S.W. 527 (1907) (option
holder who sells stock as agent).

122. See Clayton v. James B. Clow & Sons, 327 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1964).
123. Sim v. Edenborn, 242 U.S. 131 (1916), holding that any loss due to inability
to make full restoration of the status quo should fall on the unfaithful agent.

124. Dean v. Shingle, 198 Cal. 652, 246 P. 1049 (1926).
125. In re Gallagher, 123 N.J. Eq. 384, 196 A. 430 (1938).
126. See Schmitt v. Wright, 317 Ill. App. 384, 46 N.E.2d 184 (1943) ; Calaveras
Timber Co. v. Michigan Trust Co., 278 Mich. 445, 270 N.W. 743 (1936) ; New York
Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E. 102 (1926).
127. See Kilbourn v. Sunderland, 130 U.S. 505 (1889) ; Old Dominion Copper
Mines & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909); New York
Trust Co. v. American Realty Co., 244 N.Y. 209, 155 N.E. 102 (1926).
128. [1951]
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enabling the trucks to pass by the Egyptian police without being
searched. The British government seized the money and, in a suit
by the sergeant for -its recovery, was held entitled to retain it on the
ground that its -servant had obtained it illegally as a 'result of the
misuse of his position as a soldier. Any official position, said the
House of Lords, which enables the :holder to earn money by its use
gives his master a right to receive such money even though earned
by a criminal act. The fact that the master suffered no damages is
immaterial.
Recovery in such situations, as for example where a city recovered
illegal kickbacks extorted by its mayor from city employees,' 29 seems
to be entirely motivated by the policy against permitting the faithless
steward to retain his profits. Thus it must be shown why the true
victim cannot, or is unlikely to, bring suit himself.'3 0 The logical
corollary of this doctrine, without the qualification, would be that a
janitorial service, for example, whose servant abused his position to
gain entry to premises for the purposes of larceny would be the proper
party plaintiff to recover the property stolen. If the true victim is
not available to sue, the complaint should pray for recovery in order
that the wrong perpetrated on him may be righted."'
9. Profits Made After Termination of Fiduciary Status
Even though a defendant no longer serves as a fiduciary, the
use of confidential information acquired in that capacity to the prejudice
of 'his former reposant of confidence may carry with it liability or
accountability for profits. A trustee, for example, is not necessarily
exonerated from the consequences of a self-dealing transaction merely
because he has resigned from office before the transaction is completed." 2 So, too, an attorney may violate his duty to a one-time
client even after his retainer is ended. Accountability for profits can
result from a purchase by him of his former client's property at a
129. Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 115 A.2d 8 (1955), noted in 55 COLUM.
L. Rev. 1035 (1955) ; 69 HARV. L. Rv. 572 (1956); 40 MINN. L. Rv. 889 (1956);
104 U. PA. L. Rgv. 121 (1955). Sef also J.C. Peacock, Inc. v. Hasko, 196 Cal. App.
2d 353, 16 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1961), where employer recovered profits without any
showing of damage resulting from the disloyalty.
130. See City of Princeton v. Baker, 237 Ky. 325, 35 S.W.2d 524 (1931) ; City of
Boston v. Dolan, 298 Mass. 346, 10 N.E.2d 275 (1937), denying recovery by a city
against its officer for profits derived from misuse of funds of library corporation.
131. In Jersey City v. Hague, 18 N.J. 584, 599, 115 A.2d 8, 17 (1955), the court
said the city was the proper party to recover property which "as between the parties
to the suit" belongs to it. It was the proper party to seek "to right a wrong perpetrated upon its servants and inhabitants."
132. See Omohundro v. Matthews, 317 S.W.2d 771 (1958), aff'd, 161 Tex. 367,
341 S.W.2d 401 (1960). But see Hosch v. Hosch's Executors, 181 Ky. 781, 205 S.W.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
963 (1918).
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forced sale if he acquired the information leading up to the purchase
while occupying fiduciary status."' 3 Similarly, a partner who profits
through using, in his participation in a new partnership, the knowledge
acquired through membership of a former partnership can be accountable to 'his former partners.' 8 '
The most frequent source of litigation in this area, however, is
where an ex-employee is using information obtained in his previous
employment to the detriment of his former employer. Here the courts
are faced with a grave problem of balancing conflicting policies. On
the one hand, it is socially desirable that those who have exercised
initative and spent money to improve and perfect their methods and
ideas should be protected against exploitation; on the other, the courts
are preoccupied with the right of an individual, even if he once occupied
a fiduciary or quasi-fiduciary status, to better his condition if he can
honestly do so. 185 It would go contrary to the whole spirit of free enter-

prise to hamstring employees in their choice of work and freedom to exploit their skills by reason of the accident of their former employment."
To establish a case for the recovery of profits from such a defendant, therefore, much will depend on the nature of the information
so acquired, the circumstances of its disclosure and on the way in
which it is being used. The type of inquiry which should be made
to determine whether accountability for his gains should be decreed
in this field is reflected in the following questions:
What is the nature of the information defendant has used? If it
qualifies as a trade secret, no problem on this aspect is pre18 7
sented.

133. See Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1280. But see Stein v. Morris, 120 Va. 390, 91 S.E.
177 (1917), holding that nonconfidential information given by a client can be used
by an attorney for his own profit.
134. Fouchek v. Janicek, 190 Ore. 251, 225 P.2d 783 (1950).
135. See E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 41
Del. Ch. 533, 200 A.2d 428 (1964), declining summary judgment for defendant
ex-employee in action to enjoin divulging of trade secrets; Space Aero Products Co.
v. R.E. Darling Co., 238 Md. 93, 208 A.2d 74 (1965); Angell Elevator Lock Co. v.
Manning, 248 Mass. 623, 205 N.E.2d 245 (1965) (receipt of pension from ex-employer
did not preclude use of experience, knowledge, and skills for a competitor).
136. See Tempo Instrument, Inc. v. Logitek, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y.
1964); Hahn & Clay v. A.O. Smith Corp., 212 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Tex. 1962), aff'd,
320 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1963) ; Haggerty v. Burkey Mills, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 835, 838
(E.D.N.Y. 1962), stating that equity has no power to compel a man who changes
employers to "wipe clean the slate of his memory"; Standard Brands, Inc. v. U.S.
Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Wis. 1961) ; National Motor
Club of La., Inc. v. Conque, 247 La. 877, 173 So. 2d 238 (1965) (holding that absent
contract, ex-employee has an absolute right to compete with former employer);
Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica Condenser Co., 239 Mass. 158, 131 N.E.
307 (1921).
137. Note, Protection of Trade Secrets in the Employer-Employee Relationship,
39 NOTRvDAMp LAW. 200 (1964). See also Annot., 93 A.L.R. 1323 (1934) ; Annot.,
165 A.L.R.
1453 (1946).
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If it relates to knowledge of plaintiff's customers, to what extent
was this knowledge confidential?"38

How readily could others have obtained the same knowledge ?...
What was the extent of defendant's contact with the customers,
-and in what way did he serve them ?14o
14 1
Did he take with him a list?

Did he solicit customers for his post-employment activity while
in plaintiff's employ?14
If it does not relate to customer knowledge, is this knowledge
really information at all, or merely skills or technical knowhow ?143
How many other employees shared this same knowledge?
Was it expressly communicated to defendant?
Was he sworn to secrecy ?144
Why was the knowledge imparted to him?
14
If it had not been, could he have acquired it independently ? '
What relation does it bear to his employment ?146
In what way is he profiting? Did he sell the information, or
use it himself ?147
138. See Carl A. Colteryahn Dairy, Inc. v. Schneider Dairy, 415 Pa. 276, 203 A.2d
469 (1964). See also Annot., 23 A.L.R. 423 (1923) ; Annot., 126 A.L.R. 758 (1940).
139. See Ferranti Elect., Inc. v. Harwood, 43 Misc. 2d 533, 251 N.Y.S.2d 612
(Sup. Ct. 1964) (list of all best known in field, not protectable). But see Suburban
Gas of Grand Junction, Inc. v. Bockelman, 156 Colo. 391, 401 P.2d 268 (1965), requiring fraud or trade secrecy before customer list is protectable.
140. It seems unrealistic to advance generalizations, as some writers have done,
such as that remembered lists can be used, written lists cannot. See, e.g., RnSrATZMZNT
(SZCoND) or AGENcY § 396 (1957). The entire situation should be examined.
141. See Whitted v. Williams, 226 Cal. App. 2d 52, 37 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1964);
Town & Country House & Homes Serv., Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314, 189 A.2d 390
(1963); Morgan's Home Equipment Corp. v. Martucci, 390 Pa. 618, 136 A. 838 (1957).
142. An employee may during his employment negotiate for or even purchase a
competing business. But he may not, during employment, solicit his employer's
customers for such business. C-E-I-R, Inc. v. Computer Dynamics Corp., 229 Md. 357,
183 A.2d 374 (1962). If he does this he may have to account for profits. See Town
& Country House & Homes Serv., Inc. v. Evans, 150 Conn. 314, 189 A.2d 390 (1963).
143. See Temp Instrument, Inc. v. Logitek, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 1 (E.D.N.Y. 1964);
Hahn & Clay v. A.O. Smith Corp., 212 F. Supp. 22 (S.D. Tex. 1962) ; Van Products
Co. v. General Welding & Fabricating Co., 419 Pa. 248, 213 A.2d 769 (1965).
144. The fact that no contract of secrecy is required or mentioned is not, of course,
conclusive as to the right to use information. See Junker v. Plummer, 320 Mass. 76,
67 N.E.2d 667 (1946) ; Schulenburg v. Signatrol, Inc., 50 Ill. App. 2d 402, 200 N.E.2d
615 (1964).
145. This too is not conclusive against a cause of action. See Sperry-Rand Corp.
v. Rothlein, 241 F. Supp. 549 (D. Conn. 1964).
146. See Rimer v. Paskan, 213 Cal. App. 2d 499, 28 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1963), holding
that corporate officers who, at their own expense, acquired mining claims about six
months after termination of their relation with an ore-processing corporation, which
was defunct and insolvent, were not accountable to stockholders of that corporation.
147. Clearly the receipt of consideration for the information as such presents a
stronger case for accountability than the mere use of it for competitive purposes.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
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Is his profit being made in competition with plaintiff ?'
Did he know, or have reason to know, he was not free to compete?
Was there any covenant not to compete? If so, was it reasonable
as to duration, area and scope ?""4
Why did defendant initially go to work for plaintiff ?150
Why did he leave?...
Did he ever make any disclosure to plaintiff of his plans after
leaving ?152
Has plaintiff in any way indicated acquiescence in the activities
complained of?...
In this technological era it is an everyday occurrence for trained
personnel to compete with their former employers, either individually
or as employees of a rival. To hold either them or their new employers
accountable for gains so derived, in the absence of a showing of some
element of chicanery in the situation, would be unjust and impolitic.
The competition must be shown to be unfair. And it is for this reason
that, though no single answer to any of the above suggested questions
is conclusive, it is of vital importance that the entire picture should
be placed before the court'" if a good case is to be presented.
148. A covenant not to compete will not be enforced where to enforce it would
merely serve to oppress defendant whose conduct cannot result in injury to complainant.
See Sternberg v. O'Brien, 48 N.J. Eq. 370, 22 A. 348 (1891).
149. See Schmidinger v. Welsh, 243 F. Supp. 852 (D.N.J. 1965) (absence of express covenant not conclusive). For examples of covenants in restraint of trade, see
Hudson Foam Latex Products, Inc. v. Aiken, 82 N.J. Super. 508, 198 A.2d 136 (1964).
150. A showing that he obtained employment with plaintiff for the express purpose
of acquiring information he could later use in competition would be highly persuasive.
151. In Byrne v. Barrett, 268 N.Y. 199, 197 N.E. 217 (1935), an agent, employed
by a broker to negotiate the sale of a lease, lined up a prospect. Due to a slight disagreement no contract resulted. The agent resigned from his employment, qualified
as a broker and, within a month, concluded the negotiations, gaining his commission.
His agreed compensation from the plaintiff ex-employer being one-half of commissions earned by the latter, he was held accountable for one-half of such commission
gained from the deal. In view of his failure to tell the plaintiff that negotiations were
practically concluded at the time of his resignation, the decision does not seem open
to criticism. But see 48 HARV. L. REv. 1014 (1935); 10 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 140
(1935) ; 9 U. CiN. L. Rgv. 518 (1935) ; 83 U. PA. L. Rnv. 691 (1935) ; 44 YAL
L.J. 882 (1935).
152. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. U.S. Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F. Supp.
161 (E.D. Wis. 1961), holding that an employee who plans to compete with his
employer when he leaves should fully disclose his intentions. But see Chevron Oil
Co. v. Tlapek, 265 F. Supp. 598 (W.D. Ark. 1967), modified, 407 F.2d 1129 (8th Cir.
1969), where disclosure of intention "to lease an area in respect of which he had
acquired confidential information" after resigning, was held no excuse.
153. The fact that defendant was wrongfully discharged from employment may
well operate to relieve him from accountability for profits. See General Bill-Posting
Co. v. Atkinson, [1909] A.C. 118 (Eng.), 1 B.R.C. 497.
154. "Jury" determination of issues presented in this area is conclusive if supported
by substantial evidence. See Hulsenbush v. Davidson Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 730
(8th Cir. 1965).
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10. Effect of Settlor's or Beneficiary's Exoneration
from Accountability
If it is provided by the terms of an express trust that the trustee
shall be exempted from any duty to account for his administration
and the clause can-not be construed as indicating that a gift absolute
to the trustee was .intended,15 such provision is not ordinarily considered to preclude injured beneficiaries from bringing suit to remedy
a breach of trust."5 6 Similarly, a provision exculpating the trustee
from liability for a -breach of trust, or for certain breaches of trust,
is accorded limited recognition' 7 but when recognized it is strictly
construed. 5 ' The overwhelming weight of authority is -to the effect
that it cannot relieve him from accountability for profits derived
from self-dealing. 5 9 And, if such a clause is to be relied on, it should
be shown that it was not inserted as a result of undue influence.' °
If the trustee himself drafted the instrument, it should be established
that the settlor knew of its insertion. 1'6
It seems that the same principles would extend to any fiduciary.
To permit him to contract out of accountability for profits resulting
from disloyalty would go counter to clear notions of public policy.
That is not to state, of course, that consent of the reposant of confidence
is never a good defense nor imply that a confidential relation cannot
be negated by contractual stipulation.162 But one cannot contract
out of liability for fraud." 3
155. In re Lewis' Will, 107 N.Y.S.2d 607 (Sur. Ct. 1951).
156. See Wood v. Honeyman, 178 Ore. 484, 169 P.2d 131 (1946), holding that a
provision exempting trustee from the need to keep formal accounts did not preclude
beneficiary from requiring that he show faithful performance of his duties. See Annot.,
171 A.L.R. 631 (1947).
157. See Clark v. Judge, 84 N.J. Super. 35, 200 A.2d 801 (1964), from which it
would appear that power to borrow could properly be given in or implied from a
trust instrument; Telephones, Inc. v. LaPrade, 206 Va. 388, 143 S.E.2d 853 (1965),
holding no breach of duty in the purchase for the trust of stock in which trustee held
an interest where instrument expressly permitted such conduct.
158. Coberly v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 231 Cal. App. 2d 685,
42 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1965).
159. See New England Trust Co. v. Triggs, 334 Mass. 324, 135 N.E.2d 541 (1956),
holding trustee accountable for profits derived from an unreasonably long withholding
of a fund from distribution and deposited in the commercial department of trustee
bank; Peterson v. Hopson, 306 Mass. 597, 29 N.E.2d 140 (1940), denying demurrer
on basis of exculpatory clause where complaint alleged trustee to have profited; In re
Schlussel's Trust, 203 Misc. 749, 117 N.Y.S.2d 48 (Sup. Ct. 1952), rev'd on other
grounds, 284 App. Div. 68, 130 N.Y.S.2d 566 (1954), holding exculpatory clause no
defense to suit for self-dealing; In re Kramer's Estate, 172 Misc. 598, 15 N.Y.S.2d 700
(Surrogate Ct. 1939); RASTATEMENT (SgcoND) ov TRUSTS § 222 (1957). See also
Annot., 83 A.L.R. 616 (1933) ; Annot., 158 A.L.R. 276 (1945).
160. See A. ScoTr, THn LAW Op TRUSTS § 222.4 (3d ed. 1967).
161. See In re Putnam's Will, 257 N.Y. 140, 177 N.E. 399 (1931) (legacy to
draftsman).
162. Zaidan v. Borg-Warner Corp., 228 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Pa. 1964); Van
Rensselaer v. General Motors Corp., 223 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 324 F.2d
354 (6th Cir. 1962).
163. See Angerosa v. White Co., 248 App. Div. 425, 290 N.Y.S. 204 (1936).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
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11. Accountability for Profits Made by Third Person
A fiduciary is not ordinarily accountable for the wrongdoing of
another unless he himself is guilty of wrongdoing. Thus, if he properly
delegates to another a duty which is properly delegable, 4 he will not
be accountable for the profits of the one to whom he has delegated
the duty. 6 ' So, too, he is not accountable for the profits of a predecessor in office, though failure to take timely steps to redress a breach
of trust may involve him in liability for damages. The same rule
applies to the profits of a co-fiduciary who is guilty of disloyalty.' 66
To hold him for the latter's gains a showing must be made either
of participation by defendant, an improper delegation, an approval
or acquiescence in the misconduct, -or, perhaps, a failure to exercise
due care in the supervision of the co-fiduciary's conduct.' 67
Where, however, it can be shown that it was ,the fiduciary who
made it possible for another to profit, he can be made to account for
that profit whether or not he himself has pocketed any benefit. Thus
a trustee who, in the process of reorganizing a group of companies,
allowed his employees to purchase interests in the latter and re-sell
them to him as reorganization trustee at their true value was held
surchargeable. 68 An attorney who paid the realtor his -client's purchase
money with knowledge that the realtor was making a secret profit of
$1,000 over and above 'his commissions, was made to account for
that sum. 6 9 And an executor who, after his attorney had settled a
claim against the estate by making a lesser payment out of his
individual funds, paid -the judgment creditor the full amount, which
payment was passed on to the attorney, was surcharged for the profit
the attorney had made. 7 °
12. Liability of Participating Third Persons
Apart from the situation where a non-participating co-fiduciary
is held liable for the -amount of his co-fiduciary's profits for negligence
or breach of trust,' 7' where a third party has acted in collusion with
the fiduciary, liability for the recovery of his profit is generally founded
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
(SEcoND) ov TRUSTS § 171 (1957).

oit

AGENCY

§

18 (1957);

R4STATXMXNT

165. See In re Barbikas' Estate, 171 Cal. App. 2d 452, 341 P.2d 32 (1959)
(executor not accountable for funds embezzled by attorney necessarily employed for

the estate).
166. See Jackson v. Jackson, 343 Ill. App. 31, 98 N.E.2d 169 (1951); In re

Johnson's Estate, 78 Wyo. 173, 320 P.2d 429 (1958).
167. See Annot., 65 A.L.R.2d 1019 (1959).
168. Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951).

169. Coleman v. Moody, 52 Tex. App. 138, 372 S.W.2d 306 (1963).

170. In re Hogan's Will, 37 Misc. 2d 806, 237 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sur. Ct. 1962).
Published by Villanova
University
Law(E.D.
DigitalMo.
Repository,
1970
171. See
Heit v.Charles
Bixby,Widger
276 F.School
Supp.of217
1967) (corporate
directors).
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on the basis of a constructive 'trust." 2 Where, on the other hand,
the third party cannot be shown to have participated except to the
extent -that he took advantage of the situation with knowledge that
disloyalty was involved, recovery is restricted to the gains he made
after acquiring such knowledge. 7 '
Similarly, a participating third party can be held for profits he
has not received. The liability of such persons and that of the fiduciary
is often said to be joint and several. 4 Thus, he can be held for
the entire profit even though he received nothing. 17 5 In view of the
difficulty of envisaging a constructive trust where there is no conceivable res to which it can attach, it is probably preferable to present
the action as one in tort for conspiracy. However, if for some reason
a suit in tort does not lie, as, for example, it is barred by the statute
of limitations, it is possible to assert 'a cause of action in quasi contract 176 even though recovery on this basis is traditionally restricted
to benefits actually received. 77 Thus, where defendant has bribed plaintiff's buying agent it can be argued that that part of the price paid
by plaintiff which represents the bribe remains the money of plaintiff.
When paid to the agent the defendant does not exonerate himself from
the obligation to return it to plaintiff any more than if he had stolen
a chattel and lost it.178As an alternative, it can be argued that defendant is a co-constructive trustee and secondarily liable as a guarantor
7 9
of the entire fund.'
172. Lawrence Warehouse Co. v. Twohig, 224 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1955); Ohio
Oil Co. v. Sharp, 135 F.2d 303 (10th Cir. 1943) ; Goggin v. Moss, 221 F. Supp. 905
(N.D. Tex. 1962) ; Gethsemane Lutheran Church v. Zacho, 253 Minn. 469, 92 N.W.2d
905 (1958) ; Corndale v. Stewart Stamping Corp., 129 N.Y.S.2d 808 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
173. RPSTA'rEMZNT (StCOND) op AGINCY § 312 (1957) ; A. ScoTT, Tnx LAW OF
TRUSTS § 506 (3d ed. 1967). See also Annot., 45 A.L.R. 1481 (1926).
174. Canadian Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. D. Loveman & Sons, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 829
(N.D. Ohio 1964) ; Commodity Credit Corp. v. Transit Grain Co., 157 F. Supp. 527
(S.D. Tex. 1957). In Lappas v. Barker, 375 S.W.2d 248 (Ky. 1964), the liability
is said to be "joint." But since the main attribute of joint liability as distinguished
from joint and several liability is the right of a co-obligor to insist that his co-obligor
be joined in the suit, this is clearly unsound.
175. See Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 86 A.2d 201 (1952),
where a selling syndicate, held to stand in a fiduciary relation to a subdivision to whom
it had sold a bridge, had both actively participating members and nonparticipating
members, and the former were held jointly and severally liable for the entire profit
made. The latter were held severally liable only to the extent of their respective profits.
See also Knox Glass Bottle Co. v. Underwood, 228 Miss. 699, 89 So. 2d 799 (1956).
176. See J.C. Peacock, Inc. v. Hasko, 196 Cal. App. 2d 363, 16 Cal. Rptr. 525
(1961) ; Sarten v. Pomato, 192 Cal. App. 2d 288, 13 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1961).
177. F. WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 289 (1913).
178. See In re Browning's Estate, 177 Misc. 328, 30 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sur. Ct. 1941).
179. See Marcus v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1948). In Barnes v. Eastern &
Western Lumber Co., 205 Ore. 553, 287 P.2d 929 (1955), former stockholders in a
corporation brought suit against its former directors who had acquired their stock
by fraud, divided it among themselves in unequal shares and, on liquidation of the
corporation, profited on its re-sale. The court, striving to find a basis for joint and
several liability, denied that this could be on a basis of constructive trust, but concluded that, where there has been some division of the spoils, however slight, liability
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
in quasi contract is joint and several. Each is implied in law to have promised to
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Finally, counsel shoul& be aware of the fact that some jurisd'ictions have enacted statutes which protect those who deal with
fiduciaries. 8 °
13. Double Recovery
as Fiduciary

-

Against Third Person as Well

When an agent - be he the agent of a seller of goods or of the
buyer - is bribed, it is well settled that the amount of the bribe can
be recovered against the bribe-giver.' 8 There is no need to show
that the price would have been lower had it not been for the bribe
if -the victim is the buyer. The assumption is that the price was
loaded by this amount. 8 2 The victimized principal can, of course,
recover the secret commission from his agent,' 83 but the question
remains as to whether he can recover the amount of the bribe twice.
It seems clear enough that a recovery against the bribe-giver
will not preclude him from recovery against the agent. The latter's
accountability is imposed by law to discourage self-dealing, not to compensate the principal, and it would be strange to allow a disloyal
fiduciary to retain the fruits because his victim no longer needs to
be compensated.'
But if the bribe has passed hands and has been
recovered from the agent, can the bribe-giver be made to doubly reimburse the principal? English courts have so held. He can recover
from both, and it does not matter which he sues first. "The agent
has been guilty of two distinct and independent frauds - the one in
his character of agent, the other by reason of his conspiracy with the
third person

.

.

.

[who] cannot absolve himself or diminish the

damages by reason of the principal having recovered from the agent
the bribe which he received .... ,,"85 If one attempts to apply this
answer for the whole amount obtained by the wrong. See generally Annot., 123
A.L.R. 107 (1939); Annot., 170 A.L.R. 358 (1942).
180. Those knowingly dealing with fiduciaries are readily chargeable with constructive notice of any disloyalty of which the fiduciary may be guilty. With this in
mind, and particularly to protect depositories of fiduciary funds against some of the
harsh results of this, many jurisdictions have enacted the UNIVORm FIDUClAR1tS ACT
(1922). This relieves such persons from the very high degree of vigilance in the detection of possible disloyalty which the common law requires of them. See Wysowatcky
v. Denver-Willys, Inc., 131 Colo. 266, 281 P.2d 165 (1955).
181. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American Plumbing & Supply Co., 19 F.R.D.
334, 344-45 (E.D. Wis. 1956), holding a vendor who paid secret commissions to
purchaser's agent would be liable either on the basis of "constructive trust, joint tort,
or for moneys had and received."
182. Id. Donemar, Inc. v. Molloy, 252 N.Y. 360, 169 N.E. 610 (1930); Cohen v.
Kuschke & Co., 83 L.T.R. (n.s.) 102 (Q.B. 1900).
183. Donemar v. Molloy, 252 N.Y. 360, 169 N.E. 610 (1930).
184. Id. In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Metropolitan Engravers, 245 F.2d 67 (9th
Cir. 1957), it was held that the fact that the victim had levied an attachment in a
suit against the agent for his profits did not render the complaint against the participating
third party
Published by Villanova
University
Charlesdismissable.
Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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theory to actions presently used in American law a problem arises.
Firstly, the reasoning would seem to run counter to the fact that the
liability of a fiduciary and his participant is joint and several,"8 6 with
"several" generally used to mean that payment by one releases the
other.
187
Secondly, if the liability of the bribe-giver is in tort for deceit,
it would seem -that double recovery is precluded by the fact that the
victim has aleardy been compensated for the wrong. If the suit is
based on quasi contract, the fact that the defendant, having passed
on to the agent the enhancement of the price, has not been enriched,
might well present an objection. For these reasons, though authority
supports the position that recovery can be had from the agent after
relief has been had against the participating third person, 8 8 a suit
against the latter after recovery has been had from the agent would
present much difficulty.
14. Effect of Disloyalty on the Right to Compensation
Whether or not a fiduciary called upon to account for his profits
will be required to forgo his compensation is a question very much
for the discretion of the court, 89 with much depending on the gravity
of 'his misconduct. If the court is to be persuaded to deny him his
emoluments the proof should be directed into one or more of the
following channels: his conduct as showing deliberate bad faith, or
as unconscionable,' 90 or as evidencing a consistent pattern of dereliction of duty ;191 his conduct as showing active and continued opposition to the complainant's interest ;192 or that the remuneration is being
186. See p. 372 supra.

187. Barnsdall v. Day, 134 F. 828 (3d Cir. 1905).
188. In Tarnowski v. Resop, 236 Minn. 33, 51 N.W.2d 801 (1952), a principal
induced to contract by fraud of his agent and of a third person, having recovered
substantially the amount of his down payment from the latter, was held entitled to the
agent's commissions. See also RESTAT4MWNT (SEcoND) or AGtNCY § 407 (1957).
189. See Schaefer v. Berinstein, 180 Cal. App. 2d 107, 4 Cal. Rptr. 236 (1960) ;
Bata v. Hill, 37 Del. Ch. 363, 143 A.2d 728 (1958) ; In re Dean's Trust, 47 Hawaii
629, 394 P.2d 432 (1964); In re Estate of Rorem, 245 Iowa 1125, 66 N.W.2d 292
(1954) ; Sullivan v. Sullivan, 335 Mass. 268, 139 N.E.2d 510 (1957) ; In re James'
Trust, 23 App. Div. 2d 529, 256 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1965) ; Evangelista v. Queens Structure Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 962, 212 N.Y.S.2d 781 (Sup. Ct. 1961) ; Hooker v. Hoskins,
388 P.2d 493 (Okla. 1964). In a proper case, emoluments already paid over can be
recovered. See Peacock v. Hasko, 196 Cal. App. 2d 353, 16 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1961).
190. Rushing v. Stephanus, 64 Wash. 2d 607, 393 P.2d 281 (1964). In Blackburn
& Co. v. Park, 357 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1966), an agent, employed by a prospective
buyer under the mistaken belief, cultivated by the plaintiff, that plaintiff agent was in
an exclusive position to find a buyer, and that the seller could not be approached
directly, was denied compensation for negotiating a purchase on a showing that,
at the time of the rendition of these services, he was also preparing the way for a
purchase of the property by other buyers. The court, however, hints that a quasi
contractual claim might have been successful had it been properly pleaded.
191. See Sauvage v. Galloway, 335 Ill. App. 35, 80 N.E.2d 553 (1948); Katz v.
Katz, 109 N.H. 478, 190 A.2d 425 (1963).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
192. Slosberg v. Callahan Oil Co., 125 Conn. 651, 7 A.2d 853 (1939).
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sought for the very acts which have been denounced 9 8 so that an
award of compensation would enable him to profit from his own wrong.
Conversely, if the aim is to persuade the court that he ought not
to forfeit his compensation, or at least not in toto, 19 4 the proof could

usefully be directed to bring out some of the following features: that
the transaction complained of was one isolable from his conduct in
general, a single episode marring a long term of useful service, or
related only to a small part of his duties ;'O that the agreed compensation
for services performed before the act of disloyalty was apportioned
in the contract;196 or that his services considerably benefited the
beneficiary. 1 7 Good faith, though not of course conclusive as to his
right to compensation,

98

is very relevant. If the record does not show

active fraud, dishonesty or bad faith, this should be emphasized. 99
B. Particular Fiduciary Relations
The discussion which follows is primarily concerned with applications of 'the doctrines already discussed in general terms to various
particular types of fiduciaries. The routine duty of a true fiduciary,
such as a trustee, executor or guardian to account for his administration,
and the law surrounding accounting on the dissolution of a partnership
or joint venture are, however, beyond the scope of this work.
When a fiduciary's duties are of an official court-supervised nature
he -acts wisely in seeking the directions of the court before embarking
on any course which might involve a charge of disloyalty,20 0 and he
is usually allowed to charge the cost of such a proceeding to the trust
193. See Shapiro v. Stahl, 195 F. Supp. 822 (M.D. Pa. 1961)

(agent) ; Canon v.

Chapman, 161 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Okla. 1958) (broker); Evans v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 127 A.2d 842 (D.C. Mun. Ct. 1956) (realtor) ; Sunset Acres
Motel, Inc. v. Jacobs, 336 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1960) (broker).
194. See Berner v. Equitable Office Bldg. Corp., 175 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1949);
Steiner v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 47 Hawaii 548, 393 P.2d 96 (1964) (reduced
compensation).
195. See Shipley v. Meadowbrook Club, 211 Md. 142, 126 A.2d 298 (1956) ; East
& West Coast Service Corp. v. Papahagis, 344 Pa. 183, 25 A.2d 339 (1942), where
a disloyal agent who operated a concession which he should have acquired for his
principal was held entitled, in an accounting for profits, to reasonable compensation
for his efforts.
196. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

or AGENCY § 456 (1957) ; Rushing v. Stephanus,

64 Wash. 2d 607, 393 P.2d 281 (1964); Gillam v. Roadway Exp., Inc., 1 Ohio App.
2d 548, 206 N.E.2d 34 (1965), holding fact that servant who stole from master would
not entitle master to withhold wages due for work properly performed and not related
to the theft.
197. See Brooks v. Conston, 365 Pa. 256, 72 A.2d 75 (1950).
198. See Vest v. Bialson, 365 Mo. 1103, 293 S.W.2d 369 (1956).
199. See Welsh v. Atlantic Research Associates, Inc., 321 Mass. 57, 71 N.E.2d 580
(1947) (competing employee). See also Annot., 80 A.L.R. 1075 (1932) ; Annot., 102
A.L.R. 1115 (1936) ; Annot., 134 A.L.R. 134 (1941) ; 46 MICH. L. Rzv. 112 (1947).
200. See In re Weinstein's Will, 43 Misc. 2d 489, 251 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sur. Ct.
1964), rev'd on other grounds, 25 App. Div. 2d 776, 269 N.Y.S.2d 475 (1966) ; In re
Tannenbaum's Will, 30 Misc. 2d 743, 219 N.Y.S.2d 149 (Sur. Ct. 1961); Dick &
Reuteman
Co. v.Charles
Doherty
Realty
16 Digital
Wis. Repository,
2d 342, 114
Published by Villanova
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Widger
SchoolCo.,
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1970N.W.2d 475 (1962); 29
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TRUSTS § 256 (1959).
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estate. However, when the problem really involves an exercise of
business judgment some courts decline to protect him with instructions. 201 In any event, he should make a point of rendering accounts of
his administration at the promptest possible intervals, thereby placing
on the beneficiaries the burden of objecting20 2 to alleged irregularities.
Other general matters of possible collateral interest, though not
discussed 'herein, are whether a judicial settlement of account precludes subsequent attack on alleged self-dealing ;2o3 whether courts may
authorize him to borrow from the fund he is administering ;204 the
extent of liability for -loss on investments as affected by the fact that
they were taken without indication of fiduciary status ;205 and the
measure of a fiduciary's liability for selling or changing investments
in good faith.20 6
1. Trustees Under Express Trusts
The Trustee-Beneficiary Relation. The trustee-beneficiary relation
is the historical prototype of the fiduciary concept. The most common
examples of the rule that a trustee cannot profit from a breach of trust,
which is fundamental, 2 7 are those where he has used trust property
for private purposes,20 8 or acquired for himself an interest he ought
to have acquired for the beneficiaries, 209 or received commissions on
account of transactions entered into as trustee.2 10
Even when invested with discretion, the trustee can be made to
account for an abuse thereof. 21' If the abuse was such as to enable
21 2
another to profit, that other can be compelled to make reparation.
201. See Wile, Judicial Assistance in the Administration of Trusts, 14

STAN.

L.

t~v. 231 (1962).
202. See p. 374 supra.
203. See generally Annot., 132 A.L.R. 1522 (1941); Annot., 137 A.L.R. 558
(1941); Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 1060 (1948); Bambrick v. Bambrick, 165 So. 2d 449
(Fla. 1964).
204. See Annot., 30 A.L.R. 461 (1924).
205. See Annot., 106 A.L.R. 271 (1937).
206. See Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 674 (1958). Attempts to unify the various laws
relating to accounting by trustees and executors are to be found in the UNIFORM
TRUsTtEs' ACcOUNTING ACT; 9C U.L.A. 277 (1957) ; MODEL PROBATE CODE §§ 172-81.
207. Hudson v. American Founders Life Ins. Co., 151 Colo. 54, 377 P.2d 301
(1963) ; Acott v. Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d 720 (1959).
208. Gaskins v. Bonfils, 79 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1935) (borrowing trust funds);
Loring v. Wise, 226 Mass. 231, 115 N.E. 302 (1947) (retaining interest on trust
funds deposited in bank). In Bohle v. Hasselbroch, 64 N.J. Eq. 334, 51 A. 508 (1902),
a trustee used part of the cestui's money to acquire an asset, the balance being paid
from his own funds. A constructive trust was impressed on the asset, subject to a
lien to secure the trustee's share.
209. Commonwealth Trust Co. Case, 331 Pa. 569, 1 A.2d 662 (1938) (resale to
trustee of mortgages purchased below par).
210. Old Settlers Club, Inc. v. Hamm, 245 Wis. 213, 13 N.W.2d 913 (1944).
211. In re Clarenbach's Will, 23 Wis. 2d 71, 126 N.W.2d 614 (1964) (allocating
to self, as life beneficiary, as income, about half of proceeds of sale of trust res in
the exercise of "discretion").
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
212. In re Davis, 195 Misc. 213, 88 N.Y.S.2d 192 (Sur. Ct. 1949).
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Although the settlor may relieve the trustee of the necessity of keeping
formal accounts, a provision relieving him from a duty to account for
his administration will be ignored. 18 Similarly, exculpatory provisions
in the trust instrument purporting to relieve him from liability for a
breach of trust are not construed as excusing him from accountability
for any profit he had made by such conduct. An exception to the rule
of accountability for profits has, however, at times been allowed where
by the terms of the trust the trustee is entitled to retain a profit made
in its administration.2 14
A co-cestui of a trust stands in a fiduciary relation to the other
cestuis. If he consents to a breach of trust he can be held accountable
to the extent of his profit. If he goes further and actively participates
in the breach, he can be held liable beyond this for a breach of trust.215

Profits Where No Breach of Trust is Involved. The rule against
self-dealing is designed to discourage any transaction wherein a fiduciary has divided loyalties, 216 and is very strictly applied when a trustee
under an express trust is involved. 217 Thus, a trustee who, in his
capacity as partner in a brokerage firm received a commission on the
loan of trust funds was held accountable therefor to the trust.2

18

Simi-

larly, a trustee who was also -a licensed insurer was accountable for
commissions on insurance provided for the trust estate. 2 9 Further, a
corporate trustee that purchased mortgage bonds below par and resold
to the trust at par was surcharged for its profit. 2 ' It is not material
that the profitable conduct did not constitute a breach of trust, or
221
that the profit was no more than his services were reasonably worth.
Bad faith need not be shown.222 The rule does not, of course, apply
where the terms of the trust instrument authorize such conduct.228
213. Wood v. Honeyman, 178 Ore. 484, 169 P.2d 131 (1946). See also p. 369 supra.
214. 2 A. ScoTr, Tim LAW op TRUSTS § 170.9 (3d ed. 1967).
215. 3 A. ScoT, supra note 15, §§ 256, 256.1 (3d ed. 1967). G. BoG4R'r, THt LAW

oi TRUSTS

AND

TRUSTEES § 3191 (2d ed. 1965).

216. See Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106 (1914) ; City Bank & Farmers Trust
Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E.2d 674 (1943).
217. See Niles, Trustee Accountability in the Absence of Breach of Trust, 60
COLUm. L. Rig. 141 (1960). RtSTATEMENT (SVcoND) op TRUSTS § 203 (1959).
218. Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106 (1914).
219. Dick & Reuterman Co. v. Doherty Realty Co., 16 Wis. 2d 342, 114 N.W.2d
475 (1962). See also Sexton v. Sword S.S. Line, 118 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1941).
220. Commonwealth Trust Co. Case, 331 Pa. 569, 1 A.2d 662 (1938).
221. Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106 (1914).
222. In re Kline, 142 N.J. Eq. 20, 59 A.2d 14 (1948); Slay v. Burnett Trust,
143 Tex. 621, 187 S.W.2d 377 (1945).
223. Turnbull v. Pomeroy, 140 Mass. 117, 3 N.E. 15 (1885) ; Newton v. Old
Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 299 Mich. 499, 300 N.W. 859 (1941).
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But it does extend to situations where agents 224 or employees of the
trustee2 2 5 are enabled to make a profit.

Qualifications Based on Policy: Use of Deposits Awaiting Investment. The strict rule of accountability, regardless of proof of a
breach of trust, 22 admits to qualification when its application may deprive the beneficiaries of advantages which corporate trustees are often
in a position to exploit on their behalf. An example is the purchase
of stock by a corporate trustee for the trust from an affiliated corporation in which it has an -interest, or the retention of shares in its own
corporation as part of the trust res.2 These have been categorized
as situations where the putative interest of the trustee is too remote or
228
too feeble an inducement to be a determining motive for his conduct,

and thus do not fall within the early rule condemning all self-dealing. 22
The authorities are split as to whether a trustee who is also a
banking institution can deposit trust funds awaiting proper investment
with its own banking department. Most jurisdictions carry a statutory
provision on the point. 210 In New England Trust Co. v. Triggs,23 a
trustee whose duty it was to distribute the corpus on the death of
the life 'beneficiary had reason to anticipate long delay in the final
distribution. On the death of the latter he realized the assets 'and,
under the authority of a statute, deposited them in h'is corporate banking department. The court held the statute did not cover such a situation and that the trustee could, at the option of the beneficiaries, be
made to account either for his profits or for the value of the use of the
funds. Thus it would seem that such statutes are construed as applicable 'only to the situation where funds have to be held 'available for
current expenses, or where provision has to be made for the funds
while a suitable investment is being negotiated.
2. Agents
The Principal-Agent Relation. The principal-agent relation is
sometimes said not to be a "fiduciary" one for the purposes of the
224. In re Bond & Mortg. Guarantee Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E.2d 721 (1952)
(attorneys for trustee).

225. Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951).

226. See p. 376 supra.
227. See 2 A. ScoT'r, THE LAw O TRUSTS §§ 170.13 et seq. (3d ed. 1967).
228. Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955).
229. "[The law] does not stop to inquire whether the contract or transaction was
fair or unfair. It stops the inquiry when the relation is disclosed . . . without undertaking to deal with the question of abstract justice in the particular case." Munson v.
Syracuse, 103 N.Y. 58, 74, 8 N.E. 355, 358 (1886). See 25 U. CHi. L. RZv. 382 (1958).
230. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or TRUSTS § 170, comment m at 369 (1959). See
Annot., 112 A.L.R. 780 (1938).
231. 334 Mass. 324, 135 N.E.2d 541 (1956), 337 Mass. 482, 150 N.E.2d 22 (1958),

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
339 Mass. 453, 159 N.E.2d 415 (1959).
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rule 8 2 that a bill for an accounting lies when an abuse of fiduciary

relations is involved.2"' It is, of course, fiduciary in the sense that all
doctrines relating to self-dealing apply. And, even where there may
be an adequate legal remedy, such as quasi contract or conversion,
there is seldom difficulty in establishing a fiduciary element if a bill for
28
an accounting is preferred.

4

As to the principal, though ordinarily he clearly is not a fiduciary,
being the reposant 'and not the recipient of confidence, where he has
a duty to render accounts of the amount due to his agent which duty
he breaches, the agent may 'be entitled to an accounting. 28 5 The
reason is, 'however, complexity of the accounts and not any fiduciary
status. The duty of loyalty exists whether or not the agency is
gratuitous.
The mere fact that an agreement is couched in agency terms does
not of course bring the "'agent" under these self-dealing doctrines if
in fact ,he has the contractual right to buy his "principal's" goods and
the right to re-sell for gain.286
Status of Sub-Agents. The courts have at times loosely used the
term "sub-agent" as referring to an agent appointed by another -agent
acting on behalf of the principal.237 Such a person, however, is really
nothing but a fellow-agent. Wi'thout a showing of any further facts
than the profit-making transaction, there would be no basis whatever
on which the appointing agent could be made to account. And, the
obligation to account to the principal by such a wrongdoer is the same
as that of any other -agent.
The sub-agent in the proper sense is one appointed by an agent
to perform functions the agent has undertaken to perform for the
principal, but for whose conduct the agent 'agrees with the principal
to -be primarily responsible. An example would be the salesman employed 'by a realtor.2"8 By the weight -of modern authority such a
person stands in a fiduciary relation to the principal provided he
232. See p. 355 supra.
233. See Hall v. McKellar, 155 Ala. 508, 46 So. 460 (1908); Waters v. Boyden,
275 Mass. 564, 176 N.E. 535 (1931); Williams v. Finlaw, Mueller & Co., 292 Pa. 244,
141 A. 47 (1928).
234. See De Vito v. Perillo, 36 Misc. 2d 791 231 N.Y.S.2d 83 (Sup. Ct. 1962),

holding that where an agent has received and dealt with property of plaintiff, plaintiff
is entitled to an accounting without the need to show anything is due.
235. See Bell v. Trickett, 48 Del. Co. 465 (Pa. 1960) (a bill on a single account
brought by a grain broker against his client, alleging complicated transactions over
a period of months, with payments and advances made by both sides, states a cause of
action for an accounting) ; Goffe & Clarkener v. Lyons Milling Co., 26 F.2d 801
(W.D. Kan. 1928). See also RgSTATM
MNT (SZcoND) or AGENCY § 436, comment c
at 320 (1958).
236. Miller & Co. v. Crider, 196 F. Supp. 424 (W.D. Kan. 1961).
237. University
See, e.g., Charles
Hilton Widger
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269Repository,
P. 425 (1928).
238. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) or AGENCY § 5 (1958).
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knows of the principal's existence2. 3 To establish that such a defendant
is a fiduciary it should be stated and shown that the agent had power,
either express or by implication from widespread custom, to so delegate. Without this, there is the possibility that defendant might be
held to be a mere agent or servant of the agent, bearing no fiduciary
relation to the plaintiff.24 °It does not seem that the profits, as such,
derived by a servant or agent of an agent can .be recovered from the
employing agent absent a showing of participation or benefit. Further,
there would seem to be no basis for extending -the doctrine of vicarious
liability into this field. Any recovery against the agent himself, for the
profits made by a true sub-agent, would have to be in tort or contract.
Brokers. A broker, whet-her it be of real estate, stocks, merchandise or insurance, is a fiduciary in relation to his client.241 There is
a reservation, however. When it is known to both buyer -and seller
that the broker is merely acting as a middleman whose sole purpose
is to bring the parties together to arrange a deal, he cannot be made
to account for compensation received as a secret profit from either
party at the suit of the other party, even if the plaintiff did not know
that he was to receive this secret commission.2 42 Nor does the broker
thereby forego his right to compensation from either party. Thus,
where a vendor promised a commission to anyone of five hundred
brokers who produced a buyer, and one such broker made a bid in the
name of a corporation he controlled, which fact was known to the
vendor, as a finder or middleman the broker qualified for his commission. His only function was to submit a bid.2 43 The reservation,
however, can be overcome 'by a showing that he participated in the
239. RESAThMENIT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 428 (1958). In Keller v. American
Chain Co., 255 N.Y. 94, 174 N.E. 74 (1930), a buyer of goods agreed to act as agent
of the seller for the purpose of paying freight charges. He appointed a sub-agent for
this purpose. The sub-agent, on discovering that the buyer was obtaining rebates,
agreed to give this information to the seller for a consideration. The sub-agent's
assignee's suit to recover this consideration failed because the sub-agent could not act
adversely to his principal.
240. See Cowan v. Eastern Racing Ass'n, 330 Mass. 135, 111 N.E.2d 752 (1953),
wherein the court held that where an agent employs an agent or a servant to assist
him on his own account, the person so appointed is a mere agent of the agent.
241. Canon v. Chapman, 161 F. Supp. 104 (W.D. Okla. 1958) ; Fischer v. Slayton
& Co., 10 Ill. App. 2d 167 (1956) ; Maniscalco v. Glass, 163 So. 2d 438 (La. 1964) ;
Otterson v. Dobson & Johnson, Inc., 52 Tenn. App. 280, 372 S.W.2d 777 (1963). In
Boonstra v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 64 Wash. 621, 393 P.2d 287 (1964), a loan broker
who recommended investment on inadequate collateral was described as "at least
quasi-fiduciary." One who falsely represents himself to be a broker can assume the
same status as a broker. 319 E. 72nd St. Corp. v. Warnecke & Co., 20 App. Div. 2d
513, 244 N.Y.S.2d 604 (1963).
242. McConnell v. Cowan, 44 Cal. 2d 805, 285 P.2d 261 (1955) ; Moore v. Turner,
137 W. Va. 299, 71 S.E.2d 342 (1952).
243. Batston v. Strehlow, 59 Cal. Rptr. 195, vacated 68 Cal. 2d 662, 441 P.2d
101 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
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bargaining process to the slightest degree.2 44 However, when such
participation is shown, the cases merely hold the broker to have forfeited his right to compensation from the party who did not know of
the conflicting interest. It would be rash to assert that commissions
so received can be recovered as secret profits.

245

While there is no objection to a broker secretly agreeing with
the party not his client to share his commission or some of it (this
being a secret loss rather than profit) 2 46 a secret agreement to pool
commissions between brokers respectively representing the two contracting parties is regarded 'as self-dealing. 24 7 It is entirely possible
that such a transaction would afford a basis for recovery of excess
commissions so gained.
Realtors. Recovery of profits against a realtor is most commonly
had where defendant, engaged to secure property for his principal,
buys it for himself and sells, sometimes through -a dummy, to the
principal at a secret profit ;248 or where, with directions to sell, he
secretly sells to himself and re-sells at a profit. 249 In at least one jurisdiction, the seller's realtor has been made to account for the profits of
a re-sale when, though his purchase was not secret, the broker failed
to make full disclosure of his knowledge of prevailing market values. 25 °
It has been possible for one who is not the realtor's client to state
a case for recovery of his profits. Such a person has been held to
stand in a fiduciary relation to both parties to the transaction.2 5 ' Thus,
where a realtor lied to his principal, the vendor, as to the price which
a purchaser would pay and, through a dummy, obtained a substantial
portion of the land his client thought he was selling to the purchaser
at a cheaper price, a constructive trust was impressed on the land for
the benefit of the purchaser. The court reasoned that by not communicating the purchaser's offer to his client the realtor had defrauded
the purchaser. 252 Thus there may be a fiduciary duty to faithfully
communicate offers to the non-client offeror.
244. Crane v. Colonial Holding Corp., 57 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
245. See Annot., 14 A.L.R. 464 (1921).
246. Christian v. Dunavent, 232 S.W. 875 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
247. Howard v. Murphy, 70 N.J.L. 141, 56 A. 143 (1903). See also RISTATEMaINT
(StcoN ) o1 AGENCY § 391, comment c at 213 (1958).
248. See Spindler v. Krieger, 16 Ill. App. 2d 131, 147 N.E.2d 457 (1958).
249. See McKinney v. Christmas, 143 Colo. 361, 353 P.2d 373 (1960). See also
Annot., 55 A.L.R.2d 342 (1955); Annot., 26 A.L.R.2d 1307 (1952); Annot., 62
A.L.R. 63 (1929).
250. Iriart v. Johnson, 75 N.M. 745, 411 P.2d 226 (1966).
251. See United Homes, Inc. v. Moss, 154 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1963) ; Swift v. White,
256 Iowa 1013, 129 N.W.2d 748 (1964) (obiter).
252. Harper v. Adametz, 142 Conn. 218, 113 A.2d 136 (1955).
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California has no difficulty in impressing a constructive trust
on the intermediary in this type of fraud even where he was not the
agent of the plaintiff, the Code being broad enough to extend this
remedy to any victim of fraud.253 This may present a difficulty, however. If the realtor can be made to account for his profits to the
defrauded purchaser, who was not his client, and he has actually
defrauded both parties, there is the question whether the purchaser's
successful suit for his profits will preclude any subsequent suit by his
client for the same profits. For this reason it is submitted that any
action by the defrauded non-client should be in tort for deceit, and
accountability for profits - an obligation quite independent and arising
from his fiduciary status - confined to his client.
The rule which provides that when the subject matter of an agency
is sold or is disposed of, the agency terminates, does not relieve a
realtor of liability when he has made a sale which is still in escrow.
If he secretly buys the vendor's equity at a discount and takes over his
obligation he must account for his profit even though his client, the
vendor, receives exactly the price he asked. 2"' A Texas court, however, influenced by the settled doctrine that for purposes of his commission the realtor has "sold" when he has produced a purchaser willing
and able to buy, has held that once an earnest money contract has been
executed the realtor's agency is ended, and with it the fiduciary status.
Hence he is not accountable for profits indirectly resulting from false
representations made to his former principal after that date but before
title has passed to the vendee.255 The better reasoning, however, is that
the fiduciary status continues as long as he improperly remains in a
position to exploit an opportunity he should exploit for his principal.
He owes a duty not to take advantage of a still subsisting confidential
25
relation. 6
Stockbrokers. The relationship between a stockbroker and his
client, unlike that of banker and depositor, is ordinarily one of principal
and agent.257 Secret profits resulting from a purchase of stock for his
253.
254.
255.
v. Real
told the

See Ward v. Taggart, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959).
Manzel v. Selka, 179 Cal. App. 2d 612, 4 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1960).
Jones v. Allen, 294 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956). But see McPherson
Estate Comm'r, 162 Cal. App. 751, 329 P.2d 12 (1958), where a purchaser
realtor, who originally acted for the seller, that he did not want the property,

and did not care what the realtor did with it so long as he got his deposit back,
though he was able to complete the transaction. The seller, informed that the realtor
intended to resell, made no objection. Defendant was held in error in finding the
realtor to have made a secret profit on the resale, this having been made as agent for
the original buyer and not for his former client.
256. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 396 (1958).
257. Levzidger v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 396 S.W.2d 570
(Mo. 1965) (holding relationship to be fiduciary in nature) ; Selcow v. Floersheimer,
20 App. Div. 889, 248 N.Y.S.2d 934 (1964). As to the fiduciary status of investment
advisers, see pp. 407-09 infra.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
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client 258 or from a sale of stock to himself 259 without a proper disclosure 260 can be recovered. These doctrines, however, may be considerably modified by local practice or by a known custom of the
25
broker involved. '
An agreement to buy and carry stocks for the client is regarded
as more than an agreement to procure and furnish the shares when
required, being an engagement actually to purchase and hold such
shares. Whether the purchase is on margin or otherwise, most jurisdictions regard the legal title to the stock so purchased as vesting in
the client.26 2 But the broker fulfills his duty if he merely keeps sufficient stock of the same kind available.26 And if the broker sells his
64
own stock to the client he can retain title thereto until paid .2
As to the accountability of a broker for profits derived from an
illegal stock transaction, such as gambling in futures on margin, the
authorities are not in harmony.265 The best view seems to be suggested by the Restatement of Agency:
(3) An agent who has received the proceeds or profits of an
act committed by him on behalf of and at the direction of the
principal and for which the principal is criminally responsible is
under no duty to deliver them to the principal if the crime is
266
more than a minor offense.
If this type of activity is proscribed chiefly for the protection of persons
such as the plaintiff client, and is not regarded as seriously criminal,
to disallow recovery would be to impose too great a penalty for the
258. Birch v. Arnold & Sears, Inc., 288 Mass. 125, 172 N.E. 571 (1934) ; Kinney

v. Glenny, 231 App. Div. 311, 247 N.Y.S. 119 (1931). In Norris v. Beyer, 124 N.J.
Eq. 284, 1 A.2d 460 (1938), where a broker, in clear abuse of a confidential relationship, invested the proceeds of a sale of his client's securities in speculative non-income
producing stocks, charging a commission on such purchases, the court, while calling
him a constructive trustee, awarded to the client the present value of the original
securities plus the income they would have yielded her to date. The decree, which was
affirmed, appears to be in the nature of a surcharge for losses caused rather than an
accounting of profits.
259. Berenson v. Nirenstein, 326 Mass. 285, 93 N.E.2d 610 (1950) ; Tatsuno v.
Kasai, 70 Utah 203, 259 P. 318 (1927).
260. Claughton v. Baer Stearns & Co., 397 Pa. 480, 156 A.2d 314 (1959) (disclosure to client's attorney).
261. See Hall v. Paine, 224 Mass. 62, 112 N.E. 153 (1916), holding voidable
purchases of client's stock by a broker for himself notwithstanding a local custom of
which client was ignorant, but holding not voidable such purchases by broker acting
as broker for other customers, this being authorized by custom and by a rule of the
local exchange. See also Annot., 79 A.L.R. 592 (1932).
262. See Annot., 41 A.L.R. 1258 (1926). See also In re Kadar's Estate, 3 Misc. 2d
479, 154 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sur. Ct. 1956).
263. Sackville v. Wimer, 76 Colo. 519, 233 P. 152 (1925).
264. Id.
265. See Lovejoy v. Kaufman, 16 Tex. Civ. App. 377, 41 S.W. 507 (1897) (broker
accountable for money actually received from third person) ; but see Carey v. Myers,
92 Kan. 493, 141 P. 602 (1914) (broker not accountable for profits).
266. RiSTrATUM XT (SgcoND) or ActNCY § 412(3), comment c at 269 (1958).
See generally pp. 404-06 infra, as to unconscionability of plaintiff's conduct as defense
suit forUniversity
profits. Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970
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forbidden activity. However, against -this it could be urged that in no
case would the broker be able to recover losses.
Attorneys. The relation of attorney and client is a highly fiduciary
Transactions between them during the existence of the relationship are jealously scrutinized by the courts 268 and are, in most jurisdictions, presumptively fraudulent. 26 9 This presumption has been harnessed to deprive an attorney of his share of profits derived from
a joint venture entered into with his client.2 70 To rebut such a presumption it is helpful, though not essential, to show that the client
took independent legal advice.2
It follows that where the attorney
has acquired -an interest antagonistic to those of his client the client
2 72
can compel an accounting of profits.
Attorneys for trustees of an express trust owe the same duties
to the beneficiary thereof as do the trustees. If they acquire any part
of the trust estate in breach of their fiduciary duty they are accountable
one."0 7

for profits.

273

Perhaps the most frequent application of the doctrine of accountability in this area occurs where the attorney buys in an interest adverse
to his client in property which is the subject of litigation at a forced
sale. Where the acquisition is based on information obtained through
267. Gaffney v. Harmon, 405 Ill.
273, 90 N.E.2d 785 (1950).
268. See Miller v. Solomon, 49 Ill.
App. 2d 156, 199 N.E.2d 660 (1964).
269. See Jordan v. Ray Schools-Chicago, Inc., 49 Ill. App. 2d 1, 199 N.E.2d 827
(1964) ; Bounoughas v. Peters, 49 Ill. App. 2d 138, 198 N.E.2d 142 (1964) ; Scott v.
Morrow, 192 Kan. 666, 391 P.2d 47 (1964) ; Kribbs v. Jackson, 387 Pa. 611, 129 A.2d
490 (1957), holding accountable an attorney who, through a lessor's agent, but without knowledge of lessor, stipulated for a large sum to be paid to him monthly as a
precondition of his negotiating a lease.
270. See Gold v. Greenwald, 247 Cal. App. 2d 296, 55 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1967), where
the client was a business woman of considerable acumen and experience in the type of
transaction involved.
271. Curtis v. Fabianich, 200 A.2d 382 (D.C. Ct. App. 1964) (the presumption
of invalidity to extend to contracts for compensation executed during the attorneyclient relationship when the position of trust is well established and the litigation
involved is reaching its culmination) ; Trafelet v. M & C Motors, Inc., 15 Ill.
App. 2d
534, 146 N.E.2d 711 (1957).
272. Opdyke v. Kent Liquor Mart, Inc., 40 Del. Ch. 316, 181 A.2d 579 (1962). In
Rothman v. Wilson, 121 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1941), the doctrine was applied to render
accountable for profits an attorney who, due to lack of confidence in his legal ability,
did no legal work for plaintiff but received a share of the fees of plaintiff's attorney,
with whom he had an office-sharing arrangement, as a reward for having been instrumental in bringing the opportunity, the subject of the relationship to the notice of
the client. An attorney can recover a loan made to his client but cannot profit therefrom. Davanne Realty Co. v. Brunne, 67 N.J. Super. 500, 171 A.2d 97 (1961).
273. In re Bond & Mortgage Guarantee Co., 303 N.Y. 423, 103 N.E.2d 721 (1952)
(purchase by attorney for trustee for holders of mortgage bonds who bought some
of the bonds at a substantial discount). New York courts have inherent power summarily to compel an attorney to restore property of a client received or retained in
violation of professional obligations. See Cox v. Scott, 10 App. Div. 2d 32, 197
N.Y.S.2d 60 (1960) (money retained under unfair contingent fee contract) ; Fitzgerald
v. Wells, 14 Misc. 2d 435, 179 N.Y.S.2d 29 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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his retainer,274 there is a disability which is often held to continue after
termination of his employment. The attorney has at times been held
for rents and profits accruing to him through the purchase of such
an interest.2 75 However in Kelly v. Weir278 the court declined to extend
the doctrine to an attorney who had, after termination of his employment, acquired a fractional interest in land sold to satisfy a judgment
the government had obtained against his former client. He persuaded
the court that he had made great efforts to help the client save his land
but that the client had refused to 'be helped.
3. Servants
Acquisitions and Earnings from Other Sources During the Employment Term. The servant, in the sense of one who merely renders
services, cannot be classified as a true fiduciary. 77 Though he can
be held accountable for gains derived from sources other than his
employment during the employment term the early holdings, whereunder he was almost invariably so accountable 271 are presently of
historical interest only, being a relic of feudalism. The general test
of a master's right to recover in modern times is controlled by the
answer to the question of whether the acquisition was made in breach
of his employment duty.279 To penalize "moonlighting" today would
smack of involuntary servitude.
A presentation of the fact situations which will yield an affirmative answer to as many of the following questions 'as possible suggested by way of a checklist rather than as rules of law - should
go far to present a cause of action for recovery of the servant's profits
by the master:
274. See Tuab Mineral Corp. v. Anderson, 3 Ariz. App. 512, 415 P.2d 910 (1966),
holding proper a purchase at judicial sale of property in which former client was
interested, provided no information acquired in professional capacity is used to prejudice of client.
275. Some courts do not apply the doctrine where the attorney has been open and
above board in informing the client. See Annot., 20 A.L.R.2d 1280, 1309 (1951).
276. Kelly v. Weir, 243 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
277. Amerada Petroleum Corp. v. Burline, 231 F.2d 862 (10th Cir. 1956), holding
employee of mining corporation for specific and limited purposes not to be a constructive trustee of interests acquired. But see In re Burris, 263 N.C. 793, 140 S.E.2d 408
(1965) (where a servant deliberately acquires an interest adverse to his employer, a
discharge for disloyalty is justified) ; E.W. Bruno Co. v. Friedberg, 21 App. Div. 336,
250 N.Y.S.2d 187 (1964) (a manager of an importing business guilty of disloyalty
in not informing his employer when knowledge reaches him that a foreign exporter
with whom the employer is doing business is planning independent methods of distribution of its exports within the country) ; Rasbury v. Bainum, 15 Utah 2d 62,
387 P.2d 239 (1963).
278. See Annot., 13 A.L.R. 905 (1921) ; Annot., 71 A.L.R. 933 (1931).
279. See Essex Trust Co. v. Enwright, 214 Mass. 507, 102 N.E. 441 (1913),
holding that where a newspaper reporter, having learned in his employment of the
peculiar value to his employer, by reason of the way the printing press was built in, of
a lease, acquired the renewal thereof for himself he held it as trustee for the employer.
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Were any confidential disclosures made to defendant as a servant?
Did defendant contract to devote all his time and skill to
plaintiff ?280
Were the acquisitions derived from competition with plaintiff ?2l
Was the transaction in performance of a duty assigned to him
by plaintiff ?282
Was the transaction one of a type habitually performed by him
for plaintiff ?283
Was the transaction of a kind which constituted part of plaintiff's
business ?
Was the transaction an opportunity plaintiff could have exploited
for himself ?24

Did defendant use plaintiff's facilities for the purpose of the acquisition ?285
Did plaintiff pay defendant's expenses while on the enterprise ?28
Was the operation during employment hours ?287
Was defendant enabled to make the acquisition by reason of his
servant status ?288
Did he use plaintiff's funds to acquire it ?289
Did he refrain from making a disclosure?..
PreparationsDuring Employment for Competition on Termination. Absent a contract stipulation, an employee may, provided he
280. See Clarke v. Kelsey, 41 Neb. 766, 60 N.W. 138 (1894); Elco Shoe Mfrs.
v. Sisk, 260 N.Y. 100, 183 N.E. 191 (1932). But an obligation to devote one's entire
time to one's employment is not today construed to embrace time normally devoted to
rest and recreation. See Durwood v. Dubinsky, 361 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. 1963).
281. See Welsh v. Atlantic Research Associates, 321 Mass. 57, 71 N.E.2d 580
(1947).
282. See Whitten v. Wright, 206 Minn. 423, 289 N.W. 509 (1929).
283. See Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380, 122 N.E. 378, 153
N.Y.S. 757 (1919).
284. Id.
285. See Clarke v. Kelsey, 41 Neb. 766, 60 N.W. 138 (1894).
286. See Whitten v. Wright, 206 Minn. 423, 289 N.W. 509 (1929).
287. See Clarke v. Kelsey, 41 Neb. 766, 60 N.W. 138 (1894); Horn Pond Ice
Co. v. Pearson, 267 Mass. 256, 166 N.E. 640 (1929), affirming an interlocutory decree
in a suit to impress a constructive trust on a lease secured by employees who had
been approached by lessor under the earlier lease to plaintiff employer who had become
acquainted with them as a result of their employment.
288. See Reading v. Attorney-General, [1951] A.C. 507 (use of army uniform
to conceal smuggling activities). In Chalupiak v. Stahlman, 368 Pa. 83, 81 A.2d 577
(1951), defendant, employed to prepare a deed for plaintiff, discovered that plaintiff
did not have title and so informed him. Plaintiff ignored this. Defendant then acquired
the land at bargain rates from the true owner. He was held accountable on being
reimbursed for the price he had paid. Perhaps the fact that he was a local justice of
the peace and performed some draftsmanship services for the community may have
influenced the holding that he was a "fiduciary."
289. See Michigan Crown Fender Co. v. Welch, 211 Mich. 143, 178 N.W. 684
(1920).
290. See Horn Pond Ice Co. v. Pearson, 267 Mass. 256, 166 N.E. 640 (1929).
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does not use confidential information or trade secrets of his employer,
freely compete with him after termination of his employment. 2 "' There
is a trend, however, which seems to favor extension of the fiduciary
concept to these situations. 29 2 Whether or not this is a wholesome
development, 29 8 it is clear that a servant who, during his employment,

solicits for himself business opportunities which his employment requires that he solicit for his employer, should be accountable for
profits so gained after the employment is terminated. The rule is not
altered by the fact that the employer would not have been able to
exploit such an opportunity before the effective date of the employee's
termination of the service.294 Thus one who uses his employer's funds
while still in his employ (without disclosing his plans to compete) to
promote customer goodwill, some of which is to be channeled into
the competing enterprise when he quits, and who solicits other employees to enter the competing enterprise, is guilty of disloyalty. 2 5
Employees, on termination, often take "terminal leave." This is
really a lump-sum payment for accumulated annual leave on separation
from service and while on such leave, it is not improper to exploit
skills gained during employment. Further an employee can, provided
he does not compromise his employer's interest, make preparations for
activities to begin at the beginning of his terminal leave even while
actively employed.296
Right to Inventions as Between Employer and Employee. When
one is employed to exercise his general inventive talents, or to invent
a particular item, he must, if he succeeds during the term of his employment, turn over the invention to his employer.2 97 This is so because
in inventing he is simply performing his contract. 29 He has, in effect,
sold, in advance, -the fruits of his inventive powers. 9 9 Where, on the
other hand, a servant not specifically employed to invent, uses his
291. Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Audio Devices, Inc., 166 F. Supp. 250 (S.D. Cal.
1958), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 869 (1961).

292. See, e.g., Brophy v. Cities Service Corp., 131 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949)
(use by secretary of information as to employer's future stock trading plans).
293. See Marine Forwarding & Shipping Co. v. Barone, 154 So. 2d 528 (La. 1963).
294. Community Counselling Service, Inc. v. Reilly, 317 F.2d 239 (4th Cir. 1963).
295. Standard Brands, Inc. v. United States Partition & Packaging Corp., 199 F.
Supp. 161 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
296. United States v. Bowen, 290 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1961). See also Safeway
Stores v. Wilcox, 220 F.2d 661 (10th Cir. 1955), holding precluded from competition
with his ex-employer one who, though no longer in active employment, remained on
the payroll for the purpose of qualifying for separation benefits and pension rights.
297. Standard Parts Co. v. Peck, 264 U.S. 52 (1924) ; National Wire Bound Box
Co. v. Healy, 189 F. 49 (7th Cir. 1911) ; Diversey Corp. v. Mertz, 13 F. Supp. 410
(E.D. Ill. 1936) ; Dowse v. Federal Rubber Co., 254 F. 308 (E.D. Ill. 1918) ; Banner
Metals, Inc. v. Lockwood, 178 Cal. App. 2d 643, 3 Cal. Rptr. 421 (1960) ; Misani v.
Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 44 N.J. 552, 210 A.2d 609 (1965).
298. Davis v. Alwac Int'l, Inc., 369 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
299. Solomons v. United States, 137 U.S. 342 (1890).
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master's facilities during employment hours to develop an invention
for which he takes out a patent, the master is entitled to a non-exclusive
right to use the invention called a shopright 0 0 And, the fact that most
of the experimental work was done out of employment hours does not,
when the master's facilities are used, necessarily rule out shoprights.8 0 '
To establish a right to shoprights, the important features to present are:
the extent to which the master's facilities were used (with particular
emphasis on access to confidential materials); the extent to which
co-operation of any fellow employee was made use of; the amount of
employment time devoted to the perfection of the invention ;102 facts
from which assent can be implied that the master was to have the use
of it;803 the extent to which employment itself furnished the opportunity for the conception of the inventive idea;804 and the extent to
which the original idea was that of the master, the defendant merely
applying his skills towards its perfection. 0 5 Some courts do, however,
make an exception to the rule permitting shoprights where the employee
has applied for a patent before using his employer's facilities.8" 6
4. Executors, Administrators, Personal Representatives
Relationship to Decedent's Successors and Creditors. A person
administering the assets of a decedent, especially perhaps where the
beneficiary thereof is an infant, 0 is an officer of the court.0 ' He
stands in a fiduciary relation to those entitled to succeed to the decedent 0 9 and to the decedent's creditors. 10
300. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933); Cahill v.
Regan, 5 N.Y.2d 292, 157 N.E.2d 505, 184 N.Y.S.2d 348.
301. See Wellington Print Works, Inc. v. Magid, 242 F. Supp. 614 (E.D. Pa.
1965).

302. Woodruff v. New State Ice Co., 197 F.2d 36 (10th Cir. 1952).
303. See Le-Fiell v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 865 (1963) (where the inventor
is more than a mere employee, being in effect the alter ego of the employer, the
latter may be found entitled to the ownership of the invention) ; De Jur-Amsco Corp.
v. Fogle, 119 F. Supp. 262 (D.N.J. 1954) ; Barlow & Seelig Mfg. Co. v. Patch, 232
Wis. 220, 286 N.W. 577 (1939).
304. See National Development Co. v. Gray, 316 Mass. 240, 55 N.E.2d 783 (1944).
305. See Standard Brands, Inc. v. United States Partition & Packaging Corp.,
199 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Wis. 1961) (mere withholding of shoprights insufficient for
decree that defendant assign patent) ; See also International Carrier-Call & Television
Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 142 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1944).
306. See Small v. Heywood-Wakefield Co., 13 F. Supp. 825, 830 (D. Mass. 1936);
Davis Harvester Co. v. Long Mfg. Co., 252 F. Supp. 989 (E.D.N.C. 1966).
307. Stark v. Cole, 373 S.W.2d 473 (Mo. 1963).
308. Callister v. Callister, 15 Utah 2d 380, 393 P.2d 477 (1964).
309. In re Glenos' Estate, 50 Ill. App. 2d 89, 200 N.E.2d 65 (1964).
310. In Marshall v. Carson, 38 N.J. Eq. 250, 48 Am. R. 319 (1884), executors
who had purchased for themselves land of the estate at a public sale (having breached
their duty to sell the land to pay debts) were held, as to land which had been re-sold
to bona fide purchasers, accountable for profits at the suit of unpaid creditors as well
as beneficiaries.
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The most frequent areas of disloyalty resulting in the administrator's liability to account for his profits are: use of estate funds for
private purposes

;""

purchase for self of claims against the estate;812

purchase of estate assets for self 3l (some allow exception where only
personalty is involved or where the officer is an heir and the sale is
for the purpose of making a distribution of assets) ;114 and use of
decedent's real estate. Under the latter, a few jurisdictions hold him
only for the rental value; and exceptions have been allowed where
the occupation was necessary for the protection of, or accrued to, the
benefit of the estate, as where the heirs, devisees or creditors have
waived their rights to hold him for such occupation. 1 "
Continuation of a decedent's business without legal justification
will carry with it accountability for profits"" as well as loss of compensation.817 But the proper purchase of the business at a valuation by a
corporation formed by the fiduciary does not seem open to criticism. 188
5. Parents and Guardians
Parents. A parent 'has no right, as natural guardian of his child,
to deal with the child's separate property as his own and such action
can lead to a recovery of his profits as a constructive trustee.8 1 1
In a situation where minor children have contributed to the purchase of a home, title being taken by the parent, it seems that whether
or not the parent can be held as a resulting trustee should depend
on the extent to which the amount of the contribution made by each
child can be established.8 20 However, the modern tendency, in situations of this nature, though not involving a parent as defendant, is to
hold the interest of all contributors to be equal if a showing is made
of some substantial contribution by each.8 2 '
311. See In re Doroski's Estate, 29 Misc. 2d 639, 217 N.Y.S.2d 636 (Sup. Ct.
1961) (accountability for sum used plus either interest at highest legal rate or profits
derived from use thereof at plaintiffs' election).
312. See Annot., 128 A.L.R. 917 (1940).
313. See Boyd v. Matthews, 239 Ark. 112, 388 S.W.2d 102 (1965); Erbe v.
Lincoln Rochester Trust Co., 11 N.Y.2d 754, 181 N.E.2d 629, 226 N.Y.S.2d 692 (1962).
314. See 21 Am. JUR. Executors and Administrators § 625 (1939).
315. See Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 243 (1953) ; Annot., 99 A.L.R. 1135 (1935).
316. In re Tannenbaum's Estate, 20 App. Div. 2d 808, 248 N.Y.S.2d 749 (1964);
In re Blaszkiewicz' Estate, 33 Misc. 2d 884, 227 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct. 1962)
(obiter) ; In re Peck, 79 App. Div. 296, 80 N.Y.S. 76 (1903).
317. In re Ridosh's Estate, 5 App. Div. 2d 67, 169 N.Y.S.2d 54 (1957).
318. See Cates v. Cates, 272 Ala. 615, 133 So. 2d 256 (1961).
319. See Easley v. Easley, 117 Okla. 227, 245 P. 831 (1926), holding that where a
parent received a sum of money to buy land for the child and took title in his own
name he held the land as a constructive trustee for the child.
320. Dee v. Sutter, 222 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. 1949).
321. See Stewart v. Bowen, 224 Ark. 275, 273 S.W.2d 540 (1955) ; Merschat v.
Merschat, 1 Ill. App. 2d 429, 117 N.E.2d 868 (1954) ; Paluszek v. Wohlrab, 1 111. 2d
363, 115 N.E.2d 764 (1953); Zahorsky v. Leschinsky, 304 Pa. 368, 147 A.2d 362
; MacDonald
v. MacDonald,
[1957]
2 All
E.R.Repository,
6900 (Ch.).
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There is no reason why the general rule that the value of services
rendered under a mistake as to status can be recovered in quasi contract 8 22 would not extend to enable recovery of the value of services

mistakenly rendered to a person believed to be the plaintiff's parent.
The analogy to the situation of a putative marriage is patent.
Guardians. The ancient variances in the obligation of guardians,
depending on whether they were guardians in chivalry, in socage,
testamentary or appointed by chancery belong to the past. Modern
statutory law typically sets out a uniform pattern of responsibility for
all guardians. 2 ' A guardian's fiduciary status 24 and consequent accountability for profits3

25

is well settled. It is worth noting, however,

that since an inflexiible application of the doctrine forbidding purchase
by a fiduciary of the property of his beneficiary can at times operate
to the prejudice of a ward (as for example where the guardian, as a
friend or relative is willing to pay an inflated price for some asset)
local legislation frequently softens the doctrine insofar as concerns
a guardian.

26

One who takes possession of the assets of an infant without proper
8 27
authority is accountable for his profits as a guardian de son tort.
This doctrine is commonly invoked to estop a defendant who has so
acted from relying on the invalidity of his appointment as a defense
to a suit for an .accounting. 2a A parent can, of course, be made
accountable on this basis if he intermeddles with the child's property
without authority.8 2 9 The usual procedure to obtain an accounting
30
from such a defendant is in equity, and not in the probate courts.
6. Partnersand Joint Adventurers
The Relation, and How it Can Be Established. A joint adventure
is a combination for a specific enterprise in which profit is jointly
sought.88 ' The concept is of comparatively recent development, and
322. See F. WOODWARD, QuAsi
323. See UNIFORM VETERANS'

CONTRACTS § 184 (1913).
GUARDIANSHIP AcT, 38

U.S.C. (1964), as to the

impact of state and federal legislation on guardians.
324. See In re Howard's Estate, 133 Cal. App. 2d 535 284 P.2d 966 (1955);
In re Phillips' Guardianship, 144 Neb. 183, 13 N.W.2d 99 (1944); Meloy v. Nashville Trust Co., 177 Tenn. 340, 149 S.W.2d 73 (1941).
325. See Fant v. Dunbar, 71 Miss. 576, 15 So. 30 (1893) ; In re Clift's Estate,

135 Misc. 4, 237 N.Y.S. 635 (Sup. Ct. 1929).
326. See MODEL PRODAUT CODE § 230(b)
Cal. App. 2d 535, 284 P.2d 966 (1955).
327. See Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 752 (1952).
328. See Harbin v. Bell, 54 Ala. 389 (1875).

(1947); In re Howard's Estate, 133

329. See Pennington v. L'Hommedieu, 7 N.J. Eq. 343 (1848).

330. See Miske v. Habay, 1 N.J. 368, 63 A.2d 883 (1949).
331. Swann v. Ashton, 330 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1964) ; Blackner v. McDermott,
176 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Kuzel v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 20 Wis.
2d 558, 123 N.W.2d 470 (1963).
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the decisions are not yet sufficiently crystallized to admit of an allinclusive definition. 3 2 For the purposes of recovery by one adventurer of profits made by the other, no practical purpose would be served
by separate discussion of joint adventurers and partnership. The same
doctrines control.3 3 The fiduciary nature of the relation is well settled.3 4
To establish the existence of a partnership or joint adventure
relation for the purpose of suits between the parties themselves it is
essential to prove an agreement to enter this relation. 8 5 This may
be shown by implication from the circumstances 8 6 as a reasonable
deduction from the acts or declarations of the parties.3 T It is also
necessary to show that both parties made or undertook to make some
contribution, either of services, 38 property or funds33 9 or any combination thereof8 40 with the object of making a profit.8 4 ' It is not
necessary that the contributions be equal in value.3 4 And, a showing
of a common proprietary interest in these contributions 43 helps to
establish the relation. Some courts also require a showing of an agreement, express or implied, to share losses.8 44 And, some require a
showing of a mutual right of control over the subject matter. 45
332. Davis v. Webster, 136 Ind. App. 286, 198 N.E.2d 883 (1964), holding that

where the nature of the undertaking is such that no losses other than loss of time and
labor are likely, an agreement to share profits may suffice to qualify the relation as
a joint venture. See generally Taubman, What Constitutes a Joint Venture, 41
CORNELL L.Q. 640 (1956).
333. In re Cadillac Oil Co., 227 F. Supp. 397 (S.D. Cal. 1964). See Opco, Inc. v.
Scott, 321 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1963).
334. See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R. 13 (1929).
335. Powers v. Celebrezze, 230 F. Supp. 81 (D.N.D. 1964) (partnership) ; Transit
Equipment Co. v. Dyonisio, 154 Colo. 379, 391 P.2d 479 (1964) (joint adventure not
found where no mutual promises established).
336. Appleman v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 217 F.2d 843 (10th Cir.
1954) ; Woodson v. Gilmer, 205 Va. 487, 137 S.E.2d 891 (1964).
337. ABC Egg Ranch, Inc. v. Abdelnour, 233 Cal. App. 2d 12, 35 Cal. Rptr. 487
(1963).
338. See Heald v. Erganian, 377 S.W.2d 431 (Mo. 1964), holding an agreement
that property should be purchased with the funds of one, who was to take title, on its
sale the profits to be divisible between grantee and another in return for his effort in
negotiating transactions, to be in the nature of a joint venture. But see Escoe v.
Johnson, 110 Ga. App. 293, 138 S.E.2d 330 (1964). See also De Witte v. Calhoun,
221 Cal. App. 2d 473, 34 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1963), holding that the presumption that
joint venturers will share losses as they agreed to share profits inapplicable where
one contributes services only.
339. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949) (partnership).
340. See Pfingstl v. Solomon, 240 Ala. 58, 197 So. 12 (1940).
341. Woodson v. Gilmer, 205 Va. 487, 137 S.E.2d 891 (1964). Though a mere
agreement to share profits is not sufficient, if a purchase is made by persons who are
to resell and divide the profits, a joint venture is created. R.C. Gluck & Co. v. Tankel,
24 Misc. 2d 841, 199 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1960). See also People v. Grier, 53 Cal.
App. 2d 841, 128 P.2d 207 (1942).
342. Rosen v. Losch, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 2d 324, 44 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1965).
343. See Pfleider v. Smith, 370 P.2d 17 (Okla. 1962).
344. Holt v. Queen City Loan & Inv., Inc., 377 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1964) (joint
adventure) ; Hayes v. Killinger, 235 Ore. 465, 385 P.2d 747 (1963) (partnership).
345. See Pearson v. Norton, 230 Cal. App. 2d 1, 40 Cal. Rptr. 634 (1964) (managerial activity essential) ; Anderson v. Walker, 256 Iowa 1324, 131 N.W.2d 524
(1964) (community of power and administration - partnership) ; Holt v. Queen City
& Inv., Inc., 377 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1964) (mutual right of control necessary
Published by Loan
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Evidence which would be helpful -to prove the existence of the
relation, the variety of which -admits of limitless possibilities, would
include a showing of a contractual stipulation, oral or otherwise, relating to profit-sharing; a showing of past transactions in respect
of which defendant has accounted to plaintiff; a showing of negotiations prior to the coming into existence of the relation indicative of
the parties' intent ;346 and a showing that plaintiff never received any
emoluments of any kind for his contribution. 47 It is not necessary to
establish any specific agreement as to how the profits were to be
divided. 48 And although what the parties call themselves is not conclusive,84 9 it is of course highly relevant to prove or disprove their
intent to be associated -as partners or joint adventurers.
Even if the relation cannot be established, the fact situation may
well show that defendant must account for his profits on the basis of
a fiduciary relation having arisen. 350 That is, the status of a fiduciary
or quasi-fiduciary might have arisen even where the relationship has
not been voluntarily assumed by an agreement, express or implied." 3'
Unless the parties were at arm's length, one who acquires property by
reason of an understanding with another as to how he is to use it is
852
readily classifiable as an agent or trustee.
Profits Resulting from Disloyalty. The duty of good faith owed
by partners and joint adventurers to one another is not restricted
to persons who have actually entered into the relationship. It extends
to all stages of their association. Though some have said that with
regard to the preliminary negotiations the rule of caveat emptor
applies and that each may thus secure whatever share in the enterprise
for joint venture) ; Bender v. Bender, 144 Mont. 470, 397 P.2d 957 (1965) ; Pfleider
v. Smith, 370 P.2d 17 (Okla. 1962); Hayes v. Killinger, 235 Ore. 465, 385 P.2d

747 (1963).

346. Cyrus v. Cyrus, 242 Minn. 180, 64 N.W.2d 538 (1954).
347. Receipt of emoluments is not, however, conclusive to disprove the relation.
See Williams v. Herring, 183 Iowa 127, 165 N.W. 342 (1917).
348. See Replogle v. Ray, 48 Cal. App. 2d 291, 119 P.2d 980 (1941); Andrews
v. Bush, 109 Cal. App. 511, 293 P. 152 (1930).
349. See Rubenstein v. Small, 273 App. Div. 102, 75 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1947) (stipulation ignored if relation in fact qualifies). See also Fiesta Foods, Inc. v. Ogden,
245 La. 956, 159 So. 2d 577 (1963) (so-called partnership no partnership absent
essential elements).
350. See Whittle v. Ellis, 122 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1960) (attorneys sharing offices
and secretarial expenses, one doing some legal work for the other for which some
right to compensation undisputed). See generally Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 1420 (1962).
351. See Porter v. Cooke, 127 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1942). But see Jacobs v.
Escoett, 265 App. Div. 111, 37 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1942), holding not to support an
accounting an arrangement whereby one would advance capital plus living expenses of
the other, who would receive half net profit, there being no agreement to share losses.
352. See J. Leo Johnson, Inc. v. Carmer, 38 Del. Ch. 579, 156 A.2d 499 (1959) ;
Skrod v. Martorella, 273 App. Div. 848, 70 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1948); Hilde v. Flood,
81 S.D. 25, 130 N.W.2d 100 (1964).
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he can,8"" the sounder and majority position is that frank disclosure
and honest dealing is required even at this stage."' This is recognized
in the Uniform Partnership Act."'
Proof of bad faith and consequent recovery of profits resulting
therefrom can, by way of illustration, be made by a showing that the
defendant misrepresented the cost of property he was bringing into the
enterprise ;856 or that he sold his interests therein to his colleagues, 57
or purchased their interests in the enterprise58 without making a full
and fair disclosure; or that he derived gains from the secret use of
funds or facilities of the enterprise ;889 or secretly purchased for private
gain assets he should have acquired for the enterprise,860 such as a
right to renew the lease of its premises;361 or that he received secret
commissions from a third party dealing with the enterprise. s6"2
Whether the act of engaging in other activities for gain carries
with it accountability for profits usually depends on the extent to
which these activities are shown to be in competition with the business
of the enterprise. 6 ' Proof that the activity complained of was of a
nature entirely unrelated to the business will usually negative liability.
But this may not be so on a showing that defendant has expressly
or impliedly agreed to devote all of his time to the business of
86 4
the enterprise.
A close question is often presented when defendant, with his
own funds, purchases an asset which would be suitable for the purposes
of the enterprise. Here the test is whether he took advantage of his
fiduciary position in any way. A showing of the following would
be probative of accountability for gains: that the acquisition was within
the contemplated scope of the enterprise; that he refrained from making
a full disclosure to his colleagues; or that the acquisition would have
been of value to the enterprise. 6 5
353. See Haugen v. Neiswonger, 34 Wash. 2d 422, 209 P.2d 267 (1949).
354. Gluck v. Tankel, 24 Misc. 2d 841, 199 N.Y.S.2d 12 (Sup. Ct. 1960).

355. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Ac'r § 21.
356. Wilkins v. Bancroft, 248 Miss. 622, 160 So. 2d 93 (1964) ; Lappas v. Barker,
375 S.W.2d 248 (Ky. 1964).
357. See Creswell v. Keith, 235 Ark. 653, 361 S.W.2d 542 (1962).
358. Smith v. Roberts, 182 Ill. App. 227 (1913) ; see also Osburn v. Haines
Enterprises, Inc., 246 Ore. 614, 425 P.2d 537 (1967), where disclosure was held
a defense.
359. Bassett v. American Motor Co., 20 App. Div. 2d 956, 249 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1964).
360. Pearce v. Ham, 113 U.S. 585 (1885).
361. Ferry v. McNeill, 214 Cal. App. 2d 411, 29 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1963).
362. Posner v. Fink, 167 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1964) ; Liggett v. Lester, 237 Ore. 52,
390 P.2d 351 (1964).
363. See Greenan v. Ernst, 408 Pa. 495, 184 A.2d 570 (1963) ; Singletary v. Mann,
157 Fla. 37, 24 So. 2d 718 (1946).
364. See Dennis v. Gordon 163 Cal. 427, 125 P. 1063 (1912) (obiter).
365. Annot., 44 A.L.R.2d 513 (1955).
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After the enterprise has ended, the duty of loyalty is of course
no longer present.. 6. Any ex-member is free to make full use of information and skills obtained while enagaged in the venture provided
no fraud or infringement on rights which remain preserved can be
shown. But while the enterprise is in process of liquidation obligations
8
of good faith continue.

7

Ordinarily, a partner or joint adventurer required to account
for gains derived from disloyalty -has the right to share in such profit
in the proportion which 'his interest in the enterprise bears 'to the
total assets.168
Accounting of Profits Prior to Dissolution. It is now clearly
settled that a suit to recover profits resulting from a partner's or joint
adventurer's disloyalty can 'be brought without seeking a dissolution. 69
It is a clear exception to the rule370 that no action lies by one partner
against another without a dissolution of the partnership. Where the
wrong is not only a breach of contract, but a tort, and particularly
where the tort is of such a nature -that it terminates the relationship,
wrongfully destroys it and results in the conversion by the defendant
of the entire assets to his use, a suit will also lie in tort if the person

8 71
wronged so elects.

Continuation of Business after Termination But Before Liquidation. The general rule is that when the purpose of the partnership or
joint adventure is fulfilled, or the associates have agreed to put an
end to their relationship, or the -relation is factually terminated for
another reason, such as death, the enterprise must be liquidated and the
assets distributed. Anyone who does continue the enterprise is accountable for the pro rata share of profits so gained which would have
accrued to the others had the relation 'been continued.3 72 A question
which does not seem to have been uniformly settled is whether the
366. Meyer v. Sharp, 341 Ill. App. 431, 94 N.E.2d 510 (1950) (partner).
367. Elliott v. Elliott, 88 Idaho 81, 396 P.2d 719 (1964). Termination of joint
venture does not affect rights vested in an adventurer. De Witte v. Calhourn, 221
Cal. App. 2d 473, 34 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1963).
368. See Annot., 118 A.L.R. 640 (1939).
369. See Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328 (1897); Berg v. King-Cola, Inc.,
227 Cal. App. 2d 338, 38 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1964) ; Snow v. Adamson, 215 Tenn. 341,
385 S.W.2d 759 (1965). Louisana, however, appears to allow of no exceptions to the
rule requiring a dissolution. See Fossier v. American Printing Co., 130 So. 2d 529
(La. 1961) ; Pfeiffer v. Hemisphere Int'l Corp., 153 So. 2d 467 (La. 1963).
370. See Hauke v. Frey, 167 Neb. 398, 93 N.W.2d 183 (1958) ; Weiser v. Burick,
47 Misc. 2d 998, 263 N.Y.S.2d 506 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
371. Boyd v. Bevilacqua, 247 Cal. App. 2d 272, 55 Cal. Rptr. 610 (1966) (joint
adventure).
372. For a discussion of rights in profits earned by partnership or joint adventure
after death or dissolution. See Annot., 80 A.L.R. 12 (1932).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4

48

Douthwaite: Profits and Their Recovery
VILLANOVA

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15 : p. 346

division of profits so acquired must be on the basis of the relative
contribution of the parties to the venture - whether it must be based
on their original agreement. For the first position, it could be argued
that this duty to account is one that the law imposes, and is thus no
longer a consensual one. Therefore it would be unjust to base recovery on an agreement which is dead, or indeed on any other basis
than the extent to which defendant was enriched by the use of plaintiff's
property. If plaintiff had contributed nothing but skills and services
which he ceased to contribute after .the termination, would it be fair
to permit him to continue to participate? For the alternative position,
it could be urged that it is the status created by the original agreement
which is being continued, and to posit the distribution of these profits
on any other basis would be to make a new agreement for the parties;
and further that it would be difficult if not impossible to evaluate
contributions which consist only of labor when applying the "relative
8
contribution" basis.

73

Many courts allow the plaintiff to elect between recovering his
share of the profits or taking the value of his share in the joint enterprise with interest.874 Of course any such election must be as to the
whole. He could not claim surrender of some assets and a share of
the profits as to other post-termination activities. 7 5
The rule allowing profits does not apply where the parties have
expressly stipulated that a withdrawing partner is not to participate
in profits after his withdrawal. 6 It may be helpful as a guide to the
presentation of a suit of this nature to indicate some of the types of
fact situations where a recovery may well be denied as against the
equities. These would probably include a situation where defendant
had been receiving compensation under the agreement, and the profits
he has made do not exceed the amount he would have so received
had the agreement still been alive ;817 where the profits can be shown
to have been derived from some source other than the plaintiff's contribution ;878 or where the plaintiff's contribution is so slight as to be
negligible ;179 or where the profit can be shown to have derived from
the use of assets brought into the enterprise after the actual termination
373.
374.
Vitelli's
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

See Vangel v. Vangel, 45 Cal. 2d 804, 291 P.2d 25 (1955).
Wanderski v. Nowakowski, 331 Mich. 202, 49 N.W.2d 139 (1951); In re
Estate, 196 Misc. 644, 92 N.Y.S.2d 322 (Sur. Ct. 1949).
See Schneider v. Schneider, 347 Mo. 102, 146 S.W.2d 584 (1941).
See Sorokach v. Trusewich, 13 N.J. 363, 99 A.2d 790 (1953).
See Gallivan v. O'Donnell, 54 R.I. 194, 171 A. 911 (1934).
See Vangel v. Vangel, 45 Cal. 2d 804, 291 P.2d 25 (1955).
Hall v. Watson, 73 Cal. App. 2d 735, 167 P.2d 210 (1946).
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to the situation where the
date. Most courts do not extend the rule 880
plaintiff contributed skills and services only.
Election to Share in Profits under the Uniform PartnershipAct.
The Uniform Partnership Act3 8 ' gives a partner, or 'his representative

if he is dead, an election where a business is continued after the death
or retirement of one of the partners. The retiring partner, or the
representative of the decedent partner, can have the value of his interest
at the day of dissolution ascertained and receive as an ordinary creditor
such value, with interest; or, if he so elects, he may recover the profits
attributable to the use of 'his right in the property of the dissolved
partnership.
When the representative of the decedent and the surviving partner
are the same person, he can, in his representative capacity, elect the
first alternative. If he does so, and pays to the estate of the decedent
the value of decedent's interest, those entitled to succeed to the estate
of the decedent partner have no claim for the profits derived from
88 2
the continuance of the business.
It is submitted that the same election is available when the enter8 83
prise does not qualify as a partnership but is merely a joint venture.
However, the retiring adventurer, or the representative of the decedent
adventurer should take care to make his election known promptly.
Otherwise 'he may well 'be faced with a defense of laches, estoppel or
acquiescence when he decides to seek the profits of the enterprise.
7. Corporate Officers
Relationship to Stockholders. Corporate officers of course stand
in a fiduciary relation to the corporation which they serve."8 4 Dominant
or controlling shareholders are similarly regarded as occupying a fiduciary status, although some say to the corporation itself 385 and some
say to the minority shareholders.88 8 Thus a sale of control in breach
of a duty to the minority can carry with it accountability for profits. 8 7
380. See Urzi v. Urzi, 140 Cal. App. 2d 589, 295 P.2d 539 (1956) ; Blut v. Katz,

13 N.J. 374, 99 A.2d 785 (1953).
381. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP Act § 42.
382. Gianakos v. Magiros, 238 Md. 178, 208 A.2d 718 (1965).
383. See Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 1084 (1948).
384. Smith v. Robinson, 343 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Benedict v. Rue, 260 F.2d
97 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Gottlieb v. McKee, 34 Del. Ch. 537, 107 A.2d 240 (1954) ; Gould
v. Jacobs, 44 Misc. 2d 990, 256 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1964); American Discount
Corp. v. Kaitz, 348 Mass. 706, 206 N.E.2d 156 (1965); Binz v. St. Louis Hide &
Tallow Co., 378 S.W.2d 228 (Mo. 1964); Boss v. Boss, 98 R.I. 146, 200 A.2d 231
(1964) ; Shutz v. Resthaven Cemetery, Inc., 375 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. 1964) ; State ex
rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. Keypoint Oyster Co., 64 Wash. 2d 375, 391 P.2d 979 (1964).
385. In re General Economics Corp., 242 F. Supp. 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
386. See Comment, The Fiduciary Relation of the Dominant Shareholder to the
Minority Shareholders, 9 HAST. L.J. 306 (1958).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
387. See p. 399 infra.
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A derivative suit in equity is the usual way in which profits derived
from an abuse of this fiduciary status are recovered for the corporation
itself and not for the shareholders. 8 8 Initially, the complainant must
show that he has exhausted his remedies within the corporate structure."'9 This is done by averring and proving that he has made demand
on the corporation to bring suit to remedy the wrong that has been
done to it and the demand has been declined,89 ° or by establishing
facts which show that such demand would be a futility.3 91 An example
of the latter would be a showing that a controlling majority of directors
is involved in the wrongdoing.89 The corporation, which is actually
the real party plaintiff in interest, must be joined as a party defendant.393
And, a shareholder has no individual right of action for a wrong done to
the corporation unless he can show separate damage to himself as
an individual.8 94 Many courts require the complainant also to show
that he has unsuccessfully sought action on the part of shareholders
unless he can show why such an attempt would be a futility.8 95
In this area, there are a number of problems to which the courts
have not given uniform answers. To remind the practitioner to check
the case and statute law controlling in the jurisdiction in which he
proposes to file his complaint, some of these are listed:
Must the complainant show that he owned stock at the time of
396
the commission of the wrong?

Does this requirement exist when a continuing wrong is involved ?397

Is it material that he no longer owns any stock?8 9
388. Goodwin v. Whitener, 262 N.C. 582, 138 S.E.2d 232 (1964).
389. Davis v. Appalachian Elec. Co-op., 373 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. 1964).
390. Saigh ex rel. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Busch, 396 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1965)
Goodwin v. Whitener, 262 N.C. 582, 138 S.E.2d 232 (1964); Koch v. Seventh St.
Realty Corp., 205 Va. 65, 135 S.E.2d 131 (1964). But see Ash v. Int'l Business
Machines, Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965).
391. See 6 Am. JUR. P1. & Prac. Forms 6:838 (1956).
392. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1917).
393. Blumenthal v. Allen, 46 Misc. 2d 688, 260 N.Y.S.2d 363 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
394. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Peters, 175 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1965). See Henry v.
General Motors Corp., 236 F. Supp. 854 (N.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 339 F.2d 887
2d Cir. 1965); Lee v. Threshermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 26 Wis. 2d 361, 132 N.W.2d
04 (1965).

395. Compare Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), with Saigh ex rel.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Busch, 396 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. 1965).
396. See Datz v. Keller, 347 Mass. 766, 196 N.E.2d 922 (1964).
397. See Wool v. Solar Aircraft Co., 47 Ill. App. 2d 84, 197 N.E.2d 477 (1964).
See also Annot., 72 A.L.R. 62 (1931).
398. See Gresov v. Shattuck Derm Min. Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 569, 243 N.Y.S.2d 760
(Sup. Ct. 1963), holding complainant who had disposed of his stock had no standing
to sue even though he had before trial reacquired some shares.
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Is it material that he acquired stock purely for the purpose of
instituting suit ?19
Is equitable ownership in the stock sufficient ?400
If he acquired the stock as transferee of one who participated in,
acquiesced in or sought to get corporate ratification of the
conduct complained of, does this taint his stock so as to preclude
him from seeking relief ?401
How substantial must his holding be ?402
Is a holding of stock in a parent or holding corporation sufficient ?401
Should guilty or acquiescing stockholders share in the recovery,
as they of course do if the profits are awarded to the corporation,
or can the court in a proper case ensure that they do not share
without jeopardizing the rights of corporate creditors to this
fund ?404
The fiduciary principle is not applied to corporate officers with
all the strictness applied to trustees. Transactions between corporate
officers and the corporation are not impeachable as self-dealing, absent
a showing of unfairness or non-disclosure. Today, for example, transactions between corporations and their subsidiaries with interlocking
directorates are very usual. Such directors are not held accountable
for profits of other contracting entities if they act in good faith and
with reasonable care in the making of policy decisions affecting their
corporation. 0 5 The rule does not, of course, protect them from accountability for an unreasonable exploitation of the assets of one such
corporation to benefit another, however.40 6 A director may deal with
his corporation if at the same time the corporation acts through other
directors or officers in the transaction. In such event the transaction
399. See Annot., 148 A.L.R. 1090, 1101 (1944).
400. See Felsenheld v. Bloch Bros. Tobacco Co., 119 W. Va. 167, 192 S.E. 545

(1937).

401. See, e.g., F4D. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
402. The fact that complainant only holds a trifling share in the corporation may
well indicate that he is bringing the suit for improper motives. Hence, legislation
requiring him to put up security for costs if his holding is below a certain value in
case the suit is unsuccessful is not uncommon. See Kane v. Central Am. Min. & Oil,
Inc., 235 F. Supp. 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) ; Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Peters, 175 So. 2d
54 (Fla. 1965).
403. See Comment, Suits by a Shareholder in a Parent Corporation to Redress
Injuries to the Subsidiary, 64 HARv. L. Rev. 1313, 1314 (1951).
404. See Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955) ; Matthews v. Headley
Chocolate Co., 130 Md. 523, 100 A. 645 (1917); Old Dominion Copper Mining &
Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 203 Mass. 159, 89 N.E. 193 (1909).
405. See Charles v. Epperson & Co., 258 Iowa 409, 137 N.W.2d 605 (1965);
Cummings v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 237 Md. 1, 204 A.2d 795 (1964)
Cheirob, Inc. v. Barrett, 265 App. Div. 455, 39 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1943).
406. Alster v. British Type Investors, 83 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). But see
Shlensky v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960). See
generally Annot., 114 A.L.R. 308 (1938) ; Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 1065 (1954).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4

52

Douthwaite: Profits and Their Recovery
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 15 : p. 346

can be vitiated on proof of unfairness causing injury or proof of bad
faith on either -side.
Examples of the most common situations where a cause of action
can be presented for recovery of profits made by a corporate officer
are the following:
Sale of own property to corporation: Show that there was a
duty at the time of acquisition by the officer to acquire it for the
corporation ;407 or that the corporation was not represented by other
08
officers in the transaction in which it acquired the property.
Contract made with corporation for private gain: Show that the
composition of the board representing the other bargaining "party"
was not properly constituted: e.g., that defendant voted for the
contract as one of this board ;409 if possible, that his vote was not
a redundant one ;410 that others voting were not disinterested ;411
that he concealed material facts, including his interest ;412 that the
transaction was disadvantageous to the corporate interests ;413 or
that the contract was never ratified by the shareholders.4 14
Engaging in similar or competing enterprise: Show that there
was a use of corporate personnel, 415 facilities or funds 416 or
secrets ;417 enticements of customers or personnel of corporation ;418
receipt9 of secret commissions on transactions with the corpora41
tion.

Use of corporate office4 20 or opportunity421 for private profit:

Show that it was a corporate opportunity by showing that the
corporation had been seeking it, that its funds were involved in
its acquisition or that its personnel were used in acquiring it ;422
that it could have been accepted ;423 if it could not have been ex407. Compare Schoff v. Clough, 79 Nev. 193, 380 P.2d 464 (1963), with Lincoln
Stores, Inc. v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941).
408. See Twin-Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury, 91 U.S. 587 (1876); Tevis v. Beigel,
174 Cal. App. 2d 190, 344 P.2d 360 (1959).
409. See Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405,
241 P.2d 66 (1952).
410. See Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C. R.R., 103 N.Y. 58, 8 N.E. 355 (1886).
411. See Keans v. New York & College Point Ferry Co., 17 Misc. 272, 40 N.Y.S.
366 (N.Y. City Ct. 1896).
412. See Schemmel v. Hill, 91 Ind. App. 373, 169 N.E. 678 (1930).
413. As to a showing that the plaintiff has made a better bargain than it would
have from a stranger as defeating profit recovery, see Robinson v. Briar, 412 Pa. 255,
194 A.2d 204 (1963).
414. See Gottlieb v. McKee, 34 Del. Ch. 537, 107 A.2d 240 (1954).
415. See Lincoln Stores v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941).
416. See Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
417. See Wilkins v. M. Ascher Silk Corp., 207 App. Div. 168, 201 N.Y.S. 739
(1923), aff'd, 237 N.Y. 574, 143 N.E. 748 (1924).
418. See Lincoln Stores v. Grant, 309 Mass. 417, 34 N.E.2d 704 (1941).
419. See Bird Coal & Iron Co. v. Humes, 157 Pa. 278, 27 A. 750 (1893).
420. See Hendricks v. Wall, 277 S.W. 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
421. Hubbard v. Pape, 2 Ohio App. 2d 326, 203 N.E.2d 365 (1964).
422. See Durfee v. Durfee & Canning, Inc., 323 Mass. 187, 80 N.E.2d 522 (1948).
423. See Xum Speegle, Inc. v. Fields, 216 Cal. App. 2d 546, 31 Cal. Rptr. 104
(1963).
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ploited for lack of funds, that defendant made no effort to obtain
necessary financing;424 that defendant acquired the opportunity
while about the corporate 5 business or was selected to exploit the
42
opportunity as its agent.

Insofar as not controlled by statute, the old -rule was that a corporate officer was not accountable to a shareholder for profits made
by a purchase, and re-sale at a gain, of stock of the corporation without
a showing of fraud or at any rate misrepresentation.4 2' Today, however, the trend is otherwise. A fact picture presenting many, if not
all, of the following features stands an excellent chance of imposing
liability: non-disclosure to the selling shareholder of facts relating to
the value of the stock ;427 access to inside information available to
defendant ;428 instigation by him of the transaction ;429 failure to fully
acquaint plaintiff shareholder with the true financial picture where he
lacked the skills of the ordinary market manipulator ;40 use of a straw
man or dummy to conceal identity of the buying corporate officer. 4 '
The picture would of course be incomplete without mention of
the federal legislation 8 2 which permits recovery by a corporation
or by any security owner on its behalf, any profit made by a corporate
officer or by a more than ten percent beneficial owner on "short-swing"
transactions. Here, there need be no showing that defendant made use
of inside information."
Although the volume of litigation - and
no doubt the amount of wealth that has been diverted into corporate
424. See Lipkin v. Jacoby, 42 Del. Ch. 1, 202 A.2d 572 (1964). See generally
Little Rock Towel & Linen Supply Co. v. Independent Linen Serv. Co., 237 Ark. 877,

377 S.W.2d 34 (1964) ; Industrial Indem. Co. v. Golden State

Co., 117 Cal. App. 2d

519, 256 P.2d 677 (1953) ; Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch. 479, 121 A.2d 919 (1956)
Henry's Drive-In, Inc. v. Anderson, 37 Ill. App. 2d 439, 185 N.E.2d 103 (1962)
Highway Ins. Co. v. Korman, 40 Ill. App. 2d 439, 190 N.E.2d 124 (1963) ; Foley v.
D'Agostino, 21 App. Div. 60, 248 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1964); Samia v. Central Oil Co.,
337 Mass. 101, 158 N.E.2d 469 (1959) ; Gauger v. Hintz, 262 Wis. 333, 55 N.W.2d
426 (1952).
425. For a discussion of the accountability of corporate directors or officers for
profits from activities beyond the corporate powers, but involving the use of information and opportunities available to them by reason of their position in the corporation,
see Annot., 153 A.L.R. 665 (1944). There must be shown a tie-in between the
property in dispute and the business of the corporation before an opportunity can be
held to have been seized. Equity Corp. v. Milton, 42 Del. Ch. 425, 213 A.2d 439 (1965).
426. Compare Yax v. Dit-Mco, Inc., 366 S.W.2d 363 (Mo. 1963), with International Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Holloway, 368 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1963).
427. Compare Reed v. Riddle Airlines, 266 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1959), with Strong
v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1908).
428. See Fox v. Cosgriff, 66 Idaho 371, 159 P.2d 224 (1945).
429. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1908).
430. See Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (1932).
431. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1908).
432. See Securities Exchange Act §§ 10, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(j), 78(p) (1964).
See also Public Utility Holding Company Act § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 79(q) (1964);
Investment Company Act § 30(f), 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-29(f) (1964).
433. See Blau v. Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir. 1965).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4

54

Douthwaite: Profits and Their Recovery

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

15 : p. 346

coffers - is tremendous,484 it is of too specialized a nature to be proper
for discussion in a general survey of profit-recovery doctrines.
Profits Derived by Controlling Stockholders from Sale of Control.
Control stock, for various reasons, often sells for a better price
than the ordinary market price. Although holders thereof, whether
corporate officers or not, are ordinarily entitled to sell for whatever
price they can realize, they can be made to account for profits when
the sale can be shown to have been in abuse of a fiduciary relation.
The theory underlying this fiduciary status of the controlling stockholder is sometimes said to be that control itself is a corporate asset
in which all stockholders are entitled to participate.4 3
Examples of fact situations probative of this abuse of fiduciary
relation are various. Among them would be a showing that the
defendant sold at a premium to a purchaser he knew, or may fairly
be presumed to have had good reason to know, would "loot" the
corporation;480 and the fact that an officer resigns from office within
a very short time after the transaction is indicative that the price he
received included a reward for his surrender of control. A showing
that he did not disclose, or misrepresented to plaintiff minority shareholders the price he was receiving is also probative of the abuse.487
Also probative would be a showing that he persuaded plain'tiff to
let him handle the sale of plaintiff's stock, misrepresenting that he
would sell it for the same price that he was to receive for his own
4
control stock. 31
It has been suggested that the judicial reluctance to impose a
general rule of liability in these cases is properly overcome only where
the circumstances of the transaction point to a reasonable likelihood
48 9
of economic detriment and damages have actually been sustained.
Promoter's Profits. The promoter of a corporation stands in a
fiduciary relation to the corporation, 440 to its stockholders 44' and to
44 2
those persons who it is anticipated will buy stock in the future.
434. For the case law up to the year 1953 regarding Securities Exchange Act
provisions concerning liability of directors, officers, and principal stockholders for
profits on short-swing speculation in corporations' stock, see Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d
1346 (1955).
435. See Dunnett v. Ar, 71 F.2d 912 (10th Cir. 1934).
436. See Levy v. Feinberg, 29 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1941), rev'd, 38 N.Y.S.2d
517 (1942).

437. Sautter v. Fulmer, 258 N.Y. 107, 179 N.E. 310 (1932).
438. Stanton v. Hample, 272 F. 424 (9th Cir. 1921).

439. See Comment, Sale of Corporate Control and Theory of Overkill, 31 U. CI.

L. Rxv. 725 (1964).
440. Davis v. Las Ovas Co., 227 U.S. 80 (1913) ; Lomita Land & Water Co. v.
Robinson, 154 Cal. 36, 97 P. 10 (1908); Brewster v. Hatch, 122 N.Y. 349, 25 N.E.
505 (1890) ; Wilson v. McClenny, 262 N.C. 121, 136 S.E.2d 569 (1964).
441. Hayward v. Leeson, 176 Mass. 310, 57 N.E. 656 (1900).
Published by Villanova
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As a theoretical abstraction, however, it is true that the promoter can
emerge with a bulging wallet and no liability to account for profits44
by floating his corporation with an independent board of directors
who transact with him after a full disclosure, or by procuring ratification of the transaction by every stockholder. There is no reason why,
in such an arm's length transaction, he cannot drive as hard a bargain
as he can get.444 Ordinarily, however, it should not be difficult to
show that he has in some way influenced this "independent" body he
has himself selected to exploit 'his project. But if the body was truly
independent, it seems that the corporation cannot recover his profits
even if later subscribers, non-recipients of the non-disclosure, can
show injury. 445 To this, however, the qualification should be added
that if, at the time this full disclosure was made, the intent of the
corporation was to invite the public to subscribe for shares, there is
authority to support a corporate recovery of the promoter's profits on
the theory that the corporation presently suing (embracing uninformed
newcomers) and not the original corporation, is the body that has
been wronged.

44 6

Those who have gone to the trouble and expense of forming a
corporation to exploit some advantage they have acquired are often
not content to make a full disclosure, pocket their profits and retire
from the scene. In addition to the legitimate reward for their activities
to which they are indeed entitled 447 they very naturally want, for
a time at least, to remain on the inside and get the most that they
can get out of the enterprise they have brought into corporate existence.
Many and varied are the devices used to achieve this purpose. Whatever it be, the usual result is to enable them to acquire, on the basis
of being paid an exaggerated price for their contribution to the enterprise, a block of stock which they can either market at a profit or
exploit through the control it gives them to the detriment of innocent
purchasers of the stock which has been so diluted.
Can they ever be accountable for profits when they, as promoters,
have acquired the entire capital stock as the only members of the
corporation? As long as they remain the sole members, the corporation clearly cannot have an action. It -is said that the corporation
is estopped by its consent to or ratification of the transaction com443. Frick v. Howard, 23 Wis. 2d 86, 126 N.W.2d 619 (1964).
444. Burbank v. Dennis, 101 Cal. 90, 35 P. 444 (1894); Densmore Oil Co. v.
Densmore, 64 Pa. 43 (1870).
445. See Downey v. Byrd, 171 Ga. 532, 156 S.E. 259 (1930).
446. Compare Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 188 Mass.

315, 74 N.E. 653 (1905), with Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v.
Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206 (1908).
447. See Hayward v. Leeson, 176 Mass. 310, 57 N.E. 656 (1900).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
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plained of.448 More soundly, perhaps, it can be said that no disclosure
is needed when one deals with oneself, or that a person cannot owe
a fiduciary duty to himself or cannot defraud himself. 449 But where
the promoters constituted the entire personnel of the corporation at
the time of the profitable transaction, and it can be shown that they
intended later to enlarge its membership by inviting public subscriptions, a strong argument can be made that the corporation can, when
so enlarged, recover on the theory that it is to this presently existing
corporation that the fiduciary duty was owed. Perhaps even a stronger
case can be made for recovery at the suit of the victimized newcomers. 50
Measure of Recovery. When a promoter is held accountable for
his profits must he account for the difference between the price he
paid (plus the value of his services) and the price he received from
the corporation, or merely for the difference between the market value
at the time of the transaction of what he furnished and the price he
received? A decree for the former figure, which may well be a lot
higher than the latter, is likely to follow if it can be established either
that he had, at the time of its acquisition, formulated in his mind the
promotion scheme,4 5' or that he had selected the prospective personnel
of the proposed corporation.452 Possibly a mere showing that he had
acquired the asset for the purposes of a re-sale would suffice.455 The
test is whether he was occupying a fiduciary status at the time he made
the acquisition. 54 A showing that he misrepresented the amount he
had paid would also strongly influence a decision that he must account
for his entire profit.455
It should be noted that when he receives payment in stock, the
test of the value of the price so received is its market value at the
time of its receipt and not its par value.45 6
448. See Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Bigelow, 188 Mass. 315,
74 N.E. 653 (1905).
449. For a discussion of the liability of a promoter to a corporation on account of
profits as affected by fact that all outstanding stock was held by promoter or by
persons who knew the facts, see Annot., 85 A.L.R. 1262 (1933).
450. See Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co. v. Lewisohn, 210 U.S. 206
(1908), dictum of Justice Holmes declining to rule as to whether the new members
had a personal claim, though denying recovery to corporation itself.
451. See McCandless v. Furlund, 296 U.S. 140 (1935).
452. See Pietsch v. Milbrath, 123 Wis. 647, 102 N.W. 342 (1904).
453. See Gluckstein v. Barnes, [1900] A.C. 240 (England).
454. See Densmore Oil Co. v. Densmore, 64 Pa. 43 (1870); Henderson v.
Plymouth Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 347, 141 A. 197 (1928).
455. See Victor Oil Co. v. Drum, 184 Cal. 226, 193 P. 243 (1920); Frick v.
Howard, 23 Wis. 2d 86, 126 N.W.2d 619 (1964).
456. See
Hayward
v. Leeson,
Mass.
310,Digital
57 N.E.
656 (1900).
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As to who may sue for the recovery of a promoter's profits, suit
can be brought either by the corporation itself,45 by its receiver on
behalf of its creditors,45 or by injured shareholders. 459
8. Other Situations of Possible Fiduciary Status
Flexibility of the "Fiduciary" Concept. "Fiduciary" status, abuse
of which grounds a suit for profits, is not restricted to trustees, executors, guardians and others labeled "true" fiduciaries. Some say that
a fiduciary or confidential relationship - the terms being regarded as
synonymous - exists wherever one has reposed confidence in another.
They extend it to physician, priest, and all others bound by ties of
intimacy and trust.46 If defendant is not a "true" fiduciary, it is
sounder, however, to insist on a showing that the one who has gained
the confidence of the plaintiff purported to act or advise with the other's
interests in mind.4 ' Mere respect for another's judgment or trust in
his integrity, which proves to have been misplaced, should not be
enough to qualify a relationship as fiduciary or confidential. Most
business deals involve a repose of confidence to some degree in the
other party to the transaction; and without a showing that the trusting
party had reason to believe the trusted party was acting in the other's
interest, and not his own, even the advanced mores of today hardly
seem to warrant imposing the status of a fiduciary on such a reposant
of confidence.462
However, the authorities do not entirely support this. The courts
studiously avoid confining the concept of a confidential relationship
within the strait-jacket of any strict definition. This is of value in
that it enables them to keep the law in line with changes in the contemporary ethical codes; but it has the unhealthy effect of shrouding
deals involving large sums of money with an element of uncertainty.
Conduct which one chancellor may well regard as a trivial out-smarting
457. See Piggly Wiggly Delaware, Inc. v. Bartlett, 97 N.J. Eq. 469, 129 A. 413

(1925).

458. See McCandless v. Furlund, 296 U.S. 140 (1935).
459. See Di Tomasso v. Lovero, 250 App. Div. 206, 293 N.Y.S. 912, aff'd, 276
N.Y. 551, 12 N.E.2d 570 (1937) (plaintiff as sole injured stockholder). See also
Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1363 (1926).
460. See Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 243 F. Supp. 793 (N.D. Ohio
1965), holding complaint by patient alleging defendant insurer to have induced
physician to divulge confidential information states a cause of action. Whether the
privileged character of physician-patient communications can render them analogous
to the res of a trust, however, as suggested, seems highly questionable. Winker v.
Robinson, 36 Misc. 2d 804, 233 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Peoples First Nat'l
Bank v. Ratajski, 399 Pa. 419, 160 A.2d 451 (1960).
461. A confidential relation exists between two persons when one has gained the
confidence of the other and purports to act or advise with the other's interest in mind.
RZSTATXM4NT Ol RESTITUTION § 166, comment d at 676 (1937).

462. See Snow v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 309 Mass. 354, 35 N.E.2d 213 (1941),
holding that the mere existence between businessmen of mutual respect and confidence
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
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by a person at arm's length with another may, in the eyes of another
court, be construed as a breach of a confidential relation carrying with
it, through the medium of a constructive trust, the heavy burden of
accounting for profits. The courts of California have headed the field
in their readiness to find constructive fraud.4"' Though some difference in levels of judicial morality is inevitable, firm insistence on the
requirement that plaintiff must have reasonably believed defendant to
have been acting in plaintiff's interest, and not his own, would help
to make this branch of our remedial justice more predictable.
By reason of the very flexibility of the fiduciary concept, and of
the practical importance for the purpose of profit-recovery of a showing of abuse of a confidential relation, representative examples are
presented below, first of the more conservative holdings in this area,
then of the more liberal and very possibly the currently favored view.
Examples of the Restrictive Approach. Many courts indicate
that the mere existence of a moral,46 4 domestic46 5 or blood4 66 relation-

ship is not sufficient to warrant its classification as "fiduciary" for the
purpose of profit-recovery doctrines. They require a showing of confidence reposed on the one side and domination or influence on the other.
And, where the relationship is merely a business one, proof must
be presented to show that plaintiff reposed more trust in defendant
than is ordinarily the case in a single business transaction.46 7 Mere
failure to perform a contractual obligation is not regarded as fraud or
463. See Berg v. King-Cola, Inc., 227 Cal. App. 2d 338, 38 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1964) ;
Ornbaum v. Main, 198 Cal. App. 2d 98, 17 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1961) ; Gross v. Needham,
184 Cal. App. 2d 446, 7 Cal. Rptr. 664 (1960); Kent v. First Trust & Say. Bank,
101 Cal. App. 2d 361, 225 P.2d 625 (1950) ; Estate of Arbuckle, 98 Cal. App. 2d 562,
220 P.2d 950 (1950) ; Bolander v. Thompson, 57 Cal. App. 2d 444, 134 P.2d 924 (1943).
The California view is statutorily based: "Every one who voluntarily assumes a
relation of personal confidence in another is deemed a trustee . . . not only as to the
person who reposes such confidence, but also as to all persons of whose affairs he
thus acquires information which was given to such person in the like confidence, or
over whose affairs he, by such confidence, obtain any control." CAL. Civ. CODX § 2219
(West 1954). For the purposes of CAL. CIV. CODg § 2224 (West 1954), which
provides that one who gains a thing by fraud is an involuntary trustee, a constructive
fraud issuing from breach of an oral promise by a promisor who occupies a confidential
relationship with promisee is sufficient. Briggs v. Nilson, 226 Cal. App. 2d 342, 38
Cal. Rptr. 68 (1964).
464. See Watldns v. Mertz, 83 Ga. App. 115, 62 S.E.2d 744 (1950).
465. Brown v. Bryant, 220 Ga. 80, 137 S.E.2d 36 (1964)
Hoinacki, 394 Ill. 47, 67 N.E.2d 204 (1946).

(brothers) ; Moneta v.

466. See Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 913 (1959) (first cousins).
467. See Thompson v. Mobil Producing Co., 163 F. Supp. 402 (D. Mont. 1958),
holding that a complaint alleging defendant employee, a geologist, given confidential
data by plaintiff option-holder, to have advised him that the oil prospects for the
property involved were bad, and to have later enabled his employer to acquire this
land by "converting" this information states no cause of action absent any allegation
he imparted
information
wrongfully,
or participated
the acquisition of the
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abuse of confidence.40 Thus the mere fact that an employee's remuneration is to be based on a proportion of the employer's profits is held
not to render the latter a fiduciary for the purpose of presenting 4 a9
case for an accounting in equity when a discovery can be had at law.

Where plaintiff, anxious to enlist the co-operation of a defendant
whose credit rating would be helpful, gave him information about the
finances of a business and how it could be acquired (there being nothing intrinsically confidential about this) the proof was held insufficient
for a finding of a confidential relationship. 7 Similarly, mere negotiations for a joint purchase, without any repose of confidence shown,
have been held to not preclude a negotiator from acquiring the property for himself. 7 ' Some hold that even a banker does not make
himself a fiduciary by giving advice to experienced business men.472
Leading among the jurisdictions taking this more conservative
approach is Massachusetts, where one employed to buy land for another can buy it with his own funds without being held as a constructive trustee. 78 Consistent with this, one who is employed merely
to appraise goods and advise as to the price at which plaintiff should
buy can buy the goods himself with impunity, even if he lied as to
their value.47 4 Mutual respect and confidence does not make a business
relationship fiduciary. 5 However, even in Massachusetts, a construc468. Security Nat'l Bank v. Educators Mut. Life Ins. Co., 265 N.C. 86, 143 S.E.2d
270 (1965). An agreement whereby a distributor advances funds to a producer and
is to have the right to distribute the products and recoup himself out of the profits,
though it imposes a limited duty to account, does not create a "fiduciary" relationship. Fleischer v. W.P.I.X., Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 17, 213 N.Y.S.2d 632 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
A contract whereby plaintiffs, in return for a share of profits, licensed defendant to
use its name, prestige, and prior experience in sales in relation to Mothers' Day,
defendants being permitted to represent themselves as, or acting for, plaintiff does
not establish a fiduciary relationship. National Committee on Observance of Mothers'
Day, Inc. v. Kirby, Block & Co., 17 App. Div. 2d 390, 234 N.Y.S.2d 432 (1962).
Allegations that plaintiff was promised a royalty interest in any likely prospect lease
he disclosed, that he pointed out some excellent prospects, that some of these were
acquired by defendant, do not state a cause of action for the imposition of a constructive trust absent a showing of a fiduciary relationship existing before, and apart
from, the agreement. Karnei v. Davis, 409 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1966). An agreement
that after purchasing land defendant will re-sell to plaintiff does not create a fiduciary
relationship. Mortell v. Beckman, 16 Ill. 2d 209, 157 N.E.2d 63 (1959) ; Atkinson v.
Atkinson, 225 N.C. 120, 33 S.E.2d 666 (1945).
469. Nieberding v. Phoenix Mfg. Co., 31 Ill. App. 2d 350, 176 N.E.2d 385 (1961).
470. Paul v. North, 191 Kan. 163, 380 P.2d 421 (1963).
471. Appleman v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 217 F.2d 843 (10th Cir.
1954) ; Beckett v. Pierce, 157 Fla. 184, 25 So. 2d 486 (1946).
472. Lonsdale v. Speyer, 174 Misc. 532, 19 N.Y.S.2d 746 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
473. See Berenson v. Nirenstein, 326 Mass. 285, 93 N.E.2d 610 (1950), where,
however, the court declined to extend this to a broker who, having told plaintiff
stock was available and offering to buy it as his agent, bought it for himself. The
status of broker apparently made the difference. But see Hamberg v. Barsky, 355
Pa. 462, 50 A.2d 345 (1947), holding a mere undertaking to acquire a lease for another
creates a confidential relation.
474. Salter v. Beal, 321 Mass. 105, 71 N.E.2d 872 (1947).
475. Cranwell v. Oglesby, 299 Mass. 198, 12 N.E.2d 81 (1937).
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
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tive trust will be decreed where information confidentially given has
been misappropriated for gain.""
Liberal Approach. In courts taking a less restrictive approach
to the fiduciary or confidential concept, though the necessity of a showing of confidence reposed and abused is not ignored, far more weight
is placed on the existence of a moral, 477 social, 478 domestic,

479

or even

business 480

relation between the parties. The origin of the confidence
reposed, often said to be immaterial,4 8' seems in fact to be highly instrumental in contributing to the proof that confidence was reposed in
the defendant. Thus when it is sought to establish a defendant accountable for his gains by reason of his abuse of a confidential relation, the
more complete the evidentiary picture of the relations of the parties,
the better. Factors such as if they have known each other a long time,
if their families have exchanged visits, if they have had previous
business deals or have done favors for each other in the past all contribute towards proving whether there was a confidence reposed.
Information disclosed by the plaintiff is viewed as having great weight;
some holding that a confidential relationship automatically arises when,
during negotiations, plaintiff discloses facts about his business or as
4 2
to the know-how of a process he uses.
The significant difference between a technical fiduciary relation
and a confidential relation is one of proof. If the defendant is a true
fiduciary, the fact that a confidence was reposed and abused is, for
practical purposes, established by showing the profitable transaction.
If he is not a true fiduciary, the burden of proving both these elements
43
is on the plaintiff.
476. Barry v. Covich, 332 Mass. 338, 124 N.E.2d 921 (1955) ; Horn Pond Ice Co.
v. Pearson, 267 Mass. 256, 166 N.E. 640 (1929). See Broomfield v. Kosow, 349 Mass.
749, 212 N.E.2d 556 (1965), holding that though a mere repose of confidence does
not render a business association fiduciary in nature, such a status may arise where
the reposee knows of the reposant's reliance on his truthfulness.
477. See Nelson v. Dodge, 76 R.I. 1, 68 A.2d 51 (1949) ; Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d
638 (1948).
478. See Dalakis v. Paras, 86 Cal. App. 2d 243, 194 P.2d 736 (1948) (friends);
Wenger v. Rosinsky, 232 Md. 43, 192 A.2d 82 (1963) (landlady and semi-invalid);
Hamberg v. Barsky, 355 Pa. 462, 50 A.2d 345 (1947) (neighbors).
479. Tichonchuck v. Orloff, 36 Misc. 2d 623, 233 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct. 1962)
(spouses) ; Dombrowski v. Tomasino, 27 Wis. 2d 378, 134 N.W.2d 420 (1965).
480. Carroll v. Caldwell, 12 Ill. 2d 487, 147 N.E.2d 69 (1957); Funderburg v.
Shappert, 24 Ill. App. 2d 566, 165 N.E.2d 543 (1960) (banker, knew family 30 years).
481. Dormay Construction Corp. v. Doric Co., 221 Md. 145, 156 A.2d 632 (1959);
Sojourner v. Sojourner, 247 Miss. 342, 153 So. 2d 803 (1963).
482. See Heyman v. A.R. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584 (2d Cir. 1963); Speedry
Chemical Products, Inc. v. Carter's Ink Co., 306 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1962) ; Schreyer
v. Casco Prods. Corp., 190 F.2d 921 (2d Cir. 1951) ; Hoeltke v. C.M. Kemp Mfg. Co.,
80 F.2d 912 (4th Cir. 1936).
483. See Hyman v. Regenstein, 258 F.2d 502 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 913 (1959) ; Smith v. Smith, 222 Mass. 102, 109 N.E. 830 (1915).
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Fiduciary de son Tort. The power of a court to impress a con48 4
structive trust on the proceeds of wrongdoing knows no limit.
Thus anyone who without authority assumes the management of any
property can be made to account for the profits derived therefrom as
a trustee de son tort.4 5 This doctrine is most commonly invoked,
however, against one who without authority intermeddles with the
87
6
estate of a decedent, 4 with the subject matter of an express trust

88
or who without authority assumes the role of a guardian.
The practical impact of this doctrine needs little emphasis. If
the defendant has made a profit from the use of plaintiff's property
and no possible ground for presenting a case for equitable relief, such
as the need for an injunction or the complexity of the accounts can
be presented, it should simply be pleaded that, as an intermeddler, he
has become a constructive trustee who should be made to account
for his profits.48 9

Investment Advisers. An investment adviser must disclose to his
clients a practice of buying-in stocks for himself shortly before recommending their purchase as long-term investments and then re-selling, so
profiting by the market raise resulting from the client's purchase. Such
a person is a fiduciary and his conduct, whether or not it would support an action of deceit, warrants "equitable or prophylactic relief."4 '
It is entirely possible, therefore, that if it could be established that
his profit resulted from the specific breach of his duty to the plaintiff,
a case for the recovery of his profits would be presented. 49' However,
484. See Katzman v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 309 N.Y. 197, 128 N.E.2d 307 (1955),
denying summary judgment in a suit by a widow for the proceeds of her husband's
life insurance, brought against named beneficiary on the ground of the husband having
fraudulently induced her to pay the premiums and having changed the beneficiary
without notice to her.
485. See United States v. North State Lumber Corp., 54 F. Supp. 825 (E.D.S.C.),
aff'd, 141 F.2d 1020 (4th Cir. 1944), holding that one who wrongfully collects rents
belonging to another can be made a constructive trustee thereof. See also Ex porte
Morton, 261 Ala. 581, 75 So. 2d 500 (1954).
486. See Johnston v. Johnston 256 Ala. 485, 55 So. 2d 838 (1951); Pryor v.
Downey, 50 Cal. 388, 19 Am. R. 6 96 (1875) ; Saliba v. Saliba, 202 Ga. 279, 42 S.E.2d
748 (1947).
487. De Korwin v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 84 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Ill. 1949);
Putnam v. Lincoln Safe Deposit Co., 191 N.Y. 166, 83 N.E. 789 (1908), holding life
beneficiary accountable to remainderman as trustee de son tort.
488. See p. 389 supra.
489. See Bevels v. Hall, 246 Ala. 430, 21 So. 2d 325 (1945) holding that wrongful
assumption of control of property and receipt of profits therefrom is ground for the
imposition of a constructive trust.
490. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180 (1963). See also SEC
v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 87 F.2d 446 (2d Cir.
1937), holding that when one gives advice to buy stock under circumstances leading
recipient to believe the advice is disinterested, suppressing the fact of adviser's -own
interest, recipient is imposed on and deceived. In SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 300 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 375 U.S. 180 (1962),
injunction was denied for want of proof.
491. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171
(1933) ; Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
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the fact that the trustee of an investment fund is the same person as
the adviser does not present a "self-dealing" situation and does not
4 2
violate the Investment Company Act. 1
Though a fiduciary may not, of course, sell his office for gain,
this does not apply to an investment adviser because the controlling
statute specifically provides for the termination of the contract in
such event.498
Bailees. Though at one time a bailment was described as a delivery of goods in trust, clearly it is not strictly a trust. Title remains
in the bailor.49 4 However, the rule which imposes on a trustee the
burden of fully disclosing all transactions attacked extends to a bailee
as a quasi-trustee.498
If a bailee has wrongfully profited from the use of the chattel or
has sold it, a cause of action can be presented on the basis of a quasi-.
contract. If, on the other hand, plaintiff seeks to present the suit on
the theory that a constructive trust was established, a confidence reposed and abused must be shown496 since a bailee, as such, is not a
fiduciary.497 A mere showing that he had functions to perform with
the chattel, though it may well be enough to form a basis for injunctive relief498 or even a mandatory injunction to restore it to plaintiff, 499
is probably not enough to establish an equitable duty to account for
profits." 0 "Just as the butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker
do not occupy a fiduciary relation toward every customer who has too
much faith in human nature or is too busy or too careless . . .to count
Act of 1940, 28 Gao. WASH. L. lRv. 214 (1959) ; Shulman, Civil Liability and the
Securities Act, 43 YALM L.J. 227, 242 (1933).
492. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. (1964). See Saminsky v. Abbott, 41 Del. Ch. 320,
325, 194 A.2d 549, 551 (1963), wherein the court considered that to appoint a receiver

for this reason until the fund is freed of its "conflict of interest" would "invite an

excursion into a judicial never-never land." See also 51 CALIF. L. Rev. 232 (1963);
37 S. CAL. L. REv. 359 (1964).
493. SEC v. Insurance Securities, 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1958).
494. Compare Monarch Buick Co. v. Kennedy, 138 Ind. App. 1, 209 N.E.2d 922
(1965), with Leach v. Sanborn State Bank, 203 Iowa 401, 212 N.W. 694 (1927).
495. Ursitti v. Swid, 71 N.Y.S.2d 208 (N.Y. City Ct. 1947), holding plaintiffs
entitled to pre-trial examination to discover what bailee knew about allegedly converted goods regardless of where onus of proof of conversion lay.
496. See Hollywood Motion Picture Equip. Co. v. Furer, 16 Cal. 2d 184, 105 P.2d
299 (1940), holding allegations that an inventor handed to defendant patterns for
manufacture of castings for his invention, and that defendant sold castings made by
him in competition with plaintiff, stated a cause of action.
497. See Young v. Mercantile Trust Co. 140 F 61, aff'd, 145 F. 39 (2d Cir.
1906) ; Ashley v. Denton, 11 Ky. (1 Littell) 6 (1822) ; Thompson v. Whitaker Iron
Co., 41 W. Va. 574, 23 S.E. 795 (1895).
498. See Wood v. Rowcliffe, 3 Hare 304, aff'd, 2 Ph. 382 (1847), enjoining
defendant from disposing of non-unique chattels handed to her "as agent."
499. See J. POMEROY, SPZCIFIC PERFORMANCZ § 14 (3d ed. 1926), stating that to
distinguish this from agency would be refining technicality to an absurd degree.
500. But see Montgomery v. United States, Nat'l Bank, 220 Ore. 553, 349 P.2d
464 (1960), where the court, using the language of constructive trust, impressed a
lien, to the extent of the bailor's interest, on the proceeds of a hypothecation of
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his change," so also the mere agreement of a bailee to count the goods,
keep records and issue regular statements does not establish any "repose
of confidence" necessary to establish a confidential relation.5 '
Escrow Holders. Whether the escrow consists of money or of
some instrument, an escrow holder is not technically an agent of either
party to the transaction until the event occurs which terminates the
escrow relation.50 ' But he is a fiduciary for both.5"'
When an escrow holder is entrusted with funds with an obligation
to produce a like sum on the termination of the escrow, can the parties
claim a preference on his bankruptcy? Early authority holds him to
be a mere debtor. 5°4 But later authority takes the position that if the
money can be "traced" it does not vest in the bankrupt's trustee; it is
rather, held on the terms of the escrow agreement. 505 It would, however, be logical to say tracing doctrines cannot be used to give them
a preference unless he is either a bailee or a trustee.
The question then remains whether an escrow holder who misuses
the fund to make a profit can be made to account for it. Despite an
early holding that a stakeholder is not accountable for profit made
from the use of money entrusted to him,"0 it is submitted that the
fiduciary status of the escrow holder would render him so accountable.
Whether recovery could be had by the depositor of the fund or by the
person for whom the funds are intended on the happening of the event
should, if the analogy of the risk of loss through embezzlement is
applied, depend upon when the profit was made.50 7 Logically, if the
proof shows the gains to have been made partly before the event terminating the escrow and partly after, they should be divided proportion501. Johnson v. Bugle Coat, Apron & Linen Serv., 191 Md. 268, 60 A.2d 686 (1948).
502. RESTATHMENT (SEcoND) or AGENCY § 14D (1957).
503. Colonial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Redwood Empire Title Co., 236 Cal. App. 2d
186, 46 Cal. Rptr. 16 (1965); Amen v. Merced County Title Co., 58 Cal. 2d 528,
375 P.2d 33, 25 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1962) ; Squire v. Branciforti, 131 Ohio St. 344, 2 N.E.2d
878 (1936) ; Holmes v. McKey, 383 P.2d 655 (Okla. 1963). The creation, as part of
a partnership agreement, of a reserve fund to meet possible claims, to be divided
between partners on termination of the partnership, renders the holder of the fund
a fiduciary. Suit for an accounting of such funds is thus equitable and not a suit for
breach of contract for the purposes of a statute of limitations. Whitehouse v. Pine,
163 F. Supp. 888 (E.D.N.Y. 1958).
504. See Squire v. Nally, 130 Ohio St. 582, 200 N.E. 840 (1936).
505. Gulf Petroleum, S.A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257 (1st Cir. 1963) ; Scully v.
Pacific States Say. & Loan Co., 88 F.2d 384 (9th Cir. 1937) (where escrow instruction spelled out that bank was to be a depository only and that its duties were to
be limited to safe keeping) ; Higgins v. Kittleson, 1 Ariz. App. 244, 401 P.2d 412
(1965) (stating escrow holder to be trustee) ; Burket v. Bank of Hollywood, 9 Cal. 2d
113, 69 P.2d 421 (1937) (where the payment, called an "escrow check" was treated as
a special deposit title to which did not pass to the bank) ; Gillett v. American Say.
Bank, 210 Iowa 497, 258 N.W. 99 (1935); Squire v. Branciforti, 131 Ohio St. 344,
2 N.E.2d 878 (1936).
506. Harington v. Hoggart, 109 Eng. Rep. 902, 906-07 (K.B. 1830).
507. See Foster v. Elswick, 176 Ark. 974, 4 S.W.2d 946 (1928); Hildebrand v.
Beck, 196 Cal. 141, 236 P. 301 (1925) ; Angell v. Ingram, 35 Wash. 2d 582, 213 P.2d
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
944 (1950).
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ately. But, in view of the possible inequity in having the measure of
recovery rest on a circumstance of so fortuitous a nature, perhaps the
courts would allow an equal division of the profits.
Pledgees. A pledgor cannot be heard to deny the equitable rights
of the pledgee in the pledge.5 0 Though it seems anomalous to regard
one enjoying equitable rights as a fiduciary for the holder of the legal
rights, such is the situation between pledgor and pledgee. Mutual
obligations of a fiduciary nature are involved. 09 By reason of this
fiduciary status a pledgee cannot purchase the subject matter at a
nonjudicial sale absent statutory authority or consent of the pledgor,
the conflict between interest and duty being apparent.5 10 In the event
of such an improper purchase the pledgor, if he chooses to ratify, can
hold the pledgee liable for the fruits of the transaction."'
The duty of the pledgee, absent contrary agreement, to account
for the increase or profit accruing to him as a result of his possession
of the chattel 12 is now established as a fiduciary one5 15 even though
it was not always regarded as such in early times.514 On this basis,
there is little room for doubt that if he has profited by a misappropriation of the pledge the profits can be recovered. 15
Mortgagee in Possession. In jurisdictions which still cling to
the title theory of a mortgage, the mortgagee theoretically has the
right to possession. He seldom exercises this right because, due to his
duty to account for the rents and profits and to keep the property in
repair, possession is more of a burden than a benefit unless it is
essential to protect 'his security."" Some title theory states now do,
however, deny this right to possession"'T and in a lien theory state the
mortgagee may acquire the right to possession by the terms of the
mortgage.
508. In re Pan American Life Ins. Co., 88 So. 2d 410 (La. 1956).
509. See Annot., 79 A.L.R. 201 (1931).
510. Linker v. Batavian Nat'l Bank, 244 Wis. 459, 12 N.W.2d 721 (1944).
511. See Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1381 (1954).
512. RtSTATEMtNT OP SECURITY § 27 (1941).
513. See Melnek v. County Trust Co., 192 N.Y.S.2d 38 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (complexity of accounts also presented); Thomas v. Waters, 350 Pa. 214, 38 A.2d 237
(1944) (accounting of profits to pledgor's executor against recipients from pledgee).
514. See Wade v. Markwell & Co., 118 Cal. App. 2d 410, 258 P.2d 497, 37 A.L.R.2d
1363, describing pledgee as "akin to a fiduciary"; L. JoNns, THit LAW or PLEDGSS
§ 398 (1883), citing authorities using the language of quasi contract to explain this
liability; Annot., 32 Am. St. R. 711, 724, where the right to an accounting in equity
seems to be restricted to situations where there is a complexity in the accounting
situation.
515. South Shore Thrift Corp. v. Nat'l Bank, 276 N.Y. 465, 12 N.E.2d 546 (1938).
516. See Carter v. McHaney, 373 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. 1963).
517. See Williams v. Marmor, 321 11. 283, 151 N.E. 880 (1926) ; Stewart v.
Fairchild
BaldwinCharles
Co., 91
N.J. School
Eq. 86,of 108
301 Repository,
(1919).
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When in possession, the mortgagee is regarded as a quasi-trustee
of the rents and profits he receives."" s He must apply them in reduction,
first of interest on the debt, and then of principal;19 and this duty
can be enforced by a subsequent or junior lienor. 520 Many states
require him to account on an annual basis so that any surplus receipts
over interest due can be deducted from the principal debt and thus
5 21
reduce the interest payable thereon for the ensuing year.
When he acquires the property at a sale after foreclosure any
accountability to the mortgagor or to junior lienors is of course
5 22
ended. He then holds as owner.

Life Tenants. A life tenant is regarded as occupying a fiduciary
relation to the remaindermen. 23 He must not use the property in
such a way as to reduce the value of the estate of those to come after
him.5 2 4 If he does so, he can be made to account for his profits

25

if

the remedy at law is inadequate or equity is given jurisdiction because
an injunction is sought. 526 If, however, the property contains a mine,
well or the like which was in operation at the time his estate commenced,
527
If
he need not account for profits derived from its exploitation.

the remainder is a contingent one, though it is entirely possible that
the remainderman could get an injunction against threatened acts
of waste, to allow him damages or profits would be an absurdity.
Co-remaindermen owe similar fiduciary duties to each other.
Co-tenants. At common law, and in most jurisdictions absent
special circumstances such as the use of the land for mining or farming,
a co-tenant is not accountable for his own use of the premises so held
except to the extent that he actually receives more than his proportionate share of its rents and profits from a third person. 28 Though
518. Southern Creosoted Lumber Co. v. Morales, 113 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1959) ; May
v. Jeter, 245 S.C. 529, 141 S.E.2d 655 (1965).
519. Miami Gardens v. Conway, 102 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1958).
520. Id. For a discussion of the duty of a mortgagee to account for rents and
profits or for use and occupation for benefit of the owner of equity of redemption or
a junior lienor, see Annot., 46 A.L.R. 139 (1927).
521. See Moshier v. Norton, 100 Ill. 63 (1881) ; Walter v. Calhoun, 88 Kan. 801,
129 P. 1176 (1913) ; Lynch v. Ryan, 137 Wis. 13, 118 N.W. 174 (1908).
522. Kurz v. Pappas, 116 Fla. 324, 156 So. 737 (1934).
523. Perkins v. First Nat'l Bank, 221 Ga. 82, 143 S.E.2d 474 (1965) ; Morehead v.
Harris, 262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174 (1964).
524. See In re Helmers' Will, 236 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sur. Ct. 1962) (stock).
525. Anstays v. Anderson, 194 Mich. 1, 160 N.W. 475 (1916). See also Annot.
45 A.L.R. 519 (1926).
526. See State ex rel. Tillman v. District Court, 101 Mont. 176, 53 P.2d 107 (1936).
527. See Kimbark Exploration Co. v. Von Lintel, 192 Kan. 791, 391 P.2d 55 (1964),
holding this doctrine to be unaffected by the UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME AcT,
K.S.A. §§ 58-901 - 58-913 (1964).
528. See Annot., 27 A.L.R. 184 (1923) ; Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 388 (1952). Compare
In re Owen's Estate, 36 Misc. 2d 1031, 234 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sur. Ct. 1962), with
Brannon v. Adkins, 7 Ohio 1, 216 N.E.2d 71 (1966), holding that the rule that a
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol15/iss2/4
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there is some difference of opinion, it seems sound to apply the same
rule to receipts derived from materials taken from the land, provided
5 29
the defendant can set-off the value of his labor.
There is often said to be no trust relationship between co-tenants
as such. 3 0 However, if one seeks to recover a share of the gains made
by co-tenant, he might do so by trying to establish the existence of
an agency - that defendant had agreed to operate the property so
held for their mutual profit and so stands in a fiduciary relationship. 53'
Further, when the parties have derived their estate from the operation of the laws of succession, whether through a will58 2 or by in-

testacy,138 the modern trend is to decree an accounting on the basis of
53 4

a fiduciary relation.

In the area of recovery of profits, it is settled that a co-owner of
a copyright may use the work or license a third person to use it without the consent of the others, but he must share his profit.58 5 As to
tenants by the entireties, local statutes should be consulted. 8 6
tenant in common who has sole possession must account for the reasonable value of
the others' right to user can be modified by express agreement.
529. See Annot., 40 A.L.R. 1400 (1934) ; Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 1368 (1948).
530. Britton v. Green, 325 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1963).
531. Id. See Carter Oil Co. v. Crude Oil Co., 201 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1953),
holding that if one co-tenant comes into possession of funds belonging to his
co-tenant, he then stands in a fiduciary relation with respect thereto.
532. See Minion v. Warner, 238 N.Y. 413, 144 N.E. 655 (1924); Goergen v.
Maar, 2 App. Div. 276, 153 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1956).
533. Hunt v. Hunt, 261 N.C. 437, 135 S.E.2d 195 (1964).
534. See Wood v. Wright, 238 Ark. 941, 386 S.W.2d 248 (1965); American Oil
Serv. v. Hope Oil Co., 233 Cal. App. 2d 822, 61 Cal. Rptr. 209 (1961) ; Arcemont v.
Arcemont, 162 So. 2d 813 (La. 1964); Tomchak v. Hendricks, 370 Mich. 143, 121
N.W.2d 409 (1963).
535. See Krendell v. Moscow, 20 Misc. 2d 551, 194 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. 1959),
holding that allegations that plaintiff and defendant agreed to share the profits of a
book in the writing of which they collaborated, and that defendant had contracted
with a publisher for publication on a royalty basis without disclosing plaintiff's interest would not state a cause of action for an accounting of profits against the
publisher, but could support a cause of action against the individual defendant on a
basis of joint venture. Because the rule operates to facilitate the dissemination of
works owned by more than one person without ordinary detriment to the others, the
revisers of the copyright law do not recommend a change. See REPORT O THP
REGISTZR Or COPYRIGHTS ON THE COPYRIGHT

LAW RtvisIoN 88

(1961).

But see

Knpferman, Copyright Co-owners, 19 ST. JOHN'S L. Rzv. 95 (1945), wherein the
writer suggests that, as long as the co-owners have an equal opportunity to dispose
of the rights involved, and in the absence of fair dealing it would be reasonable to
allow them to retain their own profits, and that if they would have it otherwise they
can do so by contract. It would probably be more reasonable, however, to view the
situation as one in which they must have impliedly agreed that any gains derived
from the exploitation of their joint toil are to be shared.
536. See also Vai v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 56 Cal. 2d 329,
364 P.2d 247 (1961) ; College Point Say. Bank v. Tomlinson, 42 Misc. 2d 1061, 249
N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. 1964) ; Sirianni v. Sirianni, 14 App. Div. 2d 432, 221 N.Y.S.2d
693 (1961) ; Tannis v. Tannis, 213 N.Y.S.2d 320 (Sup. Ct. 1961). As to fiduciary
principles applicable to personalty held in co-tenancy, see Haller v. White, 228 Md.
505, 180 A.2d 689 (1962) ; Silfen v. Simon, 215 N.Y.S.2d 571 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
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Holders of Governmental Office. The fiduciary status of governmental employees,53 7 officials of political subdivisions5 3 or administrative commissions 3 9 and their consequent accountability for profits
resulting from self-dealing is axiomatic. Although a taxpayer's action
is commonly the remedy, injunctive relief may be sought against misconduct of this nature,54 ° with the proper party plaintiff in a suit for
profits being the governmental entity the defendant serves. 41 However, a taxpayer's suit has been allowed for this purpose.542
Since a public officer's liability for funds with which he is entrusted is in many states an absolute one, many jurisdictions do not
hold him accountable for interest derived from the investment unless
the use of the funds amounts to a misappropriation. However, even
where there is no controlling statute, the majority and sounder view
is to hold him accountable for interest. 43
There is some authority for recognition of a correlative fiduciary
duty on the part of the public doing business with public officers to deal
fairly and frankly with such officers. 44 And, since the federal labor
law has imposed a fiduciary type responsibility on officers of labor
organizations 45 a showing of a breach of this duty will also support
a recovery of profits. 4 6
537. See United States v. Carter, 217 U.S. 286 (1910) ; United States v. Drum,
329 F.2d 109 (1st Cir. 1964) (Department of Agriculture poultry inspector) ; Bishop
v. United States, 266 F.2d 657 (5th Cir. 1959) (employee of War Assets Administration Regional Office).
538. See Hulgan v. Glenhill, 207 Ga. 349, 61 S.E.2d 473 (1950) ; Warren County
v. Elmore, 250 Iowa 398, 93 N.W.2d 756 (1958); Aldom v. Borough of Roseland,
42 N.J. Super. 495, 127 A.2d 190 (1956) (borough councilmen); Riddlestorffer v.
Rahway, 82 N.J. Super. 423, 197 A.2d 883 (1964) (city councillors) ; Town of Troy
v. American Fidelity Co., 120 Vt. 410, 143 A.2d 469 (1958) (town treasurer).
539. Mills v. Town Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 144 Conn. 493, 134 A.2d 250
(1957).
540. See Terry v. Bender, 143 Cal. App. 2d 198, 300 P.2d 119 (1956) (injunction
against payment of compensation to city attorney whose official conduct was alleged to
be permeated with self interest).
541. See Lenhoff, The Constructive Trust as a Remedy for Corruption in Public
Office, 54 COLUM. L. RIv. 214 (1954).
542. See Brewer v. Hawkins, 241 Ark. 460, 408 S.W.2d 492 (1966).
543. See Annot., 5 A.L.R.2d 257 (1949) ; see also Annot., 104 A.L.R. 1402 (1936).
544. See Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 86 A.2d 201 (1951),
holding accountable for profits members of a syndicate who engineered a sale to a
political entity through the use of influence and political prestige.
545. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 § 501, 29 U.S.C.
§ 501 (1964).
546. Local 163 v. Watkins, 417 Pa. 120, 207 A.2d 776 (1965).
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